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1.1. Core concepts used in the thesis 
Imagine that you are sitting in a train absorbed by a good book and suddenly you hear a 
mother shouting angrily at her child: “Tim, you are going to annoy the other 
passengers!” You automatically look into the direction of where the event has just taken 
place, just as many other passengers probably would.  
Apparently, the mother’s utterance constitutes a powerful acoustic social 
signal that is even being processed by your brain when you not intend to. Note that the 
salience of the utterance is not determined by what the mother is saying (i.e., the content 
of the words she is using) but how she is saying it. For instance, the mother could have 
pronounced exactly same words but with different acoustic characteristics to indicate 
her surprise or sadness with the fact that Tim is annoying the passengers in the train. 
This thesis is concerned with the question what network in the human brain processes 
such acoustic properties of speech, how it does so, and why the network sometimes 
continues to process these acoustic properties even when we do not pay attention to 
them.  
The succession of the vowels and consonants that make up words (and longer 
structures) are called segments. We have seen in the example above that it is not the 
segments of speech that explain how Tim’s mother conveyed her anger, because with 
the same sequence of words she can convey various emotional meanings. The 
communicative layer of speech that uses the acoustic characteristics that cannot be 
explained by the mere succession of segments has been termed ‘prosody’ in linguistics 
(e.g., Rietveld & Van Heuven, 2009; Hardcastle, Laver, & Gibbon, 2010). The term 
‘prosody’ can roughly be translated from Greek as ‘with (pros) the song (oide)’ or ‘the 
musical accompaniment to vowels and consonants that make up the utterance’ (Van 
Heuven & Sluijter, 1996). Indeed, because this ‘musical accompaniment’ appears to be 
superimposed on the segmental layer of speech, prosodic aspects of speech have also 
been called ‘suprasegmentals’ in linguistics (Lehiste, 1970; Rietveld & Van Heuven, 
2009). Note that, fundamentally, ‘prosody’ therefore is negatively defined (anything that 
it is not segmental).  
Prosody has various communicative functions (Rietveld & Van Heuven, 2009) 
that seem to be fundamentally different in nature. On the one hand, as we have seen in 
the example above, prosody can be used to convey emotional information. Banse and 
Scherer (1996) provide a widely accepted definition of ‘emotion’, i.e. ‘an episode of 
temporary synchronization of all major subsystems of organismic functioning 
represented by five components (cognition, physiological regulation, motivation, motor 
expression and monitoring-feeling) in response to internal or external events of major 
importance to the organism.’ Note further that one key characteristic of emotion, and 
hence of emotional prosody, is that it is dimensional - Tim’s mother can express her 
anger to a certain degree to sound more or less angry. Another key aspect of emotion is 




that emotions can be qualified as positive or negative (they have ‘valence’) with respect 
to the organism experiencing emotion. A last key aspect of emotional processing, which 
we will return to, is that emotions can signal importance of information with respect to 
the well-being of the organism. This has the implication that accurate perception of 
emotional prosody is likely to have had ‘fitness value’ according to Darwin’s theory of 
evolution – it increases the probability of passing on one’s genetic material. For 
instance, the ability to accurately decipher a dominant group member’s angry mental 
state, and thereby avoiding harm due to physical conflict, is likely to have increased 
chances of survival and having offspring in our evolutionary past (and, incidentally, it 
probably still does today). This fitness value of accurate emotional prosody perception 
renders it likely that the emotional prosody perception network in the human brain has 
evolved quite early in human evolutionary history and thus is a genetically programmed 
system that we share with other mammals (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). 
On the other hand, prosody can also be used to convey ‘linguistic’ 
information. For instance Tim’s mother could pronounce the sentence “Tim, you are 
going to annoy the other passengers?” with a rising tone at the end of the utterance to 
indicate that an utterance is a question rather than a statement of fact (Rietveld & Van 
Heuven, 2009). When used linguistically, by definition, prosody conveys information 
regarding the linguistic structure of the utterance. This means that linguistic prosody 
conveys information relevant to the abstract rules of language, or in other words, the 
grammar – phonology, syntax and semantics. Another example of linguistic prosody 
that will be studied in this thesis is the placement of stress. For instance, by placing 
stress on the first syllable of the word ‘export’ (bold indicates a stressed syllable) versus 
the second syllable ‘export’ word meaning changes (from a noun to a verb). Notice 
again that the segmental layer of speech is identical – it is the suprasegmental 
characteristic of speech (i.e., linguistic prosody) that is indispensable in deriving word 
meaning. A key characteristic of linguistic (grammatical) contrasts is that they are 
categorical in nature (Ladd & Morton, 1997; Van Heuven & Kirsner, 2004), i.e., employ 
categories that obey the grammatical rule system. For instance, if we look at stress, a 
syllable either has or does not have stress. Further, stress on the second syllable of the 
word ‘neural’ (bold indicates the stressed syllable) is grammatically incorrect. Note that 
this categorical nature of linguistic prosody is in contrast to the dimensional character 
of emotional prosody. Further, note that, by definition, linguistic prosodic contrasts are 
language-specific, whereas at least some aspects of emotional prosody perception have 
been shown to be culturally (and linguistically) indifferent or ‘universal’ (Van Bezooijen, 
Otto, & Heenan, 1983; Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001), which, incidentally, would 
also be expected if the underlying emotional prosody perception network is indeed 
‘hard wired’. Last, notice that while emotional information has valence, linguistic 
information does not – for instance, placement of stress cannot be called positive or 
negative, further underscoring the fundamentally different nature of these two prosodic 
communicative functions.   
What acoustic dimensions then, does the prosodic layer of speech use to 
convey emotional and linguistic meaning? Careful analysis of various acoustic 
dimensions such as F0 (pitch), intensity (loudness), duration, spectral distribution 
(timbre) and the dynamics of these parameters in time, suggest that different vocal 
emotions have specific ‘acoustic profiles’, meaning that different emotions use a 
specific set of values along these dimensions (Banse & Scherer, 1996). Turning to 
linguistic prosody, the exact acoustic dimensions that are important in conveying 
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meaning depend on the precise linguistic function (e.g., indicating the mode of a 
sentence, phrase boundary marking or stress). However, when we zoom in on the 
linguistic prosodic function that will be studied in this thesis, i.e. linguistic stress, it 
turns out that stressed syllables differ from unstressed syllables in multiple acoustic 
dimensions – stressed syllables have higher F0 (pitch), longer duration, greater intensity 
(loudness) and spectrally more extreme realizations than unstressed syllables (Rietveld 
& Van Heuven, 2009). In the present thesis, I will examine what neural network 
analyzes these two communicative functions of prosody, and how (i.e., using what 
series of neurocognitive operations).  
 Imagine again that you are sitting in the train being absorbed by a good book 
and suddenly turning your gaze into the direction of the mother who had just expressed 
her anger towards her son. This simple observation tells us something very interesting 
about emotional prosody perception – apparently, the network in your brain analyzes 
the emotional prosody even when you do not intend to. Further, the network 
apparently even manages to divert your attention away from your book to devote full 
attention to the emotional prosodic signal, as is evidenced by the turning of your head. 
In experimental psychology, such mental operations that occur even when you not 
intend to, are called ‘automatic’. More specifically, automatic processes are 
psychological processes that occur when there is no intention to process, can continue 
to operate under low levels of attention, are efficient (rapid) and are hard to control 
once initiated (Moors & De Houwer, 2006).  
 Why would processing of anger prosody be automatic? As we have already 
touched upon, Darwin’s theory of evolution could provide an explanation. As pointed 
out earlier, accurate processing of social signals such as anger likely has had fitness 
value in our evolutionary history (Silk, 2007) – avoiding the wrath of an angry dominant 
male by accurately deciphering its angry mental state may have meant the difference 
between life and death. If true, selective pressure on accurate emotional prosody 
perception would have caused evolution of a ‘hard wired’ (i.e., genetically programmed) 
network dedicated to the perception of emotional prosody (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). 
Indeed, the perception of at least some emotional categories as communicated through 
the voice are ‘universal’, meaning that members of distant cultures (e.g. Koreans and 
Japanese) can recognize emotional meaning expressed by (for instance) Dutch speakers 
and vice versa (Scherer et al., 2001; Van Bezooijen, Otto, & Heenan, 1983). Such 
universality of a capability suggests that it sub-served by a biological substrate that is 
under genetic control. Thus, the existence of a hard-wired dedicated neural network can 
explain automaticity of emotional prosody processing, particularly for emotional 
prosody that would signal danger (such as anger and perhaps fear). In the present thesis, 
I will examine whether such a specialized neural system exists in the human brain. 
 If automatic processing of emotional prosody can be explained by an evolved 
dedicated neural system, what about the processing of a much more recently invented 
artificial acoustic signal that can powerfully convey emotions? Ask anyone why one 
listens to music and within a couple of seconds some reference to emotional states will 
be used. Also, who would not be moved by Johann Sebastian Bach’s Kunst der Fuge? 
Clearly then, music, just like ‘the music of speech’ (prosody), has a powerful capacity to 
convey emotion. One hypothesis, the ‘superexpressive voices hypothesis’, even links 
the two together – music would be such a powerful acoustic medium to convey 
emotions because it mimics and then exaggerates the characteristics of emotional 
prosody, acting as a supranormal stimulus (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008) and eliciting strong 




emotions in the audience by ‘emotional contagion’ (imitation of the emotional 
expression by the listener). A clear difference between music and prosody, however, is 
that music is an artificial signal. More specifically, it has been defined as ‘intentionally 
created non-linguistic acoustical events structured in time and produced in social 
contexts’ (Altenmüller, Kopiez, & Grewe, 2013). Thus, if automaticity of emotional 
processing can be explained by a dedicated neural system that has (probably) evolved 
before there was any music, we would not expect automatic processing of emotional 
music. On the other hand, there is some evidence that recognition of at least some 
emotional categories in emotional music is universal (Fritz et al., 2009), pointing to a 
potential fitness value of music perception in evolutionary history and potentially a 
dedicated neural system for automatic perception of emotional music, too. Alternatively, 
music may mimic emotional prosody so well that it engages the system dedicated to 
automatic processing of emotional prosody (Peretz, Aubé, & Armormy, 2013). To shed 
some light on these issues, I will directly compare perception of emotional prosody and 
emotional music in this thesis and explore whether automaticity of processing can be 
demonstrated.  
 Finally, people do not only show similarities in the way their brains process 
emotional prosody and emotional music, but they also display differences in affective 
processing style (Canli, 2004). In this thesis, we will focus on a personality trait that is 
associated with affective processing style, called ‘alexithymia’. Alexithymia can be 
translated literally as ‘having no words (alexi) for feelings (thymia)’. It is a personality trait 
that is associated with difficulty in identifying emotions (Sifneos, 1973). People who 
score in the clinical range on alexithymia have severe difficulty recognizing, identifying 
and verbalizing emotions. Due to these problems, alexithymic people may be regarded 
as ‘cold’ or ‘distant’ by their social environment, resulting in social problems. Not much 
is known about the neural processes underlying alexithymia. Further, most previous 
brain research on alexithymia has focused on how alexithymia influences neural 
processing of emotion in the visual modality (i.e., through facial expression). In the 
present thesis I will therefore explore whether, and if so how, alexithymia modulates 
activity in the emotional prosody perception network. Due to practical limitations 
however, only modulation by alexithymia in the non-clinical (normal) range will be 
examined.  
Before we turn to neurocognitive models of emotional prosody perception 
and modulation of emotional prosody perception by alexithymia, I will briefly discuss 
the methods used in this thesis to answer the questions raised.  
 
1.2. Methods used in the thesis 
1.2.1. Behavioral methods 
How can behavior inform us about the neural network involved in prosody perception? 
Two behavioral approaches that have been used widely in the past to study the neural 
processing of prosody, and that will be used in this thesis, can provide us with such 
information. These two approaches dominated research into how the brain processes 
prosody in the early days of the field, when there were no neuroimaging techniques 
available yet.  
 The first behavioral approach uses knowledge of the anatomy of the auditory 
system to inform us about whether one hemisphere is more capable at (or ‘specialized 
in’) processing prosody than the other cerebral hemisphere. Auditory information from 
the ears projects to both the same cerebral hemisphere as the side of acoustic input (the 
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ipsilateral side) as to the hemisphere at the opposite side (the contralateral side). 
However, it can be shown that if we simultaneously stimulate both ears with highly 
competing different sources of auditory information (which is called ‘dichotic’ 
stimulation), it is primarily projected contralaterally (see Davidson & Hugdahl, 1995). If 
in such a ‘Dichotic Listening (DL) task’ a stimulus is presented to the ear contralateral 
to the specialized hemisphere, the specialized hemisphere can process it immediately. If 
the stimulus is presented to the ear contralateral to the unspecialized hemisphere, 
however, it either has to be processed sub-optimally by the unspecialized hemisphere or 
cross the corpus callosum to reach the specialized hemisphere, causing degradation of 
the stimulus representation or a time delay, respectively (Grimshaw, Kwasny, Covell, & 
Johnson, 2003). Therefore, if behavioral performance is systematically superior with 
stimulation to one of the ears, this is indicative of superiority (‘hemispheric 
specialization’) of the contralateral cerebral hemisphere at the perception task, e.g. 
perceiving prosody. 
 The second approach is the ‘lesion-deficit’ approach, which is one of the 
oldest research methods of neurology. It is grounded in the basic logic that if a certain 
neural structure is necessary for a certain mental capacity, damage to this structure should 
result in performance deficits in that mental domain as compared to controls without 
damage to the structure. Thus, in the case of prosody perception, comparing 
performance of patients with damage to structures hypothesized to be necessary for 
prosody perception to the performance of undamaged controls on the same prosody 
perception task, can inform us about what neural structures are indeed crucial for 
prosody perception.  
 
1.2.2. Neurophysiological methods 
An obvious approach to finding out what neural network is involved in prosody 
perception would be to directly observe brain activity while the brain is engaged in the 
processing of prosody. Indeed, with the development of neuroimaging techniques this 
has become possible and these methods have become standard tools of cognitive 
neuroscience. Two of such techniques will be used in the present thesis.  
 Brain cells communicate with each other through electrochemical signals. 
Although these electric potentials are very small (in the order of magnitude of micro-
volts), with sufficient amplification the concerted electrical activity of groups of 
neurons can be measured at the scalp using electrodes (e.g. Luck, 2005). However, the 
brain is always active, so if we were to use this electroencephalography (EEG) 
technique while people are listening to prosody, how would we know what activity is 
related to prosody perception and what activity is not? By repeating a prosodic stimulus 
many times and averaging the electrical activity immediately after this ‘event’ over many 
such trials, the electrical activity not associated with the prosody perception process 
averages out and we are left with the averaged electrical brain wave that is associated 
with the perception of the prosodic stimulus – the Event Related Potential (ERP). The 
shape and distribution over the scalp of these ERPs can inform us about the nature of 
the prosody perception process.  
 Brain cells need energy to generate electrochemical signals. Neurons acquire 
energy by using oxygen to metabolize glucose into Adenosine Tri Phosphate (ATP). 
Thus, when neurons are active, the blood surrounding these neurons will have relatively 
low oxygen content, while blood surrounding less active neurons will have relatively 
high oxygen content. It can be shown that blood low in oxygen has slightly different 




magnetic properties than oxygen-rich blood. This magnetic consequence of brain 
activity is called the Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) response to brain 
activity. Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) takes advantage of the BOLD response to 
infer brain activity. A participant is placed in a strong magnetic field, for instance while 
listening to prosody. Areas of the brain that are involved in prosody perception will 
consume more oxygen to generate activity than areas that are not involved in prosody 
perception, causing differences in distortion of the magnetic field depending on levels 
of brain activity. By measuring these small differences in the magnetic field, we can 
infer which areas were active when the participant was listening to prosody (e.g. see 
Jezzard, Matthews, & Smith, 2001). Because with this type of magnetic resonance 
imaging we can make inferences about brain function, it has also been called functional 
MRI (fMRI).  
 Note that these two neurophysiological methods can be seen as 
complementary to the lesion-deficit method to study the neural correlates of prosody 
perception. While the neurophysiological methods tell us what neural structures are 
sufficient for the perception of prosody, the lesion-deficit approach tells us which of 
these structures are necessary for prosody perception. Further, ERPs and fMRI can be 
seen as complementary too, as the first has high temporal (but low spatial) resolution 
while the latter has high spatial (but low temporal) resolution. In other words, while 
ERPs can inform us about when brain activity changes, fMRI can tell us where activity 
changes during prosody perception. 
 
1.2.3. Quantitative meta-analysis 
When the research for this thesis was initiated, there was already a large body of 
literature available that had used the lesion-deficit approach to study the neural network 
involved in prosody perception, but no clear conclusion had been reached. Therefore, it 
was decided that potentially more insight could be gained by re-analyzing and 
synthesizing the existing literature, rather than to set up yet another primary lesion 
study. Indeed, quantitative meta-analysis can provide new insights into existing 
literature by quantitatively combining the effects found in individual published studies 
(e.g. Hedges & Oklin, 1985). For instance, in the case of lesion-deficit studies, this 
would imply for every study computing the effect of damage to a neural structure on 
performance as compared to performance of subjects without brain damage. 
Subsequently, all the effect size estimates of individual studies are weighted by 
measurement precision and then combined into an overall effect size estimate. Through 
the combined sample size of all primary studies sampled, meta-analysis can test crucial 
hypotheses in a field with much higher statistical power than individual studies. Further, 
new insights can be gained by examining which factors - varying across studies - 
influence the overall effect size (which individual studies, by definition, cannot test).  
 Similarly, a significant body of fMRI literature into the network involved in 
emotional prosody perception had already accumulated when the research for this 
thesis was initiated. Thus, by quantitatively combining the results of these MRI studies, 
we could, at least in theory, infer with comparably high statistical power which neural 
network is involved in emotional prosody perception. A problem with fMRI results, 
however, is that they generally provide a set of locations of activation in the brain and 
no one obvious effect size that can be used for quantitative research synthesis. 
Therefore, in recent years a meta-analysis method has been developed that only uses 
the coordinates of activation of all individual studies to quantitatively synthesize fMRI 
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research findings. At the core of this technique lies an algorithm that, based on all the 
activation coordinates provided by the primary studies, estimates for every location in 
the brain whether there is a better-than-chance association of that location with the 
mental operation (in our case prosody perception) studied. Such ‘Activation Likelihood 
Estimation (ALE-) meta-analysis’ (Laird et al., 2005) has become a mainstream tool in 
quantitatively synthesizing neuroimaging research.  
 
1.2.4. Combined approaches to study automatic perception of emotional prosody 
In the first section of this introduction we discussed the possibility that perception of 
emotional prosody (and perhaps emotional music) might be relatively automatic 
because of the existence of a hard-wired system dedicated to its perception. But how 
can we study whether automatic neural processing of emotional prosody perception 
really exists?   
 The example that we started with provides a clue as to how we could 
investigate automatic processing of emotional prosody. If we can show that a neural 
system continues to be engaged in the processing of emotional prosody processing 
even when attention is directed at something else (in the example we used, being 
absorbed by a good book), this is evidence that the processing of emotional prosody by 
that neural structure is automatic (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 
2003). In this thesis we will similarly divert attention away from emotional prosody 
while we record brain activity using fMRI to see what structures in the brain might 
process emotional prosody automatically.  
 Recall that another aspect of ‘automaticity’ is that automatic processes are very 
fast (Moors & De Houwer, 2001). The so-called ‘affective priming paradigm’, 
developed by Fazio (2001) takes advantage of this attribute of automaticity to study 
whether an affective stimulus is being processed automatically. With this paradigm first 
positive (e.g. ‘happy’) or negative (e.g. ‘sad’) prosody is presented. Almost immediately - 
200 milliseconds (ms) - later, a target word is presented that is either positive (e.g. 
HEALTH) or sad (e.g. PAIN) and participants are asked to decide as quickly as 
possible whether the word is positive or negative. If the emotional prosody is indeed 
processed rapidly (within 200 ms), it should be able to affect the speed of the response 
to the target words. If so, we expect responses to be slower for target words that are 
affectively incongruent with the primes (e.g., happy prosody – PAIN) than for 
congruent primes (e.g., sad prosody – PAIN). In this thesis, the affective priming 
paradigm will be used to study whether such rapid processing of emotional prosody 
(and perhaps of emotional music) can be demonstrated.  
When the work for this thesis was initiated, there were two competing 
explanations for the nature of such rapid affective priming effects. On the one hand, it 
had been proposed that affective priming effects (APEs) occur because of rapid 
spreading of activation through a conceptual associative network from the affective 
concept activated by the affective prime to concepts with the same affective valence 
(Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996). Responses to affective targets would then 
be faster in the affectively congruent condition than incongruent condition because the 
target concept would already have been pre-activated by the affective prime in the 
congruent condition. On the other hand, it had been proposed that affective primes 
pre-activate a response tendency to press ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ – responses to targets 
in congruent conditions would then be faster than in incongruent conditions because 
the correct response would already have been pre-activated by the prime in the 




congruent condition, while in affectively incongruent conditions there would be 
interference by the pre-activated incorrect response in selecting the correct response, 
slowing down reaction time (De Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002). 
In Chapter 2.5 of this thesis it will be tested whether fast automatic affective priming 
can be demonstrated for emotional music and emotional prosody perception, and if so, 
which of these two mechanisms, ‘the spreading of activation account’ vs. ‘the response 
competition account’ can best explain APEs. 
 
1.3. The cognitive neuroscience of prosody perception and its modulation by alexithymia 
1.3.1. Interhemispheric neurocognitive models of prosody perception 
In Figure 1, a schematic visualization can be found of the prosody perception pathway 
as hypothesized by two major models of (emotional) prosody perception (Schirmer & 
Kotz, 2006; Wildgruber, Ethofer, Grandjean, & Kreifelts, 2009) that existed when the 
research work for this thesis was initiated. As will be explained in more detail in the 
next section, these models suggest that prosody perception is a multi-stage process with 
elementary acoustic processing first taking place in the primary auditory cortex 
(Heschl’s gyrus, HG), after which there are further stages of acoustic processing with 
increasing complexity in the middle superior temporal gyrus (mid-STG) and 
subsequently in either the anterior STG (a-STG) or posterior STG (p-STG). Finally, 
abstract evaluation of (emotional) prosody would be sub-served by the inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG). 
 Early work on the cognitive neuroscience of prosody perception focused on 
the question of whether the right hemisphere would be more adept to, or ‘specialized’ 
in, the processing of emotional prosody than the left hemisphere. It was hypothesized 
that the right hemisphere might be specialized in the processing of emotional prosody 
similarly to left hemispheric specialization for propositional language and that the 
classical Wernicke-Broca model of propositional language perception by the left 
hemisphere could be applied to right hemisphere processing of emotional prosody 
(Ross, 1981). In Figure 1, right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody 
perception is symbolized by the bold circles in the right hemisphere. Note that the 
hypothesis that the right hemisphere is specialized in the processing of emotional 
prosody is strictly ‘interhemispheric’ – it leaves unspecified at what stage of processing 
within the right hemisphere the purported right-hemispheric advantage arises.  
The ‘right hemisphere hypothesis of emotional prosody perception’ (e.g., Ross, 
1981) stimulated many lesion studies to investigate whether patients with right-
hemispheric damage would show a more pronounced deficit in emotional prosody 
perception task performance than patients with equivalent damage to the left 
hemisphere. These studies were soon followed up by hypotheses about why the right 
hemisphere might be better at the processing of emotional prosody than the left. 
Broadly, two hypotheses were postulated. First, according to the ‘functional lateralization 
hypothesis’, the cerebral hemispheres are specialized in the processing of functional 
categories, with the right hemisphere being specialized in processing of emotional 
information and the left in the processing of linguistic information (Van Lancker, 1980). 
In contrast, acoustic lateralization hypotheses proposed that specialization for prosody 
processing depends on the acoustic cues that are critical for the extraction of meaning. 
One prominent acoustic lateralization hypothesis stated that the left hemisphere is 
better at processing of temporal information while the right hemisphere is superior at 
spectral processing (e.g. Van Lancker & Sidtis, 1992). For instance, as variation in pitch 
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is an important acoustic cue to the meaning of emotional prosody, right-hemispheric 
superiority for emotional prosody processing could then be explained on the basis of 
right hemispheric specialization for pitch processing. Note that, if cue-dependent 
lateralization hypotheses were correct, we would expect hemispheric asymmetries early 
on in the prosody perception pathway (Figure 1) in areas devoted to acoustic 
processing. If, on the other hand, hemispheric specialization is driven by specialization 
for more abstract (functional) categories we would expect hemispheric asymmetries to 
emerge later in the prosody perception pathway, when a more abstract level of 
processing has been reached.  
 In the first three empirical chapters of the first empirical section of this thesis, 
lesion-deficit data (Chapter 2.1), dichotic listening data combined with ERPs (Chapter 
2.2) and neuroimaging data (Chapter 2.3) will be examined to test whether hemispheric 
specialization for prosody perception can be demonstrated and if so, which of the 


















Figure 1. Schematic visualization of the prosody perception pathway as hypothesized 
by two dominant models of (emotional) prosody perception, superimposed on an 
axial slice of an MRI scan. Solid circles and arrows indicate regions and connections 
that are hypothesized to be important in (emotional) prosody perception by both 
models. Dashed circles and arrows indicate areas and connections hypothesized to 
be involved in prosody perception by only one of the two models. White circles 
indicate areas hypothesized to be involved in the first stage, light grey circles in the 
second stage and dark grey circles in the final stage of (emotional) prosody 
perception. Bold circles in the right hemisphere as compared to the left indicate 
hypothesized right-hemispheric superiority for emotional prosody perception. 
Abbreviations: HG = Heschl’s gyrus, m-STG = middle superior temporal gyrus, p-
STG = posterior superior temporal gyrus, a-STG = anterior superior temporal 
gyrus, IFG = inferior frontal gyrus. 
 




1.3.2. Intrahemispheric neurocognitive models of prosody perception 
With the development of neuroimaging methods it became possible to further probe 
the human brain to reveal which areas within the cerebral hemispheres are involved in 
prosody perception. These neuroimaging studies inspired two similar three-stage 
(emotional) prosody perception models, developed by two leading German research 
groups (Schirmer & Kotz, 2006; Wildgruber, Ethofer, Grandjean, & Kreifelts, 2009). 
The neural network of emotional prosody perception that these two models proposed, 
and the disagreement between the two models is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 When auditory information reaches the cerebral cortex, first elementary 
acoustic processing takes place in the primary auditory cortex (PAC), which is located 
in the transverse temporal gyrus or Heschl’s gyrus (HG). According to both the model 
of the Kotz group (Schirmer & Kotz, 2006) and the Wildgruber group (Wildgruber, 
Ethofer, Grandjean, & Kreifelts, 2009) in an initial stage (white circles in Figure 1) basic 
acoustic features important for (emotional) prosody perception are extracted in HG 
and the middle superior temporal gyrus (mid-STG). Both models propose a subsequent 
second stage (light-grey circles in Figure 1) of (emotional) prosody perception where 
the acoustic features extracted in stage one are integrated into a ‘gestalt’ (more abstract 
units of representation), but the models disagree on the brain area which is responsible 
for this stage of processing. While the Wildgruber model proposes that stage-two 
emotional prosody perception takes place in the posterior STG (p-STG), the Kotz 
model places this stage further anterior along the auditory ‘what pathway’ (auditory 
object recognition stream) in the anterior STG (a-STG). Last, in a final third stage 
(dark-grey circles in Figure 1) both models propose that abstract evaluation of prosodic 
information and integration of prosodic information with other layers of the speech 
signal (such as semantics) takes place in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). In Chapter 2.3 
of this thesis, the neuroimaging literature of emotional prosody perception that was 
available when the work for this thesis was initiated will be meta-analyzed, to investigate 
which of these two models is best supported by the neuroimaging evidence base.  
 In addition to the cortical areas mentioned above, subcortical structures have 
been implicated in emotional prosody perception. According to the Kotz model, the 
amygdala plays a role in the automatic perception of emotional prosody. Indeed, the 
amygdala has been implied in fast (and hence possibly ‘automatic’) emotional 
processing in the classic dual route model by LeDoux (2001) and Öhman and Mineka 
(2001) have subsequently proposed that it might be the amygdala that has evolved as 
the neural substrate dedicated to the (automatic) processing of potentially harmful 
social signals (such as anger prosody). The two approaches to studying automaticity of 
processing described in section 1.2.4 will therefore be applied in this thesis to test 
whether two key features of ‘automaticity’ can be demonstrated for the perception of 
emotional prosody (and perhaps emotional music): (1) that the perception process 
occurs even when participants do not intend to analyze the emotional signal and (2) 
that the perception process is fast. First, in Chapter 2.4 it will be tested using fMRI 
whether the emotional prosody perception process continues to operate at the neural 
level even when subject do not intend to process emotional prosody. Furthermore, it 
will be examined whether the amygdala might indeed be the neural substrate of 
unintentional emotional prosody perception. Second, in Chapter 2.5 it will be tested 
using the affective priming paradigm and EEG whether rapid perception of emotional 
prosody and emotional music can be demonstrated. Additionally, it will be tested which 
of the two proposed fast mechanisms described in section 1.2.4, spreading of activation 
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in a conceptual network of affective concepts vs. response competition, can best 
explain such affective priming effects.  
 
1.3.3. Modulation by alexithymia 
As was explained in section 1.1 of this introduction, alexithymia is a personality trait that 
is associated with difficulty in verbalizing and identifying emotions. Therefore, it seems 
plausible to assume that at some level in the emotional prosody perception pathway, 
individual differences in this personality trait should be reflected. When the work for 
this thesis was initiated, the few neuroimaging studies that had been performed pointed 
to a decreased response of both subcortical (Kugel et al., 2008) and cortical areas (Kano 
et al., 2003, but see Berthoz et al., 2002 for mixed evidence) to emotional stimulation 
for people scoring high on this personality trait. Therefore, there is discussion about 
whether alexithymia is primarily reflected by subcortical (and possibly ‘automatic’ 
perception of emotion) or cortical mechanisms (perhaps reflecting more abstract and 
deliberate interpretation of emotional information). Functional connectivity studies had 
proposed an alternative explanation: some evidence had been found for altered 
coupling of cortical and limbic areas during emotional processing in alexithymics, 
possibly explaining the reduced ability of alexithymics to reflectively process emotional 
information by disturbed flow of information between subcortical and cortical areas 
(Mériau et al., 2006). However, all these studies were based on emotional processing 
through the visual system, rendering it uncertain whether the above hypotheses would 
also hold for emotional perception through the auditory system. Thus, in Chapter 3.1 it 
will be tested whether the purported automatic (rapid) perception of emotional prosody 
and emotional music as measured with the affective priming paradigm is modulated by 
(non-clinical) alexithymia. Last, in Chapter 3.2 it will be examined whether (non-clinical) 
alexithymia modulates automatic (unintentional) perception of emotional prosody and 
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It is unclear whether there is hemispheric specialization for prosodic perception and, if 
so, what the nature of this hemispheric asymmetry is. Using the lesion-approach, many 
studies have attempted to test whether there is hemispheric specialization for emotional 
and linguistic prosodic perception by examining the impact of left- versus right 
hemispheric damage on prosodic perception task performance. However, so far no 
consensus has been reached. In an attempt to find a consistent pattern of lateralization 
for prosodic perception, a meta-analysis was performed on 38 lesion studies (including 
450 left hemisphere damaged patients, 534 right hemisphere damaged patients and 491 
controls) of prosodic perception. It was found that both left- and right hemispheric 
damage compromise emotional and linguistic prosodic perception task performance. 
Furthermore, right hemispheric damage degraded emotional prosodic perception more 
than left hemispheric damage (trimmed g = −0.37, 95% CI [−0.66; −0.09], N = 620 
patients). It is concluded that prosodic perception is under bihemispheric control with 




















How we say something can be as important as what we say when conveying a message to 
our audience. This prosodic (supra-segmental) layer of speech uses a variety of acoustic 
cues such as speaking rate, pitch and intensity to convey different communicative 
functions. On the one hand, prosody can be used to convey information regarding the 
linguistic structure of an utterance (for a review of linguistic prosodic functions see 
Cutler, Dahan, & Van Donselaar, 1997). This ‘linguistic prosody’ can be used to stress 
syllables, group words into intonational phrases, emphasize importance of constituents 
in a sentence and to signal whether an utterance is meant as a question or a statement. 
On the other hand, prosody can be used to convey paralinguistic information such as 
the emotional state of the speaker (for a review see Scherer, 1986), which henceforth 
will be referred to as ‘emotional prosody’.  
Over the last four decades a considerable body of literature has accumulated 
on the question how the brain processes prosody (for recent reviews see Wong, 2002; 
Wildgruber, Ackermann, Kreifelts, & Ethofer, 2006; Kotz, Meyer, & Paulmann, 2006; 
Schirmer & Kotz, 2006; Alves, Fukusima, & Aznar-Casanova, 2008; Kotz & Paulmann, 
2011). Understanding how prosody is processed in the brain is not only interesting 
from a fundamental cognitive neuroscience point of view but could also be clinically 
relevant as, for instance, impairment of prosodic processing has recently been found to 
be a core deficit in schizophrenia (Hoekert, Kahn, Pijnenborg, & Aleman, 2007). A 
central question that has remained unresolved so far is whether there is hemispheric 
specialization for prosodic perception, and if so, which mechanism drives this 
hemispheric asymmetry. 
 Concerning lateralization of prosodic perception on the cortical level, four 
hypotheses have emerged: 
(1) The right cerebral hemisphere is specialized in the processing of all prosodic 
information (Klouda, Robin, Graff-Radford, & Cooper, 1988);  
(2) The Right hemisphere hypothesis posits that the right hemisphere is specialized in 
emotional prosodic processing (Ross, 1981; Blonder, Bowers, & Heilman, 1991; Borod 
et al., 1998); 
(3) The Functional lateralization hypothesis (Van Lancker, 1980) proposes that hemispheric 
specialization is dependent on the communicative function of prosodic material: 
emotional prosodic information is processed in the right hemisphere while linguistic 
prosody is processed in the left; 
(4) The Cue dependent lateralization hypothesis proposes that lateralization of prosodic 
processing depends on the acoustic cues that are critical for the extraction of meaning: 
the left hemisphere would be better adapted to processing of durational information 
while the right hemisphere is superior in spectral processing (Van Lancker & Sidtis, 
1992). As variation in pitch is an important acoustic cue to the meaning of emotional 
prosody (but not the only cue; see Scherer, 2003), right hemispheric superiority for 
emotional prosodic processing could then be explained on the basis of rightward 
lateralization for pitch processing. 
On the one hand, the first three hypotheses all assume a specialized (and 
lateralized) module for structuring of incoming acoustic information into prosodic 
categories. Note that these three “categorical” hypotheses need not necessarily be 
mutually exclusive; for instance, the functional lateralization hypothesis can be seen as a 
refinement of the right hemisphere hypothesis. On the other hand, cue-dependent 
hypotheses posit that lateralization of prosodic processing is determined by non-




prosody specific acoustic processes. The cue-dependent and the “categorical” 
lateralization hypotheses are not mutually exclusive either: they could represent 
different stages of prosodic processing which might be differentially lateralized (see 
Schirmer & Kotz, 2006).  
 One way to test these hypotheses is through the lesion approach. Typically, 
lesion studies compare a group of patients with acquired left or right hemispheric brain 
damage to a group of healthy controls on a prosodic perception task. If there is 
hemispheric specialization for prosodic processing then damage to the specialized 
hemisphere should (1) compromise performance on prosodic tasks as compared to 
controls (and equivalent damage to the non-specialized hemisphere should degrade 
performance relative to controls less) and (2) deteriorate performance as compared to 
equivalent damage to the non-specialized hemisphere. This approach provides 
information about which hemisphere of the brain is necessary for prosodic perception. 
In order to differentiate between the “categorical” lateralization hypotheses it 
is necessary for lesion studies to have (1) a right hemispheric damage (RHD) group, a 
left hemispheric damage (LHD) group and a normal control (NC) group as well as (2) 
an emotional and a linguistic prosodic perception task. Unfortunately most lesion 
studies that have been published to date do not fulfill these criteria. The studies that did 
fulfill these criteria give an inconsistent picture with some presenting evidence favoring 
global right-hemisphere superiority for prosodic processing (Blonder et al., 1991; Borod 
et al., 1998) the right hemisphere hypothesis (Heilman, Bowers, Speedie, & Coslett, 
1984) and the functional lateralization hypothesis (Walker, Daigle, & Buzzard, 2002) 
while others do not support any of the hypotheses (Pell & Baum, 1997; Pell, 1998; 
Breitenstein, Daum, & Ackermann, 1998; Geigenberger & Ziegler, 2001; Zgaljardic, 
Borod, & Sliwinski, 2002; Kho et al., 2007). When these studies and studies that 
included all relevant groups but imposed only one prosodic task find detrimental effects 
of hemispheric damage, many find that damage to each of the two hemispheres 
compromises emotional (Heilman et al., 1984; Van Lancker et al., 1992; Lalande, Braun, 
Charlevois, & Whitaker, 1992; Peper & Irle, 1997; Pell, 1998; Breitenstein, 1998; Zaidel, 
Kasher, Soroker, & Batori, 2002; Kucharska-Pietura, Phillips, Gernand, & David, 2003; 
Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2004; Pell, 2006; Kho et 
al., 2007, but for evidence of hemisphere specific degradation see Tompkins & Flowers, 
1985; Bowers, Coslet, Bauer, Speedie, & Heilman, 1987; Blonder et al., 1991; 
Geigenberger et al., 2001; Walker et al., 2002; Charbonneau, Scherzer, Aspirot, & 
Cohen, 2003) and linguistic (Heilman et al., 1984; Pell et al., 1997; Baum, 1998; 
Geigenberger et al., 2001; Aasland & Baum, 2003; Seddoh, 2006b, but for hemisphere 
specific degradation see Bryan, 1989; Blonder et al., 1991; Perkins, Baran, & Gandour, 
1996; Pell, 1998; Borod et al., 1998; Walker, Fongemie, & Daigle, 2001; Walker et al., 
2002; Abada & Baum, 2006) prosodic perception performance, suggesting that both 
hemispheres provide necessary contributions to both prosodic functions.  
 To disentangle the contribution of “categorical” versus cue-dependent 
hemispheric specialization in prosodic perception it is necessary to vary the function of 
the prosodic material while keeping acoustics constant or vice versa and observe 
whether there is differential impact of left- versus right-hemispheric damage on 
prosodic perception performance as compared to performance by NC. One approach 
has been to selectively remove durational or fundamental frequency (F0) variation in 
linguistic or emotional prosodic stimuli and to observe whether LHD or RHD 
differentially degrades perception performance as compared NC. Unfortunately these 
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studies (Pell, 1998; Baum, 1998; Aasland & Baum, 2003) have not consistently found 
differential degradation of performance after removal of F0 variation for LHD and after 
removal of durational information for RHD, as would have been expected based on the 
Cue-dependent lateralization hypothesis (Van Lancker et al., 1992). Adopting a 
different approach, Van Lancker et al. (1992) used discriminant analysis to analyze 
which acoustic properties of emotional prosody could predict the pattern of errors 
made by LHD and RHD patients on an emotional categorization task. It was shown 
that the errors of the RHD patients could be predicted by misuse of F0 variability. The 
authors concluded that the right hemisphere might contribute to emotional prosodic 
perception through a specialization in pitch processing. However, this conclusion must 
be considered with caution as Baum and Pell (1997) failed to replicate the result.  
Several factors have been suggested in the literature that can moderate the 
impact of lateralized brain damage on prosodic perception performance. Ross, 
Thompson, and Yenkosky (1997) propose that apparent emotional prosodic processing 
deficits after LHD are not caused by emotional prosodic processing deficits per se, but 
that these patients have problems linking emotional meaning from the prosodic layer to 
the propositional layer of the speech signal. These authors predict that when the 
‘verbal-articulatory demands’ (whether lexical meaning and syllables are present) of an 
(affective) prosodic perception task are increased LHD performance should degrade 
while RHD performance should remain unaffected. Secondly, as was already evident in 
our discussion of the non-mutual exclusivity of the cue-dependent versus “categorical” 
hypotheses of prosodic perception, prosodic processing can be conceptualized as a 
process consisting of several stages. For instance, in a recent review Schirmer and Kotz 
(2006) propose that there are at least three stages in prosodic perception (see also Kotz 
et al., 2006). In an initial stage, complex acoustical analysis of the speech signal is 
performed; in the second stage, emotional or linguistic information is identified; and in 
a final stage, this information becomes available to higher-order cognitive processes for 
further evaluation or integration with other layers of speech (such as the propositional 
content). This proposal implies that performance for prosodic perception tasks such as 
those used in the lesion literature reflects a combination (i.e. summation or even 
interaction) of these stages, each of which might be differentially lateralized (Gandour, 
2004). Lastly, as Hoekert et al. (2007) have pointed out in a meta-analytic review of 
emotional prosodic impairment in schizophrenia, the quality of the prosodic perception 
task used might influence the findings. Tasks with high psychometric quality can be 
expected to give a better picture of prosodic performance degradation due to lateralized 
brain damage than tasks of low psychometric quality.  
In sum, although a considerable body of lesion literature has accumulated, no 
consensus has been reached on the degree and nature of hemispheric lateralization for 
prosodic perception. Most studies that had the appropriate design for differentiating 
between the “categorical” lateralization hypotheses of prosodic perception find that 
both LHD and RHD can affect prosodic perception, suggesting that hemispheric 
specialization for prosodic perception is a matter of degree rather than type. The small 
number of studies that have manipulated acoustic cues in prosodic perception tasks 
have not consistently supported the cue-dependent lateralization hypothesis. The most 
important problems in testing the “categorical” lateralization hypotheses mentioned is 
that many of the lesion studies published to date do not have the appropriate design to 
disentangle the various lateralization hypotheses (Wong, 2002). Furthermore, studies 




typically had fewer than 15 subjects per experimental group, limiting statistical power to 
detect effects.  
In the present study, a meta-analysis was employed to review the lesion 
literature on hemispheric specialization for prosodic perception. By (1) including RHD, 
LHD and NC groups as well as (2) both emotional and linguistic perception tasks in 
the meta-analysis, it was possible to overcome the main weaknesses of previous 
individual studies and meta-analytically differentiate between the “categorical” 
lateralization hypotheses of prosodic perception (the number of studies manipulating 
acoustics while keeping prosodic function constant or vice versa was too low to 
contrast the “categorical” hypotheses with the cue-dependent lateralization hypothesis). 
For instance, although individual studies that have only included a NC group and a 
LHD or RHD group and one prosodic function (e.g. Baum, Daniloff, Daniloff, & 
Lewis, 1982; Wertz, Henschel, Auther, Ashford, & Kirshner, 1998; Seddoh, 2006; 
Weintraub, Mesulam, & Kramer, 1981; Harciarek, Heilman, & Jodzio, 2006) cannot 
give any definitive information on lateralization of prosodic processing (i.e. whether 
one of the hemispheres is specifically necessary for emotional or linguistic prosodic 
perception or both), such studies are valuable for discriminating between the 
“categorical” lateralization hypotheses when compared meta-analytically. Furthermore, 
by including a large number of subjects for each experimental group in the meta-
analysis, the lateralization hypotheses of prosodic perception could be tested with high 
statistical power, making it possible to demonstrate subtle effects that individual studies 
cannot detect. By summarizing studies quantitatively a more precise and objective 
insight in the effect of lateralized brain damage on prosodic perception task 
performance can be gained as compared to the traditional qualitative reviews. 
Additionally, we tested the influence of factors that have been suggested to moderate 
the relationship between lateralized brain damage and prosodic perception performance 
by moderator-analysis. Moderating variables (such as whether patients and controls are 
matched on demographic variables) typically vary only between studies. Therefore, 
while most individual studies cannot test for such effects, meta-analytic moderator 
analysis can provide novel insights by assessing the impact of moderators. Finally, since 
the last qualitative review of the lesion literature on prosodic processing was published 
in 2002 (Wong, 2002), the current review additionally covers almost a decade of 




2.1. Literature search 
The PubMed and PsycLit databases were searched for relevant articles published until 
January 2011 using the search string ‘prosod* AND brain NOT EEG NOT ERP* NOT 
*MRI’ (where the asterisk denotes a wildcard) in the title or abstract. Additionally, the 
reference lists of all articles included in the meta-analysis and available reviews (Wong, 
2002; Kotz et al., 2006, 2011) were manually checked for previously published 
potentially relevant articles. This search yielded 80 publications that were considered for 
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2.2. Study selection 
Studies needed to fulfil the following set of criteria to be eligible for inclusion in the 
meta-analyses. First, (i) at least an adult group with acquired left hemispheric damage 
(LHD) and a group with right hemispheric damage (RHD) or (ii) at least one of these 
brain damaged groups and a normal control (NC) group had to be present. Second, 
objective (CT/MR imaging or surgical) evidence for the lateralized nature of the 
damage had to be presented for the majority of the patients. Third, the brain damage 
had to be primarily cortical and focal: lesions had to be clearly localizable and situated 
primarily in the cerebral cortex which implied that most lesions were caused by 
cerebrovascular damage or surgical intervention (such as tumor extirpation or resection 
for intractable epilepsy). We excluded non-focal (diffuse) etiology such as diffuse 
traumatic brain injury or Parkinson and Huntington pathology. As part of our general 
strategy to include as many lesion studies as possible in order to maximize the scope of 
our results and test for potentially moderating effects factors such as etiology rather 
than exclude studies, no further restrictions were imposed on etiology of the brain 
damage. However, as can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, the vast majority of included 
studies presented patients with brain damage of vascular origin. Fourth, at least one 
explicit linguistic or emotional prosodic perception task had to be reported and 
performance needed to be qualitatively interpretable (i.e. we excluded rating tasks that 
do not allow for the interpretation of test scores in terms of good/bad). Emotional 
prosodic perception tasks typically present a set of prerecorded utterances that are 
intoned in a variety of emotional categories by an actor; patients typically have to 
identify (or rate the intensity of) the intended emotion or discriminate between the 
emotional intonation of utterance pairs. Linguistic prosodic perception tasks also 
typically demand subjects to identify or discriminate between prosodic categories, but 
in this case prosody imparts linguistically relevant (and hence categorical) information 
such as sentence modality, sentential stress, syntactic structure through phrase marking 
or metrical stress. One of these studies (Grosjean, 1996) used an atypical task: the 
ability of subjects to predict from sentence prosody whether a sentence continues or 
stops at a certain target word. We considered this task to tap linguistic prosodic 
processing because it is a measure of the ability to perceive phrase structure on the 
basis of prosodic features (which can be considered a linguistic prosodic function, e.g. 
for a review see Cutler, Dahan, & Van Donselaar, 1997). Fifth, the study had to report 
original material (e.g., we excluded Ross & Monnot (2008), who reanalyzed data from 
their research database) in order to prevent data from entering a meta-analysis twice 
(which violates the assumption of independence) and had to be published in an English 
language international peer-reviewed journal. Implicit prosodic perception tasks (e.g., 
Wunderlich, Ziegler, & Geigenberger, 2003) were not included as they might engage 
different neural systems (for a review of this issue see Wildgruber et al., 2006) and by 
definition tap other processes in addition to prosodic processing (i.e. the patient is 
actively engaged in a different task than evaluating the prosodic information). 
Furthermore, there were not enough studies that reported implicit tasks to look at the 
moderating effect of the explicit versus implicit nature of the task. Sixth, we excluded 
studies on tonal languages as the literature suggests that these might have a different 
lateralization pattern than non-tonal languages (e.g., see Gandour et al., 2003). Finally, 
the study had to report sufficient information to be able to compute or accurately 
estimate the standardized difference in means. This required the study to report (i) 




sample size and means and standard deviations or (ii) sample size and test statistics such 
as Z- or T- or F-values with means or (iii) sample size and exact or categorical p-values. 
 
2.3. Data analysis strategy  
We tested the effect of RHD versus LHD and of lateralized damage versus NC 
performance for both emotional and linguistic prosodic tasks. For meta-analysis to be 
statistically valid, it is necessary that each study and each subject only contributes to the 
analysis once. This assumption of independence required six separate meta-analyses: 
three comparisons (NC vs. LHD; NC vs. RHD; LHD vs. RHD) for each of the two 
prosodic functions (emotional vs. linguistic). 
  Additionally, we wanted to assess differences between comparisons in the 
mean weighted effect size (ES). For instance, we asked whether damage to the 
specialized hemisphere compromises performance (as compared to NC) more than 
damage to the non-specialized hemisphere, or whether damage to a hemisphere 
differentially disturbs performance for linguistic or emotional prosodic processing. 
Therefore, the 85% confidence interval (CI) around the mean weighted ES under the 
random effects model was computed for each meta-analysis. Non-overlapping 85% CIs 
of two mean weighted effect sizes indicate a significant difference at the traditional 5% 
type I error threshold (Goldstein & Healy, 1995). This approach allowed us to assess 
whether there were differences in the mean weighted ES between meta-analyses and to 
present a graphical overview of the analyses. 
Many studies reported multiple (and hence non-independent) measures of 
prosodic processing. To preserve independence we pooled multiple effect sizes to 
obtain one measure of ES per study for each of the six comparisons. This strategy had 
the following implications. First, we pooled across multiple measures of a prosodic 
function. However, if a study reported unimodal (only prosodic) and multimodal 
prosodic tasks (for instance, tasks in which emotional semantics can be congruent or 
incongruent with the emotional meaning of the prosody), only the unimodal task was 
used (as the former is a purer measure of prosodic processing). Second, if data were 
presented for subgroups with damage to different locations within a hemisphere we 
pooled to a mean ES for the whole hemisphere (since interhemispheric differences are 
the focus of the meta-analysis). Third, if pre- and post-surgical data (tumor extirpation, 
resection of epileptic foci) were reported, we only analyzed the post-surgery data 
(preserving the overall logic of analyzing the effect of acquired brain damage on 
prosodic processing between groups).  
 
2.4. Computation of effect size and meta-analytic procedures 
Hedges’s measure of effect size g (the standardized difference in means) was calculated 
for each comparison. Hedges’s g is very similar to Cohen’s d (the difference between 
means divided by the pooled standard deviation) but is less biased if the sample size is 
small (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). When comparing patient groups to NC we gave the ES 
a negative sign if patients performed worse than NC to indicate deterioration of 
performance due to brain damage. When comparing the LHD to RHD group we gave 
the ES a minus sign if RHD performed worse than LHD since most hypotheses of 
hemispheric specialization for prosodic processing predict performance degradation for 
the RHD group relative to LHD.  
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The included studies varied widely in the quality of the reported statistics. 
When possible, ES was calculated from the sample size and the (pooled) means and 
standard deviations. If the standard deviation was zero we entered the value 1·10-10 
because the Comprehensive Meta Analysis package (Borenstein, hedges, Higgins, & 
Rothstein, 2005) does not accept standard deviations of zero. If the study reported 
sample size and either a t-test or sample size and a p-value, we used Comprehensive 
Meta Analysis (CMA) to convert to Hedges’s g. When (one way) F-tests were reported, 
we used the “Effect size determination program” developed by Wilson 
(http://mason.gmu.edu/~dwilsonb/downloads/ES_Calculator.xls) to convert to g. 
When categorical p-values were reported, we entered the upper border in CMA (i.e. p = 
0.05 when p < 0.05 was reported), and when ‘no effect’ was reported, we entered an ES 
of 0, adopting a conservative approach.  
Two additional sources of information were used to estimate g. When the 
main effect F-value of a multiple way ANOVA was reported, we used the ‘Effect size 
determination program’ to convert it to g. This procedure potentially overestimates the 
true ES as the error term of the F-test will be smaller due to the inclusion of an 
additional factor (apart from the factor of interest: lateralized brain damage versus 
control). We also entered Z-values (performance scores that have been normalized 
using the mean and standard deviation of the control group) as g in the meta-analysis 
for comparisons of patient groups versus controls. These measures of ES may also 
overestimate ES since it is not the pooled standard deviation but the (likely smaller) 
standard deviation of the control group that is used in the denominator. We later tested 
in a moderator analysis whether these last two sources of information gave a 
significantly larger ES than the other measures of ES but this test failed to reach 
significance. Therefore, we decided to include these measures of ES in the meta-
analyses in order to increase the representativeness of the results.  
For each meta-analysis, the distribution of effect sizes was checked for outliers 
by first converting all g’s to Fisher’s Z and subsequently converting to standard normal 
scores. Outliers were defined as values outside the −3.29 to 3.29 range (corresponding 
to a probability that is lower than 0.001 in the normal distribution). As none of the 
study outcomes fulfilled this criterion all the included outcomes remained in the meta-
analyses.  
 All further meta-analytic procedures were performed with Comprehensive 
Meta-Analysis (Borenstein et al., 2005). The mean weighted ES g and 95% CI were 
computed using the random effects model. The random effects model was chosen 
because it is reasonable to assume that the true ES varied among included studies (see 
Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009) and it produced more conservative 
results. For each meta-analysis the mean weighted effect size and its confidence interval 
was computed using the inverse variance weight of each study under the random 
effects model, ensuring that the measurement precision of contributing studies was 
taken into account when computing the summary statistics. Subsequently, the Q-
statistic was computed to test whether there was significant heterogeneity in the ES 
distribution (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Follow-up moderator analyses were performed to 
explore whether theoretically or methodologically plausible factors (see below) could 
explain variance in the ES distribution.  
Seven studies fulfilled all inclusion criteria but failed to report sufficient 
information to calculate g. In order to give a complete overview of the issue at hand 
these studies were analyzed through narrative review. 




2.5. Publication bias 
A threat to the validity of meta-analysis is the so-called ‘file drawer problem’ (Rosenthal, 
1979). This refers to the phenomenon that studies that find statistically significant 
differences are published more easily than studies failing to reject the null-hypothesis 
(they remain in the file drawer). These statistically non-significant studies have a lower 
probability of being included in the meta-analysis than studies that do find statistically 
significant differences resulting in the risk of overestimation of the true ES by meta-
analysis. This issue can be examined by plotting the ES of each study against the 
precision (defined as the inverse of the standard error) in a so-called ‘funnel-plot’ 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). If there is no publication bias, this plot should look like a 
funnel where the less precise studies are scattered more widely around the point 
estimate than the more precise studies. If there is publication bias, studies with lower 
precision and a small ES (that did not get published) should be missing causing an 
asymmetry at the base of the funnel. For each of the six meta-analyses we checked the 
funnel plot for publication bias. Subsequently, we formally tested whether there was 
funnel plot asymmetry using Egger’s regression test (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & 
Minder, 1997). This test aims to quantify funnel plot asymmetry by regressing the 
standard normalized ES against its precision (the inverse of the standard error). If there 
is funnel plot asymmetry the intercept of the regression line should be significantly 
different from zero (where p = 0.10 is chosen as the statistical threshold to compensate 
for the limited power of the test). Furthermore, we computed Orwin’s fail-safe number 
of studies (Orwin, 1983) which is the number of unpublished and statistically non-
significant studies that is needed to reduce the observed ES to a negligible effect (which 
we defined as a g of −0.20). A large fail-safe number of studies gives credence to the 
robustness of the observed ES. Lastly, we used the trim-and-fill method (Duval & 
Tweedie, 2000) to correct the observed ES for publication bias. This method iteratively 
trims small studies on the positive side of the funnel plot until it is symmetric, ‘fills’ the 
funnel plot with the trimmed studies and their mirror images (in order not to 
underestimate the variance), and recalculates an adjusted pooled ES. It is assumed that 
the adjusted ES is a more precise estimate of the true ES since it also incorporates 
unpublished studies.  
 
2.6. Moderating variables 
As discussed in the Introduction, the lesion literature suggests several variables that can 
moderate the relationship between lateralized brain damage and performance on 
prosodic perception tasks. These can be broadly categorized as either sample or task 
characteristics. 
 
2.6.1. Sample characteristics  
First, it is possible that hemispheric specialization patterns for prosodic processing 
differ between languages, especially for linguistic prosody (e.g., see Gandour et al., 
2003). Therefore, we tested whether the mean weighted ES differed between studies 
using (American) English subjects and studies that used non-English speaking 
populations. There was not enough variation in languages between studies to further 
differentiate between specific languages. Second, studies varied in the proportion of the 
patient sample that had objective (radiologically or surgically confirmed) evidence for 
the lateralized nature of the brain damage. Studies that provide objective evidence for 
the lateralized nature of the brain damage for all patients will provide a more accurate 
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picture of the effect of LHD and RHD on performance than studies that do not (as in 
the latter case the possibility cannot be excluded that damage was in fact contralateral 
or bihemispheric for some patients). We therefore tested whether there was a 
difference in the mean weighted ES between studies that presented objective evidence 
for the lateralized nature of the damage for the total sample versus studies that did so 
for the majority of the sample (but not all patients). Third, when experimental groups 
significantly differ in demographic (such as sex or age) or neuropsychological variables 
(such as attention deficit) that could affect prosodic processing (see Fecteau, Armony, 
Joanette, & Belin, 2004; Schirmer, Striano, & Friederici, 2005), it is possible to 
erroneously conclude that differences between groups in prosodic processing are due to 
differences in lateralized brain damage while in reality the aforementioned confounders 
are (partially) responsible. Therefore, we tested whether there were differences in the 
mean weighted ES between studies that had matched groups on at least one 
demographic or neuropsychological variable versus studies that did not match 
experimental groups. Finally, it is possible that the nature of the brain damage 
influences the occurrence of prosodic perception deficits. Therefore we tested for a 
moderating influence of etiology of the brain damage by comparing studies that tested 
patients with only vascular damage, only other than vascular damage or vascular and 
non-vascular damage.  
 
2.6.2. Task characteristics 
First, similarly to Hoekert et al. (2007) we tested the following task quality parameters: 
(1) whether or not the article reported psychometric (reliability, validity) information 
about the task; (2) whether the actors that produced the prosodic material were 
professional actors or phoneticians or not; (3) whether at least six items per prosodic 
category were used for the task or less (since fewer than six items compromises the 
reliability of the task) and (4) whether six or more or less than six prosodic categories 
were used for the task (as more than six prosodic categories might tax working memory 
of the patients too much and confound degradation of performance due to prosodic 
processing deficits).  
 The influence of ‘verbal-articulatory load’ (Ross, Thompson, & Yenkosky 
1997) was tested in multiple ways. First, it was tested whether there was a difference in 
the mean weighted ES for tasks that used speech material that contained lexical 
semantics versus tasks that used material without lexical semantics (such as pseudo-
language or low-pass filtered speech). Secondly, we tested whether there was an effect 
of the extent to which the response procedure taxed verbal abilities: we contrasted tasks 
that demanded a verbal response (such as pointing to a verbal label) versus tasks that 
required a nonverbal response (such as pointing to a facial expression) versus tasks that 
allowed for both modes of responding. This moderator is also interesting from a 
different perspective than the variation in verbal load: one could argue that tasks that 
allow for multiple ways of responding are a more valid measure of prosodic processing 
than tasks that only allow one kind of response as performance is less affected by 
response-specific (non prosodic) factors. Lastly, we compared identification with 
discrimination performance. Identification tasks tax verbal capacities to a greater extent 
than discrimination tasks (Pell, 2006) as in the former case prosodic information needs 
to be associated with verbal categories while in the latter case no such verbal 
categorization is required. Because many studies that used discrimination tasks also 
used identification tasks (forcing us to pool those tasks to preserve independence), we 




decided to contrast studies that used both tasks to studies that only used identification 
tasks instead of comparing discrimination to identification orthogonally.  
 Contrasting the effect of lateralized brain damage on discrimination versus 
identification performance could also be interesting with regard to the proposed 
subdivision of the prosodic perception process in at least three stages (Schirmer & 
Kotz, 2006). One could argue that discrimination tasks primarily tap early processes 
(acoustic analysis, determination of emotional or linguistic significance) while 
identification tasks additionally tap the later evaluative processes. Therefore, contrasting 
these two tasks allows one to investigate whether lateralized brain damage differentially 
disturbs earlier or later prosodic processing stages.  
Lastly, a number of variables were checked for moderating effects but these 
variables did not vary enough between studies to perform a sufficiently powerful 
moderator analysis (i.e. there were fewer than five studies per level of the moderator). 
These moderators included the size of the (prosody carrying) unit (e.g., Gandour et al., 
2003) as most studies used sentences, the length of the lesion-onset-testing interval 
(nearly all studies tested patients in the ‘chronic stage’ i.e., used intervals of longer than 
3 months) and whether lesion localization was only cortical or cortical and also 
subcortical (nearly all studies involved patients with cortical and subcortical damage). 
Similarly, we also aimed to test the hypothesis that perception of positive versus 
negative (or approach versus withdrawal) emotions is lateralized differently but the 
number of studies presenting data for these emotional categories separately was too 
small for a meaningful statistical analysis. 
  
2.7. Explorative intra-hemispheric analysis 
Although the current meta-analysis is focused on interhemispheric differences in 
prosodic perception performance, several authors have proposed specific roles for 
different intrahemispheric loci. For instance, Schirmer and Kotz (2006) have proposed 
that the (bilateral) superior temporal sulcus and gyrus (STS/STG) are involved in the 
determination of emotional significance of prosodic cues while at a later stage prosodic 
information is evaluated and integrated with other cognitive processes in the frontal 
cortex. Ross and Monnot (2008) have also proposed a different role for temporal lobe 
and frontal lobe areas in emotional prosodic perception. These authors posit that the 
temporal operculum of the right hemisphere is crucial for adequate emotional prosodic 
perception and suggest that while damage to the right hemispheric temporal operculum 
differentially degrades emotional prosodic perception performance as compared to 
frontal cortical damage, for the left hemisphere the intrahemispheric cortical locus of 
the lesion does not predict prosodic perception performance.  
  Given these intrahemispheric models of emotional prosodic perception it 
would be interesting to meta-analytically test whether the intrahemispheric locus of the 
brain damage influences prosodic perception performance. Unfortunately, there were 
not enough studies reporting performance measures separately for subgroups of 
patients with damage restricted to certain intrahemispheric cortical loci, preventing us 
from directly meta-analytically investigating this issue. However, a more explorative 
analysis was undertaken. For each study, the number of patients with temporal and 
frontal lobe damage (as reported by the authors) was counted and the percentage of 
patients with temporal and frontal damage was derived. Subsequently, for each patient 
group as compared to controls and for emotional and linguistic prosody, we performed 
a meta-regression analysis (e.g., see Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) to investigate the influence 
CHAPTER 2.1:  LATERALIZED PERCEPTION OF PROSODY: A META-ANALYSIS  
 
39 
of percentage temporal and frontal lobe damage on effect size for prosodic perception 
performance. A weighted least squares regression analysis was performed with 
percentage temporal and percentage frontal damage as the predictors, the inverse 
variance under the random effects model as the regression weight and the effect size as 
the criterion. Similarly to Alink et al. (2008), we converted the effect size to Fisher’s Z 
and used this metric as the dependent for the meta-regression analysis as it has superior 
distribution characteristics (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). To test statistical significance of 
predictor beta-weights, a corrected standard error was used as suggested by Lipsey and 
Wilson (2001).  
 We also counted the number of patients with subcortical damage and white 
matter lesions (as reported in the article) for each study. Unfortunately, the percentage 
of patients with white matter or subcortical damage did not vary enough between 
studies to allow for a meta-regression analysis. As white matter or subcortial lesions 
have been implicated in prosodic perception performance (e.g. see Ross & Monnot, 
2008) we were concerned that cortical lateralization effects might be confounded with 
these lesions. Therefore, we used an independent t-test to check whether there was a 
systematic difference between the right and the left hemisphere in the percentage of 
patients with subcortical or white matter lesions.  
 
3. Results 
A total of 38 studies fulfilled the inclusion criteria: 28 studies provided data for the 
meta-analyses on emotional prosody (Table 1), and 20 studies for the meta-analyses on 
linguistic prosody (Table 2). An independent rater (DV) coded the part of the coding 
form involving the study, sample and task characteristics for 10 studies (26% of all 
included studies). The mean inter-rater agreement was 97.9% suggesting a high level of 
reliability of the coding process.  
 
3.1. Emotional prosody  
 
3.1.1. LHD vs. NC 
A total of 21 studies (with a total of 287 LHD-patients and 399 NC) provided sufficient 
data for this comparison (see studies with an NC and LHD group in Table 1). The ES 
distribution with 95% CIs (the forest plot) can be found in Figure 1. The mean 
weighted ES g (95% CI) under the random effects model was −1.06 (−1.40; −0.71) 
suggesting a large effect of left hemispheric damage on emotional prosodic processing. 
Inspection of the ES to measurement precision scatterplot (the funnel plot: Figure 2) 
suggested publication bias. In Table 3 it can be observed that Egger’s regression test 
confirmed the existence of publication bias. The number of statistically non-significant 
unpublished studies (Orwin’s fail-safe N) to reduce the observed ES to a negligible 
effect was sufficiently large to give credence to the robustness of the observed effect. 
Trim and Fill did not result in an adjustment of the mean weighted ES.  
 The heterogeneity statistic was significant (Q(20) = 81.23, p < 0.0001) 
suggesting significant unexplained variance in the ES distribution. None of the 









 Table 1. Overview of studies on emotional prosody. 
       
Study Language Etiology CT/MR NL NR NC 
Heilmanet al. (1984) English CVA Most 9 8 15 
Tomkins et al. (1985) English CVA Most 11 11 11 
Bowers et al. (1987) English ? ? 10 10 12 
Ehlers et al. (1987) Danish Mixed All 5 11 - 
Blonderet al. (1991) English  CVA All 10 10 10 
Brådviket al. (1991) Swedish CVA Most - 20 18 
Lalande et al. (1992)  French CVA Most 10 12 16 
Van Lancker (1992) English CVA Most 24 13 37 
Hornak et al. (1996)  English Mixed Most 4 11 16 
Pellet al. (1997)  English CVA ? 10 9 10 
Peper et al.(1997)  German Resection All 21 19 12 
Ross et al. (1997)  English CVA All 10 12 16 
Schmitt et al.  (1997) German CVA ? 25 27 26 
Breitenstein et al. (1998) German Mixed All 16 16 10 
Pell (1998) English CVA  All 11 9 10 
Wertz et al. (1998)  English CVA Most - 20 18 
Karow et al. (2001) English Mixed All 10 10 5 
Walker et al. (2002) English CVA All 8 8 8 
Adolphs et al. (2002) English Mixed All 25 26 ? 
Zgaljardic et al. (2002) English CVA L: Most 
R: All 
7 9 7 
Charbonneau et al. (2003) French CVA Most 17 15 16 
Hornak et al. (2003) English Mixed Most 9 16 48 
Kucharska et al. (2003) Polish CVA All 30 30 50 
Shamay-Tsoory et al.(2004) Hebrew Mixed All 18 16 19 
Harciarek et al. (2006) Polish CVA All - 30 31 
Pell (2006) English CVA All 11 9 12 
Rymarczyk et al. (2007) Polish CVA  All - 37 26 
Kho et al. (2008) Dutch Resection   All 16 15 47 








Language = native language of the subjects; CT/MR = objective (CT/MR imaging,  
or surgical-) verification of lateralized damage for all or most patients; NL = number 
of patients with left hemispheric damage; NR = number of patients with right 
hemispheric damage; NC = number of healthy controls. 
 
























Figure 1. Forest plot of the mean effect 
size (g) and 95% confidence interval for 
each of the studies included in the 
comparison of LHD to NC for 
emotional prosodic perception. Larger 
symbols indicate a larger number of 






Figure 2. Funnelplot of the studies 
included in the comparison LHD to 
NC for emotional prosodic perception. 
The effect size g of each study (x-axis) 
is plotted against its standard error (y-
axis). The vertical line represents the 
mean weighted effect size and the 









3.1.2. RHD vs. NC 
A total of 26 studies (with a total of 402 RHD patients and 508 NC) provided sufficient 
data for this comparison (see studies with an NC and RHD group in Table 1). The 
forest plot can be found in Figure 3. The mean weighted ES (95% CI) was −1.41 (−1.76; 
−1.05) suggesting a large effect of right hemispheric damage on emotional prosodic 
processing. Inspection of the funnel plot (see Figure 4) suggested publication bias. 
However, as can be observed in Table 3 Egger’s regression test did not reach 
significance and Orwin’s fail-safe gave credence to the robustness of the observed 
effect. Trim and Fill did not result in an adjustment of the mean weighted ES. 
 The heterogeneity statistic was significant (Q(25) = 134.201, p < 0.0001). The 
mean weighted ES was significantly larger (QB(1) = 4.15, p < 0.05) for studies that 
presented objective evidence for the lateralized nature of the brain damage for all 
patients (g = −1.72; k = 14) than for studies that provided objective evidence for the 




















Figure 3. Forest plot of the mean 
effect size (g) and 95% confidence 
interval for each of the studies 
included in the comparison of 
RHD to NC for emotional 
prosodic perception. Larger 
symbols indicate a larger number 
of subjects included in the 




Figure 4. Funnelplot of the studies 
included in the comparison RHD to 
NC for emotional prosodic perception. 
The effect size g of each study (x-axis) 
is plotted against its standard error (y-
axis). The vertical line represents the 
mean weighted effect size and the 
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3.1.3. LHD vs. RHD 
A total of 22 studies (with a total of 314 LHD and 306 RHD-patients) provided 
sufficient data for this comparison (see studies with an LHD and RHD group in Table 
1). The forest plot can be found in Figure 5. The mean weighted ES (95% CI) was 
−0.47 (−0.74; −0.20) suggesting a significantly larger effect of right hemispheric damage 
than left hemispheric damage on emotional prosodic processing. Inspection of the 
funnel plot (Figure 6) suggested publication bias but as can be observed in Table 2 
Egger’s regression test did not reach significance and Orwin’s fail safe N supported the 
robustness of the observed effect. Trim and Fill identified two missing studies and led 
to a slight downward adjustment of the mean weighted ES (95% CI) to −0.37 (−0.66; 
−0.09).  
 The heterogeneity statistic was significant (Q(21) = 58.74, p < 0.0001). None 




































Figure 5. Forest plot of the mean 
effect size (g) and 95% confidence 
interval for each of the studies 
included in the comparison of 
LHD to RHD for emotional 
prosodic perception. Larger 
symbols indicate a larger number 
of subjects included in the 




Figure. 6. Funnelplot of the studies 
included in the comparison LHD to 
RHD for emotional prosodic 
perception. The effect size g of each 
study (x-axis) is plotted against its 
standard error (y-axis). The vertical line 
represents the mean weighted effect 
size and the diagonal lines the 95% 









Table 2. Publication bias analyses for emotional prosody. 
      












Adjusted g  
(95% CI) 
      
LHD - NC −1.06 (−1.40; 
−0.71) 
78 −3.22* 0 - 
RHD - NC −1.41 (−1.76; 
−1.05) 
146    −2.94     0 - 
LHD - RHD −0.47 (−0.74; 
−0.20) 
30   −0.13 2 −0.37 (−0.66; 
−0.09) 
3.2. Linguistic prosody 
An overview of the studies included in the meta-analysis of linguistic prosody 
perception can be found in Table 3. 
 
3.2.1. LHD vs. NC 
A total of 17 studies (with a total of 211 LHD patients and 249 NC) provided sufficient 
data for this comparison (see studies with a LHD and NC-group in Table 2). The forest 
plot can be found in Figure 7. The mean weighted ES (95% CI) was −1.05 (−1.39; 
−0.71) suggesting a large effect of left hemispheric damage on linguistic prosodic 
processing. Inspection of the funnel plot (Figure 8) suggested publication bias. As can 
be observed in Table 4 publication bias was confirmed by Egger’s regression test but 
Orwin’s fail-safe N gave credence to the robustness of the observed effect. Trim and 
Fill identified three missing studies and led to a downward adjustment of the mean 
weighted ES (95% CI) to −0.81 (−1.20; −0.43). 
 The heterogeneity statistic was significant (Q(16) = 44.89, p < 0.0001). None 













LHD - NC = left sided damage vs. controls, RHD - NC = right sided damage vs. 
controls, LHD - RHD = left sided damage vs. right sided damage. *p < 0.10    
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Table 3. Overview of studies on linguistic prosody. 
Study Language Etiology CT/MR NL NR NC 
Weintraubet al. (1981) English Mixed ? - 9 10 
Baumet al. (1982) English CVA All 8 - 8 
Heilmanet al. (1984) English CVA Most 9 8 15 
Emmoreyet al. (1987) English CVA Most 15 7 15 
Bryan(1989) English CVA Most 30 30 30 
Blonderet al. (1991) English  CVA All 10 10 10 
Brådviket al. (1991) Swedish CVA Most - 20 18 
Grosjean(1996) French Mixed Most 10 10 20 
Perkins et al.(1996) English CVA All 8 8 8 
Baumet al. (1997) English CVA ? 10 10 10 
Baum et al. (1998) English CVA All 12 10 10 
Pell et al. (1997)  English CVA ? 10 9 10 
Borod et al.(1998)  English CVA All 10 11 15 
Breitenstein et al. (1998) German Mixed All 16 10 10 
Pell (1998) English CVA All 11 9 10 
Walkeret al. (2002) English CVA All 8 8 8 
Zgaljardic et al. (2002) English CVA  L: Most 
R: All 
7 9 7 
Seddoh (2006) English CVA All 21 - 16 
Rymarczyk et al. (2007) Polish CVA All - 37 26 
Kho et al.(2008) Dutch Resection All 16 15 47 

















Language = native language of the subjects; CT/MR = objective (CT/MR 
imaging, or surgical-) verification of lateralized damage for all or most patients; NL 
= number of patients with left hemispheric damage; NR = number of patients 
with right hemispheric damage; NC = number of healthy controls. 
 












3.2.2. RHD vs. NC 
A total of 18 studies (with a total of 236 RHD patients and 271 NC) provided sufficient 
data for this comparison (see studies with an RHD and NC group in Table 2). The 
forest plot can be found in Figure 9. The mean weighted ES (95% CI) was −0.88 (−1.11; 
−0.64) suggesting a large effect of right hemispheric damage on linguistic prosodic 
processing. Inspection of the funnel plot (Figure 10) suggested publication bias. In 
Table 4 it can be observed that Eggers regression test confirmed publication bias but 
Orwin’s fail-safe N supported the robustness of the observed effect. Trim and Fill 
identified four missing studies and led to a downward adjustment of the mean weighted 
ES (95% CI) to −0.73 (−0.99; −0.47). 
 The heterogeneity statistic failed to reach significance (Q(17) = 25.88, p > 0.05) 
suggesting a homogeneous ES distribution. None of the moderators explained a 
significant amount of variation in the ES distribution. 
 
Fig. 8. Funnelplot of the studies 
included in the comparison LHD to 
NC for linguistic prosodic perception. 
The effect size g of each study (x-axis) 
is plotted against its standard error (y-
axis). The vertical line represents the 
mean weighted effect size and the 





Figure 7. Forest plot of the mean effect 
size (g) and 95% confidence interval for 
each of the studies included in the 
comparison of LHD to NC for 
linguistic prosodic perception. Larger 
symbols indicate a larger number of 











3.2.3. LHD vs. RHD 
A total of 14 studies (with a total of 172 LHD patients and 160 RHD patients) 
provided sufficient data for this comparison (see studies with an LHD- and RHD-
group in Table 2). The forest plot can be found in the Figure 11. The mean weighted 
ES (95% CI) was 0.12 (−0.29; 0.52) indicating a negligible (and nonsignificant-) 
difference between the two cerebral hemispheres in linguistic prosodic processing 
capability. The funnelplot (Figure 12) was symmetric. However as can be seen in Table 
4 Egger’s test did suggest publication bias but Trim and Fill did not identify any missing 
studies.  
 The heterogeneity statistic was significant (Q(13) = 43.30, p < 0.0001). None 
of the moderator variables explained a significant amount of variance in the ES 
distribution. 
 
Figure 9. Forest plot of the mean effect 
size (g) and 95% confidence interval for 
each of the studies included in the 
comparison of RHD to NC for linguistic 
prosodic perception. Larger symbols 
indicate a larger number of subjects 





Fig. 10. Funnelplot of the studies 
included in the comparison RHD to 
NC for linguistic prosodic 
perception. The effect size g of each 
study (x-axis) is plotted against its 
standard error (y-axis). The vertical 
line represents the mean weighted 
effect size and the diagonal lines the 












    Table 4. Publication bias analyses for meta-analyses for linguistic prosody. 
      










Adjusted g  
(95% CI) 
LHD - NC −1.05 (−1.39; 
−0.71) 
59 −4.8* 3 −0.81 (−1.20; 
−0.43) 
RHD - NC −0.88 (−1.11; 
−0.64) 
58 −2.4* 4 −0.73 (−0.99; 
−0.47) 
LHD - RHD 0.12 (−0.29; 
0.52) 
- 3.7* 0 - 





Figure 11. Forest plot of the mean 
effect size (g) and 95% confidence 
interval for each of the studies 
included in the comparison of LHD to 
RHD for linguistic prosodic 
perception. Larger symbols indicate a 
larger number of subjects included in 





Figure 12. Funnelplot of the studies 
included in the comparison LHD to 
RHD for linguistic prosodic 
perception. The effect size g of each 
study (x-axis) is plotted against its 
standard error (y-axis). The vertical 
line represents the mean weighted 
effect size and the diagonal lines the 
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3.3. Overview and comparison of the meta-analyses 
The mean weighted ES and 85% CI under the random effects model for all six meta-
analyses are presented in Figure 13. It can be observed that damage to each hemisphere 
compromises performance on both emotional and linguistic prosodic functions as 
compared to controls but that there is a non-significant trend for emotional prosody to 
be more disturbed following RHD than LHD while the reverse holds for linguistic 
prosody. Furthermore RHD compromises emotional prosodic processing more than 
linguistic prosodic processing. Finally, when comparing RHD to LHD directly there is 
evidence for right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody but no clear 















Figure 13. The mean weighted effect size g (y-axis) with 85% CI is shown for each 
of the six meta-analyses (x-axis). It can be observed that both left hemispheric 
damage (LHD) and right hemispheric damage (RHD) compromises both 
emotional (circles) and linguistic (triangles) prosodic perception as compared to 
normal controls (NC). Furthermore, RHD degrades emotional processing more 
than linguistic processing. Lastly, RHD compromises emotional prosodic 
perception as compared to LHD while there is no significant difference between 
these groups for linguistic prosodic perception.  
 




3.4. Qualitative mini-review of studies reporting insufficient data 
A total of seven studies did not report enough statistics to compute Hedges’s g but did 
fulfill the other inclusion criteria. To give a complete review of the literature on 
hemispheric specialization for prosodic perception, these studies will now be briefly 
reviewed.  
 
3.4.1. Emotional prosody  
Four studies used emotional prosodic perception tasks. Cancelliere and Kertesz (1990) 
focused on the influence of the intrahemispheric location of brain damage on 
emotional processing. Semantically neutral sentences that had been pronounced in 
happy, sad, angry, or neutral prosody were presented to 28 RHD, 17 LHD patients, and 
20 NC. Participants were requested to identify the prosodic category. Because the focus 
was on intrahemispheric damage, the two lateralized damaged groups were not 
compared directly. Using the lesion-overlap method, the authors concluded that the 
basal ganglia are important for prosodic perception (irrespective of the side of the 
lesion).  
Starkstein, Federoff, Price, Leiguarda and Robinson (1994) examined the 
effects of acute lateralized brain damage on emotional prosodic perception. A total 
number of 59 patients (numbers of LHD or RHD patients unclear) and 17 NC were 
presented with two prosodic perception tasks. For the first task, semantically neutral 
sentences were intoned in happy, sad, or angry prosody and participants were asked to 
identify the prosodic category. In a second task, the instructions were the same but the 
sentences contained emotional semantics that was either congruent or incongruent with 
the prosodic layer of the utterance. For the first task, LHD and RHD groups were not 
directly compared but for the second task the authors reported worse performance for 
RHD as compared to LHD. 
Weddell (1994) investigated the effect of cortical and subcortical damage on 
emotional processing. Ten patients with damage to the wall or floor of the third 
ventricle (hypothalamus), 27 RHD and 24 LHD patients (which included cortical and 
subcortical lateralized damage) and 15 controls with spinal lesions had to identify the 
prosodic category (happy, sad, angry, surprised or neutral) of semantically neutral or 
congruent utterances. The authors reported poorer performance for the RHD group as 
compared to the LHD group but only when emotion was expressed solely through 
prosody. Furthermore, basal ganglia damage (irrespective of the side of the lesion) 
impaired emotional prosodic processing. The authors concluded that the bilateral basal 
ganglia are important for emotional perception. 
Zaidel et al. (2002) administered an affective prosodic perception test to 23 
RHD, 12 LHD patients and 21 NC among a set of tasks that tapped pragmatics. 
Participants were requested to identify the emotional prosodic category (happy, sad, 
angry, neutral) of semantically neutral sentences. Both brain damaged groups 
performed worse than NC but the authors did not report a significant difference 
between the brain damaged groups. The authors concluded that there is no clear 
hemispheric specialization for pragmatic aspects of language.  
 
3.4.2. Linguistic prosody 
Three studies used linguistic prosodic perception tasks. Aasland and Baum (2003) 
investigated the sensitivity of LHD and RHD patients to durational cues in determining 
phrasal boundaries. The duration of pauses and of pre-boundary words in the utterance 
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“Pink and black and green” was systematically varied to obtain different phrase 
structures. In two experiments, 10 LHD, 9 RHD patients, and 10 NC were asked to 
identify the phrase structure by pointing to a picture that depicted the correct grouping 
of constituents (colors). This design allowed the authors to parametrically investigate 
the interaction of durational cues and lateralized hemispheric damage on phrasal 
boundary processing. Overall, both patient groups performed worse than NC in 
identifying phrasal boundaries, but the LHD group showed improved performance 
when temporal cues were exaggerated while the RHD group did not. The authors 
concluded that while a heightened temporal cue threshold might be responsible for the 
deficiency in phrasal boundary processing for the LHD group, the exact mechanism for 
the deficit in RHD group is unclear.  
 Abada et al. (2006) investigated whether the left and right hemisphere are 
differentially sensitive to metrical stress. Monosyllabic words (such as ‘mint’) were 
embedded in disyllabic nonwords where the second syllable was either weak (such as in 
“mintef”) or strong (such as in “mintayf”). Previous research had shown that detection 
of the proper word is faster when the nonsense syllable is weak as compared to a strong 
nonsense syllable as there is a tendency to attempt lexical access at strong syllables. 
Groups of 10 LHD, 10 RHD patients and 10 NC were required to press a button as 
they detected a proper word. All three groups showed the strong syllable effect but 
overall the LHD group performed worse than NC while RHD patients did not differ 
from the other two groups which led the authors to conclude that LHD induces 
difficulties utilizing stress patterns.  
 Seddoh (2006b) presented meaningful and nonsense sentences that were 
intonated as statements or questions to 13 LHD, 8 RHD patients and 12 NC. 
Participants were asked to identify whether the utterance was a question or a statement. 
Both patient groups performed worse than the control group but only for utterances 
with question intonation. Seddoh suggested that the patients might have had difficulties 
in processing specific components of the pitch contour.  
 
3.4.3. Conclusion of the mini-review 
Taken together the studies on emotional prosodic perception indicate bilateral 
processing of emotional prosody with subcortical involvement and a possible relative 
right hemispheric advantage. This is in line with the quantitative analysis of emotional 
prosodic perception studies. The small number of studies on linguistic prosody 
generally points to bilateral processing, which is also in accordance with the quantitative 
analysis.  
 
3.5. Explorative intrahemispheric analysis 
Table 5 presents the percentage of patients with damage to intrahemispheric locations 
for each study. To explore a possible differential impact of temporal versus frontal 
damage on prosodic processing performance, a weighted least squares random effects 
meta-regression analysis was performed with the percentage of patients with temporal 
lobe damage and the percentage of patients with frontal lobe damage as predictors and 
the Fisher’s Z transformed ES as the dependent variable. For none of the meta-analyses 
percentage temporal or percentage frontal damage explained a significant amount of 
variance in the effect size distribution (for all: -0.3 < ß < 0.7, p > 0.05). A series of 
independent t-tests revealed no difference between the LHD and RHD groups in the 




percentage of patients with subcortical damage or white matter lesions for any of the 
meta-analyses (for all: −0.71 < t < 0.78, p > 0.05).  
 
  Table 5.  Percentage of patients with damage to intrahemispheric loci for each study. 










poral   
F
rontal 
Weintraubet al. (1981) Linguistic Right 0 11.11 66.67 22.22 
Baum et al. (1982) Linguistic Left ? ? ? ? 
Right 0 0 0 50.00 Heilman et al. (1984) Linguistic+  
Emotional 
Left 0 0 22.22 55.56 
Right ? ? ? ? Tomkins et al. (1985) Emotional 
Left ? ? ? ? 
Right ? ? ? ? Bowers et al. (1987) 
 
Emotional 
Left ? ? ? ? 
Right 0 28.57 14.28 28.57 Emmorey et al. (1987) Linguistic 
Left 0 0 6.67 60.00 
Right 0 0 36.67 26.67 Bryan(1989) Linguistic 
Left 0 0 23.33 13.33 
Right 0 0 60.00 60.00 Blonder et al. (1991) Linguistic+ 
Emotional Left 0 0 80.00 50.00 
Brådvik et al. (1991) Emotional Right ? ? ? ? 
Lalande et al. (1992)  Linguistic+ 
Emotional 
Right ? ? ? ? 
Right ? ? ? ? Van Lancker (1992) 
 
Emotional 
Left ? ? ? ? 
Right 20.00 30.00 60.00 60.00 Grosjean (1996) Linguistic 
Left 0 70.00 50.00 70.00 
Right 9.09 27.27 27.27 72.72 Hornak et al. (1996)  Emotional 
Left 50.00 0 0 50.00 
Right 12.50 25.00 62.50 62.50 Perkins et al.(1996 Linguistic 
Left 25.00 37.50 50.00 50.00 
Right ? ? ? ? Pell et al. (1997)  Linguistic 
+  
Emotional 
Left ? ? ? ? 
Right 20.00 0 20.00 0 Baum et al. (1997) Linguistic 
Left 0 0 10.00 40.00 
Right ? ? ? ? Peper et al.(1997)  Emotional 
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Right ? ? ? ? Ross et al. (1997)  Emotional 
Left 90.00 30.00 30.00 50.00 
Right ? 63.00 ? ? Schmitt et al.  (1997) Emotional 
Left ? 56.00 ? ? 
Right 20.00 0 30.00 0 Baum et al. (1998) Linguistic 
Left 0 8.33 8.30 33.33 
Right 27.27 36.36 0 45.45 Borod et al. (1998) Linguistic 
Left 40.00 20.00 30.00 30.00 
Right 0 12.50 37.50 50.00 Breitenstein et al. 
(1998) 
Linguistic+ 
Emotional Left 0 6.25 31.25 50.00 
Right 9.09 0 27.27 9.09 Pell (1998) Linguistic+ 
Emotional Left 0 9.09 9.09 36.36 
Wertz et al. (1998)  Emotional Right ? 25.00 30.00 25.00 
Right 20.00 50.00 40.00 50.00 Karow et al. (2001) Emotional 
Left 10.00 50.00 20.00 40.00 
Right 0 0.25 37.50 37.50 Walker et al. (2002) Linguistic+ 
Emotional Left 0 0 37.50 87.50 
Right 22.22 0 44.44 22.22 Zgaljardic et al. (2002) Linguistic+ 
Emotional Left 14.29 14.29 57.14 28.57 
Right 33.33 26.67 6.67 40.00 Charbonneau et al. 
(2003) 
Emotional 
Left 23.53 5.88 17.64 29.41 
Right 0 0 0 100.0
0 
Hornak et al. (2003) Emotional 
Left 0 0 0 100.0
0 
Right ? 6.67 33.33 30.00 Kucharska et al. 2003) Emotional 
Left ? 1.00 30.00 30.00 




Left 0 0 0 55.56 
Right 11.11 22.22 11.11 0 Pell (2006) Emotional 
Left 0 18.18 9.09 36.36 
Right     Seddoh (2006) 
 
Linguistic 
Left     

























4. Discussion  
The current meta-analyses suggest that both cerebral hemispheres are necessary for 
adequate explicit emotional and linguistic prosodic perception. Within Cohen’s (1988) 
framework for qualifying effect size, the detrimental effect of both RHD and LHD (as 
compared to NC) on both linguistic and emotional prosodic perception performance 
can be considered large (i.e., g was larger than 0.80 for all comparisons). However, 
when comparing the detrimental effect of LHD and RHD (as compared to NC), it was 
shown that while LHD degrades emotional and linguistic prosodic perception to a 
similar degree (−1.06 and −1.05 respectively) RHD degraded emotional prosodic 
perception performance more (g = −1.41) than linguistic prosodic perception 
performance (g = −0.88). Finally, when comparing both patient groups directly, RHD 
degraded emotional prosodic processing more than LHD (g = −0.47) while there was 
no differential degradation of lateralized brain damage for linguistic prosodic 
perception performance. These results are therefore compatible with the notion of 
bihemispheric control over the perception of linguistic and emotional prosody with a 
relatively greater contribution of the right hemisphere to emotional prosodic perception.  
 Strong versions (absolute lateralization) of the “categorical” lateralization 
hypotheses mentioned in the introduction can therefore not be supported. The results 
of the present study clearly do not support even a weak version of global control of the 
right hemisphere over all prosodic perception (Klouda et al., 1988) since LHD 
compromised linguistic prosodic perception performance to a comparable degree as 
RHD did. A relative version of the Functional lateralization hypothesis (Van Lancker, 
1980) can not be supported either. Although RHD compromised emotional perception 
more than LHD no significantly larger performance degradation for LHD than RHD 
was found for linguistic prosodic processing, as would have been predicted by this 
hypothesis. However, our results are compatible with a weak version of the right 
hemisphere hypothesis (Ross, 1981; Blonder et al., 1991; Borod et al., 1998) where 
there is bilateral processing for emotional prosodic perception but with larger right than 
left hemispheric contribution. As discussed in the introduction, the current design does 
not permit us to differentiate between the “categorical” and cue-dependent 
lateralization hypotheses of prosodic perception. Hence, it is unclear whether the right 
hemispheric superiority for emotional prosodic processing originates in superior 
processing of acoustics necessary for adequate emotional prosodic perception (Van 
Lancker et al., 1992) or superiority in processing of emotional prosodic categories (in 
partial support of the Functional lateralization hypothesis) or both (for an informative 
discussion of this issue see Pell, 1998).  
 Another important line of evidence regarding hemispheric specialization for 
prosodic perception is provided by the neuroimaging literature. Activation maps of 
fMRI/PET studies are highly dependent on the exact experimental and control 
condition (i.e. contrast) used. For instance, contrasting emotional versus linguistic 
decisions for the same prosodic material in a categorization task is mainly sensitive to 
later stages of the prosodic perception process (identification of emotional or linguistic 
information), whereas contrasting emotional prosody to neutral prosody additionally 
taps into earlier stages (acoustic analysis). Hence, comparing neuroimaging studies is 
not without difficulty. With this caveat in mind, imaging studies to date have found 
bilateral temporofrontal (STG/STS, IFG) activations for emotional (Buchanan et al., 
2000; Mitchell, Elliott, Barry, Cruttenden, & Woodruff, 2003; Kotz et al., 2003; 
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Grandjean et al., 2005; Ethofer et al., 2006a; Ethofer et al., 2006b; Mitchell & Ross, 
2008; Ethofer et al., 2009; Ethofer, Van de Ville, Scherer, & Vuilleumier, 2009) and 
linguistic (Gandour et al., 2003; Wildgruber et al., 2004; Doherty, West, Dilley, 
Shattuck-Hufnagel, & Caplan, 2004; Humphries, Love, Swinney, & Hickok, 2005; 
Aleman et al., 2005) prosodic perception tasks. Some of these imaging studies have 
additionally found more (extended) right than left hemispheric activation for emotional 
prosodic processing (Buchanan et al., 2000; Mitchell et al., 2003; Ethofer et al., 2006a; 
Ethofer et al., 2009) while for the limited number of studies that used linguistic 
prosodic perception tasks, the results are mixed with some finding more (extended) 
activation in the left (Wildgruber et al., 2004; Aleman et al., 2005) and others in the 
right (Gandour et al., 2003; Doherty et al., 2004) hemisphere. These studies therefore 
suggest that there is a bilateral temporofrontal network of areas involved in the 
perception of linguistic and emotional prosody with possibly a relative right 
hemispheric superiority for emotional prosodic perception. The results of our meta-
analysis are clearly in keeping with the neuroimaging literature and additionally suggest 
that within this bilateral network of sufficient areas both hemispheres are also necessary 
for the perception of prosody. Moreover, our results suggest that the stronger 
activation of the right hemisphere found by some neuroimaging studies might reflect 
relative superiority of the right hemisphere in the perception of emotional prosody. 
Our explorative meta-regression analysis of intrahemispheric contributions to prosodic 
perception did not reveal a differential impact of temporal versus frontal damage on 
prosodic perception performance. However, due to the indirect nature of this analysis 
this result should not be taken as conclusive.  
 Although we tested in multiple ways whether the ‘verbal-articulatory demands’ 
of prosodic perception tasks (Ross et al., 1997) moderated the effect of lateralized brain 
damage on prosodic perception performance, we failed to find such effects. Increased 
verbal demands on prosodic tasks (such as the presence of lexical semantics or the need 
to respond verbally) did not increase the effect of left hemispheric damage on 
emotional perception performance. However, one moderating variable yielded a 
statistically robust effect. Studies that provided objective evidence that brain damage 
was indeed right lateralized for all patients, found a significantly larger effect of RHD 
on emotional prosodic perception performance than studies that did not provide such 
evidence for all patients. It is therefore possible that in the latter case patients with left 
or bilateral brain damage had been included, which might have decreased the ES (and 
hence the reported mean weighted ES for the effect of RHD on emotional prosodic 
perception reported here might represent an underestimation). A clear recommendation 
for future studies, then, is that presumed lateralized brain damage for all patients should 
be radiologically confirmed in order to get an accurate measure of the effect of 
lateralized brain damage.  
There were some limitations to the present investigation. First, the study 
design does not permit us to conclude that the observed division of labor between the 
hemispheres is specific to prosodic processing as we have not included non-prosodic 
control tasks. Hence, although we cannot exclude the possibility that the results might 
generalize to linguistic and emotional processing in other modalities, we can conclude 
that the results are at least valid for prosodic processing. A second and related issue that 
has already been pointed out is that the current design does not permit us to 
differentiate cue-dependent versus “categorical” lateralization (which might be 
modality-independent) explanations of the right hemispheric advantage for emotional 




prosodic processing. Thirdly, to maximize sensitivity of our meta-analysis to 
hemispheric specialization we were forced to pool effect sizes over the levels of 
moderators. This may have decreased the power of our moderator analyses so that the 
(absence of) effects in our moderator analysis should not be taken as conclusive. Fourth, 
an often mentioned critique on meta-analysis is that it quantitatively combines studies 
that are incomparable and therefore should not be combined. In this light, it might be 
possible that different linguistic prosodic functions follow a separate pattern of 
hemispheric lateralization and that the net bilateral control that was found in the 
current meta-analysis reflects this heterogeneity in hemispheric specialization. 
Unfortunately, the number of studies per prosodic linguistic phenomenon was too 
small for a statistically robust test of this issue leaving this a matter for future 
investigation. Finally, although we focused on cortical lateralization of prosodic 
perception, many of the studies that were analyzed in the current meta-analysis included 
patients with cortical and subcortical damage. Therefore, we cannot rule out a 
contribution of subcortical structures to the observed pattern of hemispheric 
involvement in prosodic perception (indeed many studies have suggested involvement 
of subcortical structures in prosodic processing such as the basal ganglia, see e.g. 
Cancelliere & Kertesz, 1990; Blonder, Gur, & Gur, 1989). Hence, when assessing the 
effect size of lateralized brain damage on prosodic perception performance as 
compared to controls in isolation it should be kept in mind that the effect likely reflects 
both cortical, subcortical, and white matter damage. However, as it seems likely that 
subcortical involvement was present in the right and left hemisphere to a similar degree 
(which was confirmed by the analysis of the percentage of patients with subcortical 
damage as reported in each paper) this does not complicate our comparisons of left 
with right hemispheric damage.  
In sum, we conclude that the network of necessary areas dedicated to the 
perception of linguistic and emotional prosody is bilateral with only relative right 
hemispheric specialization for emotional prosodic perception at best.  
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Recent evidence suggests that there is relative right hemispheric specialization for 
emotional prosody perception while linguistic prosody perception is under bilateral 
control. It is still unknown, however, how hemispheric specialization for prosody 
perception might arise. Two main hypotheses have been put forward. Cue-dependent 
hypotheses on the one hand, propose that hemispheric specialization is driven by 
specialization for non-prosody specific processing of acoustic cues. The functional 
lateralization hypothesis on the other hand, proposes that hemispheric specialization is 
dependent on the communicative function of prosody with emotional and linguistic 
prosody processing lateralized to the right and left hemisphere, respectively. In the 
present study, the functional lateralization hypothesis of prosody perception was 
systematically tested by instructing one group of participants to evaluate the emotional 
prosody and another group to the linguistic prosody dimension of bi-dimensional 
prosodic stimuli in a dichotic listening paradigm while event related-potentials (ERPs) 
were recorded. The results showed that the right ear advantage was associated with a 
decreased latency of an early negativity in the contralateral hemisphere. No evidence 
was found for functional lateralization. These findings suggest that functional 
lateralization effects for prosody perception are small and support the structural model 
































Speech prosody is an important means to convey emotions (e.g., indicating whether the 
speaker is angry or sad) and linguistic structure (e.g., signifying a statement or a 
question). A longstanding question in the neuropsychological literature has been 
whether there is hemispheric specialization for the perception of prosody. Recent meta-
analytic evidence suggests that there is a relative right hemispheric specialization for 
emotional prosody perception, while the processing of linguistic prosody seems to be 
controlled bilaterally (Witteman, Van IJzendoorn, Van de Velde, Van Heuven, & 
Schiller, 2011).  
However, the nature of this relative right hemispheric specialization for 
emotional prosody is currently unknown. Two mechanisms have been proposed as to 
how hemispheric specialization for prosody perception might arise. On the one hand, 
cue-dependent lateralization hypotheses propose that right-hemisphere specialization for 
emotional prosody perception can be explained by a (non-prosody specific) advantage 
of the right hemisphere for early acoustic processing, such as spectral processing (Van 
Lancker & Sidtis, 1992), as spectral parameters appear to be particularly important for 
decoding emotional prosody (Scherer, 2003). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of the 
neuroimaging literature of emotional prosody perception found preliminary evidence 
for relative right hemispheric specialization of the primary and secondary auditory 
cortex (Witteman, Van Heuven, & Schiller, 2012), which could be interpreted as 
(indirect) support for the cue-dependent lateralization hypothesis.  
On the other hand, the functional lateralization hypothesis posits that the right 
hemisphere is specialized in the processing of the emotional communicative function of 
emotional prosody (Van Lancker, 1980), whereas the left hemisphere might be 
specialized in the processing of linguistic prosodic function. The dynamic dual pathway 
model by Friederici and Alter (2004) further suggests that when linguistic prosody is 
more bound to segments (such as in the case of metrical stress), it is left lateralized, 
while linguistic prosody at the sentence level (such as boundary marking) is right 
lateralized. The goal of the present investigation was to systematically test whether there 
is functional lateralization for prosody perception.  
 To comprehensively test the functional lateralization hypothesis it is necessary 
to vary the communicative function of prosodic material while keeping acoustics 
constant, and to observe whether there is a change in the difference of activity between 
the hemispheres. Note that the acoustic and functional lateralization hypotheses are 
non-mutually exclusive and could represent different stages of the prosody perception 
process. Indeed, recent neural models of prosody perception have suggested that there 
might be acoustically driven lateralization in an initial processing stage, but more 
semantically (functionally) driven lateralization in subsequent stages (Bruck, Kreifelts, & 
Wildgruber, 2011; Kotz & Paulmann, 2011). To shed light on the issue of when in time 
functional lateralization arises the present ERP study systematically manipulated the 
function of prosody by instructing one group of subjects to evaluate the emotional 
prosody dimension and a different group of participants to evaluate the linguistic 
prosody dimension of identical bi-dimensional stimuli.  
Interestingly, Paulmann, Jessen and Kotz (2012) recently reported such a 
direct comparison of emotional to linguistic prosody perception using the cross-splicing 
paradigm. A so called ‘prosodic expectancy positivity (PEP)’ was found that was more 
pronounced for emotional than linguistic prosody expectancy violations, suggesting 
prioritized processing of emotional prosodic cues. However, the authors did not find 




task-driven effects and suggested that the absence of such effects at the 
electrophysiological level might have been caused by a lack of statistical power to detect 
(presumably small) task effects, requiring investigation of this issue using larger study 
samples. Furthermore, a within-subjects manipulation of task demands was employed, 
which required subjects to switch between an emotional and a linguistic task set. As the 
authors pointed out, this procedure might have reduced task-driven differences in 
prosody processing, warranting a more extended investigation of this issue using a 
between subjects manipulation of task demands.  
 The dichotic listening (DL) paradigm is particularly suited to study 
hemispheric specialization in the auditory modality (Greenwald & Jerger, 2003). In the 
divided-attention version of this paradigm, two different stimuli are presented to each 
ear. The participant has to divide attention over the auditory channels and react only to 
the target stimulus presented to one of the ears. It is generally agreed that in the DL-
situation the ipsilateral projection of information from the ears to the cerebral 
hemispheres is inhibited, rendering auditory information from the ears to be primarily 
available to the contralateral hemisphere (e.g. see Davidson & Hugdahl, 1995). 
Therefore, if there were hemispheric specialization for the processing of an auditory 
stimulus, this would be observable as a performance advantage of the ear contralateral 
to the specialized hemisphere as it has direct access to the specialized processing 
module (for a discussion of the exact mechanisms behind DL, see Grimshaw, Kwasny, 
Covell, & Johnson, 2003).  
Only one previous study has combined the DL-paradigm with ERPs to study 
lateralization of emotional prosody perception. Erhan, Borod, Tenke and Bruder (1998) 
presented participants with dichotic pairs of nonsense syllables, each of which was 
spoken in one of seven emotional prosodic categories. Participants had to detect a pre-
specified emotional prosodic category as fast as possible while the EEG was recorded. 
Auditory target detection studies like these generally find an initial negativity followed 
by a positivity for targets as compared with non-targets (e.g., see Fitzgerald & Picton, 
1983). In the case of the positivity, it has been demonstrated that its amplitude 
increases when target probability decreases, while for the earlier negativity this effect is 
weak at best (Polich & Bondurant, 1996). The positivity can be subdivided in the P3b 
component and the slow wave, which together have been termed Late Positive 
Potential or LPP (e.g. see Briggs & Martin, 2009). Erhan et al. (1998) indeed found an 
N1 and a sustained negativity, followed by a late positivity and a slow wave. Further, at 
the behavioral level a left ear advantage (LEA) was found for accuracy, in line with a 
right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody. The sustained negativity (300-
879 ms post stimulus onset) was identified as a potential electrophysiological marker of 
the behavioral ear advantage, hypothesized to reflect the emotional categorization 
process. However, although the relatively late latency of the component might be 
interpreted to reflect  fairly late (and therefore possibly functional) processing, strictly 
speaking it is unclear whether this lateralized component reflected early acoustic 
lateralization, more abstract functional hemispheric specialization or both as the 
function of prosody was not manipulated independently of the acoustics (or vice versa).  
In the present ERP study, linguistic and emotional prosodic task demands 
were manipulated between-subjects with comparably high statistical power while 
keeping acoustics constant in a divided-attention dichotic auditory target detection. We 
predicted that, if there is functional lateralization of prosodic perception, there should 
be a right-ear advantage for the linguistic prosody perception task and a left-ear 
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advantage for the emotional task. At the electrophysiological level, we hypothesized 
that the distribution of the N2 or LPP over the hemispheres might change 
correspondingly, demonstrating functional lateralization. Lastly, we considered the 
possibility that an earlier component (reflecting acoustic processing) might also be 
sensitive to variation in task demands, reflecting top-down task dependent (and 
possibly lateralized) modulation of earlier acoustic processing, as has been 
demonstrated previously (Sussman, Winkler, Huotilainen, Ritter, & Näätänen, 2002).  
 
2. Methods  
 
2.1. Participants 
A total of 82 subjects participated in the experiment. Five subjects were excluded 
because of lower than chance level performance and three due to noisy EEG-data, 
resulting in a total of 74 participants; 41 (21 male; mean age 23, range 18-37) for the 
emotional prosodic task and 33 different participants (16 male; mean age 23, range 19-
36) for the linguistic prosodic task. The two groups did not differ in male-female ratio 
or age (for all: one-way ANOVA, F < 1.01, p > 0.5) All participants were right-handed 
as assessed with the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), were native 
speakers of Dutch, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no (neuro)psychiatric 
problems in present or past. Participants showing a mean inter-ear hearing threshold 
difference greater than 12 dB on .5 kHz, 1 kHz, 2 kHz, 4kHz sinusoid tones were 
excluded from the study. Participants received 20 Euros for their participation in the 
two hour EEG session. Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to 
the experiment. The study was approved by the local ethics committee and conducted 
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
2.2. Materials 
Pseudowords (see Appendix A) with a bisyllabic structure were generated by randomly 
combining monosyllables that were composed of random combinations of an initial 
consonant, a vowel and a final consonant. All pseudowords obeyed Dutch phonotactics 
and were checked to verify the absence of semantic content. All pseudowords were 
uttered with angry and sad prosody and with stress on the first and second syllable by a 
professional actress and recorded at 16 bit resolution and a 44.1 kHz bit sampling rate 
in a sound-proofed booth. Items were intensity normalized and had a mean duration of 
750 msec. In line with previous literature (Cutler, 2005; Scherer, 2003) unstressed 
syllables differed from stressed syllables primarily in duration while sad and angry 
prosody additionally differed in F0, F0 variability, and variation in intensity (see Table 1). 
Note that angry and sad items did not show a large intensity difference as the stimuli 
had been intensity-normalized. To verify the validity of the intended prosodic contrasts, 
a panel of five healthy volunteers classified each sad and angry prosodic stimulus (in 
addition to neutral, happy and surprised prosodic stimuli that were not used in the 
present study) in a forced choice task and rated each item on a five-point typicality scale 
(1 = very atypical, 5 = very typical). Only pseudowords were selected for which the 
emotional prosodic contrasts (angry and sad intonation) were classified correctly by at 
least 4 out of 5 panel members and which had a typicality rating of at least 3.5.  
There is evidence that increasing spectral overlap between the target and the 
competing stimulus increases the suppression of ipsilateral afferent routes from the ears 
to the cerebral hemispheres, which enhances ear advantages (Della Penna et al., 2007). 




Therefore, to maximize spectral overlap, a competing babble stimulus was created by 
selecting random small segments of speech of the actress and superimposing them onto 
each other. Dichotic stimuli were created by selecting a random sample of the babble 
stimulus with the exact same duration of the target stimulus and combining the two 
(with the target presented in one channel and the babble stimulus in the other channel). 
This procedure ensured constant and high competition between the target stimulus and 
the distracter. 
Two dichotic target detection tasks were created that presented identical 
prosodic dichotic targets. From the pool of validated dichotic stimuli, six that had sad 
prosody and stress on the first syllable served as targets. For the emotional task, 
subjects were instructed to press as fast as possible when they heard a sad target. For 
the linguistic task, subjects responded as fast as possible when targets had word initial 
stress. Hence, identical stimuli served as targets for both tasks while only the task 
demands (emotional versus linguistic decision) varied. Ten items with angry prosody 
and stress on the second syllable served as non-targets in both target detection tasks. 
Additionally, four task-specific (non-target) filler items were presented ten times to each 
ear but were not analyzed. For the emotional task, angry items with stress on the first 
syllable were added to prevent subjects from using a linguistic strategy to detect 
emotional prosody. For the linguistic task, sad items with stress on the second syllable 
were added to prevent subjects from using an emotional strategy to detect stress 
position. Each item was presented ten times to each ear, resulting in a total of 120 
target and 280 non-target trials per ear. Hence, a target occurred in 30% of the trials for 
both the emotional and the linguistic DL-task, and target probability was 50% between 
the two ears. Task-irrelevant prosodic categories (e.g. word-initial versus word-final 




  Table 1. Acoustic properties of the linguistic and emotional prosodic contrasts (SD in  








     


















































Each participant completed one of the two dichotic target-detection tasks in a sound-
proof booth. Subjects were instructed that they would hear a prosodic stimulus in one 
ear and people babbling in the other ear. They were told to ignore the babble stimulus 
and to decide as fast and accurately as possible when they heard the target prosody by 
pressing the spacebar with the index finger. Response hand was counterbalanced across 
participants. Participants were instructed that they could respond while the stimulus 
was still playing (i.e., RTs were recorded from the onset of the stimulus). All 
instructions were exactly the same for both tasks except for the description of the task-
specific prosodic stimulus categories.  
Each dichotic listening task started with twelve dichotic practice trials. 
Participants kept practising these items until a performance level of at least 75% correct 
was reached. Subsequently, the experimental trials started which encompassed a total of 
400 dichotic trials (120 targets, 200 non-targets and 80 fillers). Stimulus presentation 
order was (pseudo-) random with the restriction that no more than two consecutive 
presentations of a target were allowed. 
An experimental trial started with a black fixation cross that was presented for 
1500 ms. Subsequently, a red fixation cross and a binaural warning tone of 500 Hz were 
presented for 500 ms, after which the dichotic stimulus was presented while the 
fixation cross remained red. The trial ended 2000 ms after stimulus onset or when 
participants made a response. Participants were instructed to fix their gaze on the 
fixation cross throughout the experiment in order to reduce eye movements and not to 
blink while the fixation cross was red (i.e., when the stimuli were presented).  
Stimulus presentation was controlled using E-prime 1.2 and stimulus material 
was presented at 16 bit resolution and a 44.1 kHz sampling frequency through 
headphones at a comfortable intensity level. 
 
2.4. EEG Recordings 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64 tin electrodes mounted in an 
elastic electro-cap organized according to the international 10/20 system. EEG data 
were recorded with a linked mastoid physical reference and were re-referenced using an 
average reference. Vertical and horizontal electrooculogram (VEOG and HEOG) were 
recorded with two pairs of electrodes, one pair placed above and below the left eye, the 
other pair placed beside the two eyes. The ground electrode was applied to the sternum. 
Impedance of all electrodes was kept below 5 kΏ for each participant. EEG was 
continuously recorded with a sampling rate of 500 Hz, amplified, and off-line digitally 
low-pass filtered with a cut-off frequency of 30 Hz. Participants were seated in front of 
a monitor at a distance of approximately 50 cm in a dimly lit, electrically shielded and 
sound-attenuated booth.  
 
2.5. Behavioral analysis  
A RM-MANOVA was performed with Ear (left, right) as a within-subject factor, and 
Task (emotional, linguistic) as between-subject factor. Dependent measures were 










The EEG data were analyzed with Brain Vision Analyzer (version 1.05). Prior to 
averaging, trials with eye-movement and blink artefacts were excluded from analysis. 
Criteria for artefact rejection within an epoch were a maximal voltage step of 50 µV, a 
maximal difference between two values in a segment of 100 µV, and a minimal and 
maximal amplitude of -100 µV and 100 µV, respectively. 
ERP epochs were computed in a 1000 ms time-window and aligned to a 100 
ms pre-stimulus baseline. Individual averages included at least 38 correctly detected 
target trials per ear. Based on the previous literature on attentive auditory target 
detection (e.g., see Fitzgerald & Picton, 1983; Nager et al., 2001; Becker & Reinvang, 
2007), we expected to find negativities in the N2 range, followed by a late ( > 300 ms) 
positive potential (LPP) including a P3b and a slow wave, when comparing targets to 
non-targets. Visual inspection of the ERP waves confirmed our expectations and 
additionally suggested an early negativity in the N1 latency range for targets as 
compared to non-targets (see Figure 2). Although both peak and mean amplitude 
analyses were considered, we decided to exclusively report mean amplitude analyses as 
only the early negativity exhibited a clear peak (as can be observed in Figure 2). For 
each participant, mean amplitudes for correct target detection were computed for 100-
140 ms (early negativity), 180-320 ms (N2) and 350-900 ms (LPP). Because the early 
negativity exhibited a clear peak, peak latency could be analyzed additionally. 
Due to the relatively large sample size of the present investigation, an analysis 
of the electrophysiological correlate of the ear advantage was possible. Participants were 
divided into a left ear advantage (LEA) group and a right ear advantage (REA) group, 
defined as the negative or positive difference between reaction times for correct 
responses of the left and right ear, respectively. This group analysis served to identify 
differences in ERP components depending on the laterality of the ear advantage (LEA 
versus REA). 
For all analyses, a set of 36 electrodes was used (see Figure 1). For each 
hemisphere, the 18 electrodes were divided into six regions of interest (ROIs) 
comprising three electrodes each. Topographic effects were then analysed using two 
factors: Laterality (left hemisphere, proximal electrodes: F3, FC3, FC1, C3, C1, FC3, P3, 
PO3, P1; lateral electrodes: F7, F5, FC5, T7, C5, CP5, P7, P5, PO7; right hemisphere, 
proximal electrodes: F4, FC4, FC2, C4, CP4, C2, P4, PO4, P2; lateral electrodes: F8, F6, 
FC6, T8, C6, CP6, P8, P6, PO8), and a factor Longitudinality (left hemisphere, frontal 
electrodes: F7, F5, FC5, F3, FC3, FC1; central electrodes: T7, C5, CP5, C3, C1, CP3; 
posterior electrodes: P7, P5, PO7, P3, P1, PO3; right hemisphere, frontal electrodes: F8, 
F6, FC6, F4, FC4, FC2; central electrodes: T8, C6, CP8, C4, C2, CP4; posterior 
electrodes: P8, P8, PO8, P4, P2, PO4).  
For the main analyses, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
conducted using PASW Statistics with Ear (left, right), Hemisphere (left, right), 
Laterality (proximal, lateral) and Longitudinality (frontal, central, posterior) as within-
subject factors and Task (linguistic, emotional) as between-subject factor and mean 
amplitude as dependent variable (for the N1 component latency was additionally 
analyzed as dependent variable). An additional MANOVA was performed using exactly 
the same factors but with the additional factor EA Group to investigate the 
electrophysiological correlates of the behavioral ear advantage. Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected p-values are reported. 
 


























3. Results  
 
3.1 Behavioral results 
The behavioral results can be found in Table 2. Repeated Measures (RM)-MANOVA 
suggested that the emotional task was easier than the linguistic task as indicated by a 
main effect of Task (F(2,71) = 91.54, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .72). Follow-up univariate tests 
confirmed that both reaction time was faster (F(1,71) = 180.91, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .72) 
and accuracy higher (F(1,71) = 57.84, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .45) for the emotional as 
compared to the linguistic task.  
 In sum, the behavioral results suggest that the emotional prosody task was 




   Table 2. Behavioral results for the experimental conditions (SD in parentheses). 
 Linguistic task Emotional task 
 Left ear Right ear Left ear Right ear 
Accuracy (% correct) 88 (0.10) 86 (0.11) 99 (0.02) 99 (0.01) 






Figure 1. Electrode array used for the experiment. Dashed lines indicate the 
combination of the levels of the factor Laterality (central, lateral) and Longitudinality 






























3.2. Electrophysiological results –task effects 
The ERP waves of the early negativity, N2 and LPP are visualized in Figure 2. As the 
present paper is focused on task effects, in the results section below, only task-related 
effects and the most complete interactions are discussed. For the qualified main effects 
and simpler interactions and non-task related effects, we refer the reader to the 
Supplementary information.  
 
3.2.1. Early negativity  
The RM-MANOVA for mean amplitude revealed a Hemisphere × Ear × 
Longitudinality × Task interaction (F(2,142) = 3.34, p < 0.05, ηp2 = .05). Following up 
with separate ANOVAs for each level of Longitudinality, revealed that at frontal sites, 
the left ear elicited a larger negativity than the right for the emotional task in both 
hemispheres while for the linguistic task each ear elicited a larger negativity in the 
contralateral hemisphere (F(1,72) = 6.25, p < 0.05, ηp2 = .08) while at central (F(1,72) 
= 0.2, p > 0.05, ηp2 = .003) and posterior sites (F(1,72) = 0.1, p > 0.05, ηp2 = .001) 
there was no three-way interaction.  
An identical MANOVA with latency as dependent variable revealed a 
Hemisphere × Ear × Task interaction (F(1,71) = 5.93 p < 0.05, ηp2 = .08) with shorter 
latency in the contralateral hemisphere for each ear for the emotional task, while for the 
linguistic task latency was shorter in the hemisphere ipsilateral to each ear.  
In sum, at frontal sites the left ear elicited a stronger negativity than the right 
ear in both hemispheres for the emotional task, while for the linguistic task each ear 
elicited a larger negativity in the contralateral hemisphere. Last, latency was shorter in 
the hemisphere contralateral to the stimulated ear for the emotional task, while for the 
linguistic task latency was shorter in the ipsilateral hemisphere.  
 
3.2.2. N2 
The MANOVA for mean amplitude revealed a Longitudinality × Task interaction 
(F(2,142) = 19.74, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .22). Following up with separate ANOVAs for each 
level of Longitudinality revealed a larger N2 amplitude for the emotional task compared 
to the linguistic task at frontal sites (F(1,72) = 13.24, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .16), a trend for 
the emotional task to elicit a greater negativity than the linguistic task at central sites 
(F(1,72) = 3.76, p = 0.057, ηp2 = .05), and a greater negativity for the linguistic task 
than the emotional task at posterior sites (F(1,72) = 6.04, p < 0.05, ηp2 = .08) 
In sum, the emotional task elicited a larger negativity than the linguistic task at 
frontocentral sites, while the linguistic task elicited a larger negativity than the 
emotional task at posterior sites. 
 
3.2.3. LPP 
The MANOVA for mean amplitude revealed a Hemisphere × Longitudinality × Task 
interaction (F(2,144) = 6.23, p < 0.01, ηp2 = .08). Following up the interaction with 
separate ANOVAs for each level of Longitudinality revealed a significant Hemisphere 
× Task interaction at posterior sites (F(1,72) = 8.28, p < 0.01, ηp2 = .10) with a clear 
positivity for the emotional task that was larger for the left than the right hemisphere 
while for the linguistic task there was a much smaller positivity that was larger for the 
right than the left hemisphere. For frontal and central sites there was no significant 
Task × Hemisphere interaction (p > 0.05).  
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Further, there was a Hemisphere × Laterality × Task interaction (F(2,144) = 7.65, p < 
0.01, ηp2 = .10) Follow-up ANOVAs for each task revealed that for the emotional task 
there was a significant Hemisphere × Laterality interaction (F(1,40) = 13.03, p < 0.01), 
ηp2 = .25) with a positivity for proximal sites that was larger for the right than left 
hemisphere and a negativity for lateral sites that was larger for the right than the left 
hemisphere, while for the linguistic task there was no significant interaction (p > 0.05).  
 To summarize, for the emotional task, there was a late positivity that was 
larger in the left than the right hemisphere at posterior sites and larger in the right than 
left hemisphere for proximal sites irrespective of intra-hemispheric location, while for 
the linguistic task there was a highly reduced positivity that was larger in the right than 















Figure 2. Grand average for the perception of emotional (targets: green, non-targets: 
red) and linguistic (targets: blue, non-targets: black) prosody for a representative set 
of electrodes used in the analyses. Averages are shown for a 1000 ms time window 
post target onset. 




3.3. Electrophysiological results - ERP correlates of the ear advantage 
The LEA and REA group consisted of 46 and 28 participants respectively. The two 
groups did not differ in male-female ratio, age or task performance (for all: p > 0.05). 
The groups showed a very large difference in the mean ear advantage T(1,71) = −10.17, 
p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.46) with a very large mean LEA and REA of −34 ms (SD = 
26; Cohen’s d = −1.30) and 33 ms (SD = 30; Cohen’s d = 1.14), respectively. For both 
groups, the ear advantage was very robust (paired t-test for both groups; p < 0.001). In 
the section below, only significant interactions with EA-group are discussed (for a 
complete overview of effects, please see the Supplementary information).  
 
3.3.1. Early negativity 
No significant main effects or interactions were found for the MANOVA with mean 
amplitude as dependent variable.  
The MANOVA with peak latency as dependent variable revealed a 
Hemisphere × Laterality × EA-group interaction (F(1,69) = 4.96, p < 0.05, ηp2 = .10). 
Follow-up MANOVAs for each group showed that for the LEA-group the two-way 
interaction was non-significant (p > 0.05) but for the REA group there was a significant 
interaction (F(1,26) = 11.75, p < 0.01, ηp2 = .31) with shorter latency for the left 
hemisphere than the right, but only at lateral sites (see Figure 3).  
 
3.3.2. N2 
No main effects or interactions were found.  
 
3.3.3. LPP 

















Figure 3. Hemispheric asymmetry of N1 peak latency (left hemisphere peak latency 





























Error bars: 95% CI
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4. Discussion  
The goal of the present investigation was to test whether functional hemispheric 
specialization for prosody perception could be demonstrated. This was achieved by 
varying the emotional versus linguistic prosodic processing mode between participants 
using identical prosodic stimuli in a dichotic listening ERP paradigm. No functional 
lateralization effects were observed at the behavioral or electrophysiological level. 
Overall, the emotional task generated a larger response than the linguistic task. Last, the 
behavioral ear advantage correlated with hemispheric asymmetry of early negativity 
latency for the REA group. The absence of functional lateralization effects, task effects 
and the neural correlate of the right ear advantage will be discussed below.  
 
4.1. Functional hemispheric specialization for prosody perception 
As outlined in the introduction, recent meta-analytic evidence suggests that there is 
relative right hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception while 
linguistic prosody perception is under bilateral control (Witteman, Van IJzendoorn, 
Van de Velde, Van Heuven, & Schiller, 2011). Hemispheric specialization on the one 
hand has been proposed to result from a non-prosody specific right hemispheric 
advantage in the processing of relevant acoustic cues (i.e., the cue-dependent lateralization 
hypotheses) while the functional lateralization hypothesis on the other hand proposes 
that the left and right hemisphere are specialized in the processing of the functional 
categories of emotion versus linguistic prosody, respectively. The dynamic dual pathway 
model by Friederici and Alter (2004) further specifies that in the case of linguistic 
prosody perception, lateralization may depend on the degree to which prosody is 
bound to segmental structure, with linguistic prosody that is relatively closely bound to 
segments (such as metical stress, as used in the present investigation) being left-
lateralized and linguistic prosody that is not closely bound to the segmental structure 
(such as boundary marking) being right-lateralized. Note that the functional hypothesis 
requires that an abstract categorical level of processing has been reached (in order to 
deduce the functional category of prosodic information) before functional hemispheric 
specialization can take place.  
As outlined in the introduction, recent models propose a three-stage process 
of (emotional) prosody perception (Kotz & Paulmann, 2011; Brück, Kreifelts, & 
Wildgruber, 2011), including (1) extraction of acoustic properties in the primary 
auditory cortex, (2) integration of acoustic properties into a meaningful suprasegmental 
representation in the associative auditory cortex, and (3) explicit evaluation in frontal 
cortical areas. It has been suggested that it takes at least 100 ms to reach the first more 
abstract stage (stage-two) level of processing (Schirmer & Kotz, 2006). Therefore, 
assuming a strictly serial model, functional lateralization effects are expected to be 
present in the electrophysiological signal 100 ms after the presentation of a prosodic 
stimulus. However, it seems likely that the prosody perception process is dynamic, 
allowing for the possibility of task demands modulating (hemispheric specialization for) 
earlier stages of prosodic perception (e.g., Brechmann & Scheich, 2005) through top-
down modulation. 
As both acoustic and functional properties have been hypothesized to 
influence hemispheric specialization for prosody perception (Pell, 1998) it is necessary 
to vary the functional task demands of a prosody perception task while keeping 
acoustics constant and to observe whether there is a shift in hemispheric asymmetry of 
neural activity to test the functional hemispheric lateralization hypothesis. Therefore, in 




the present study we instructed one group of participants to categorize the emotional 
and another group to categorize the linguistic prosodic dimension of the same bi-
dimensional prosodic stimuli. Furthermore, to maximize power to detect hemispheric 
specialization effects, we presented stimuli in a dichotic listening paradigm with a 
relatively large sample of participants as compared to previous research. Indeed, using 
G-power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) we calculated that even a small-to-
moderate effect of the critical Ear × Task interaction could be detected with sufficient 
(80%) power in the present study. However, no functional hemispheric specialization 
effects were found at the behavioral level (as indexed by the ear advantage) or at the 
electrophysiological level. Two explanations seem plausible for the absence of this 
effect: (1) functional lateralization effects are of considerable magnitude but the present 
paradigm was not able to detect the effect of interest; (2) functional lateralization 
effects are too small to be picked up even by the present (relatively high powered) study. 
The first explanation seems unlikely as a standard dichotic target detection paradigm 
was employed in the present investigation that has frequently been used in previous 
studies. Further, an ERP-waveform was detected that is typically observed in target 
detection paradigms (initial negativity followed by a positivity) demonstrating the 
validity of the paradigm and suggesting that the current paradigm should in principle 
have been able to detect functional lateralization effects.  
Concerning the second explanation, an examination of the previous evidence 
in favor of functional lateralization is required. Only three previous studies had the 
necessary design to test the functional lateralization hypothesis. First, in a behavioral 
study, Luks, Nusbaum and Levy (1998) presented 32 subjects with utterances that were 
pronounced either as a question or a statement in the dichotic listening paradigm. 
Participants were instructed to categorize the utterances as a question or statement. No 
ear advantage was found. In a second experiment, 50 subjects had to categorize the 
same utterances but now emotionally (whether the utterances sounded surprised or 
neutral). This time a LEA was found. The authors concluded that the ear advantage 
could be modulated by task demands alone. However, these results are only partially in 
line with the functional lateralization hypothesis, as the expected REA for the linguistic 
prosody categorization task was not found. Second, Wildgruber et al. (2004) contrasted 
discrimination of sentential focus (linguistic prosody perception) to discrimination of 
expressiveness of the same stimuli (which can be argued to fall in the category of 
emotional prosody) in a functional imaging study including 10 participants. When 
contrasting the two tasks directly, a cluster of activity was observed in the left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) for perception of linguistic prosody while 
bilateral orbitofrontal activation was noted for the perception of emotional prosody. 
Although this seems to provide evidence in favor of a greater left- than right-
hemispheric contribution to linguistic prosody perception, no formal tests on 
hemispheric asymmetry were performed, leaving it unclear whether the left DLPFC was 
indeed significantly more active than its right-hemispheric counterpart. Also, the 
expected right lateralized activity for the emotional task was not found. Lastly, a recent 
ERP-study using the cross-splicing paradigm with a sample size of 20 participants also 
failed to find (functional) hemispheric specialization effects for emotional versus 
linguistic prosody perception (Paulmann, Jessen, & Kotz, 2012). Therefore, based on 
the scarce evidence to date, we conclude that the evidence for functional lateralization 
in prosody perception is weak and future high-powered studies that manipulate the 
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function of prosody independently of acoustics while measuring neural activity over the 
two hemispheres are required to clarify this issue. 
 
4.2. Task effects 
Although no significant interaction between task demands and hemispheric asymmetry 
was found, emotional task demands enhanced the amplitude of all ERP components 
across both hemispheres relative to the linguistic task. Two explanations may account 
for these effects. On the one hand, directing attention to the emotional dimension of 
the stimuli might have enhanced processing (or the emotional dimension might have 
interfered with linguistic processing during the linguistic task). Indeed, previous studies 
have found evidence for enhancement of ERP amplitudes by emotional task demands 
(e.g., for the LPP see Hajcak et al., 2006; Naumann et al., 1992), interpreted as 
prioritized processing of emotional information. On the other hand, task differences 
could be explained by differences in task difficulty, as the emotional task was easier 
than the linguistic task in the present investigation. Indeed, previous ERP studies have 
found enhanced amplitudes when difficulty of a task is reduced (e.g., for the LPP, see 
Molnár, 1999; Gaál, Csuhaj, & Molnár, 2007; but see Combs & Polich, 2006 for 
conflicting evidence). These two explanations might be non-mutually exclusive as 
processing of emotional information might be easier than linguistic processing because 
of its comparatively large salience. Future studies that vary emotional versus non-
emotional task demands while controlling for difficulty (or vice versa) are needed to 
shed light on this issue. 
Lastly, early negativity amplitudes were larger across both hemispheres for the 
left ear than the right for the emotional task, while the reverse was true for the linguistic 
task. Although it is tempting to interpret this interaction as an electrophysiological 
correlate of LEA and REA respectively, these effects were unrelated to behavioral EA 
effects.  
 
4.3. Electrophysiological correlates of the Ear Advantage (EA) 
Although we did not find an overall EA for linguistic or emotional prosody perception, 
the relatively large sample size of the present investigation permitted an additional 
analysis to explore the electrophysiological correlates of the EA. Participants could be 
divided into a REA or LEA group independently of whether the emotional or linguistic 
task was performed, allowing for an analysis of possible underlying electrophysiological 
determinants of the EA. This analysis revealed that only hemispheric asymmetry in the 
latency of the early negativity for lateral sites could account for REAs, with REAs 
associated with shorter latency in the left than right hemisphere. For LEAS, however, 
such a latency difference was not found.  
 The ‘structural model’ of the ear advantage proposed by Kimura (see Della 
Penna et al., 2007) suggests that EAs arise in the DL-situation because ipsilateral neural 
routes from the ear to the hemisphere are suppressed. When the specialized 
hemisphere is ipsilateral to the stimulated ear, the signal has to be transferred over the 
corpus callosum to reach it and reaction time is delayed. The present results are in line 
with the structural model as REAs (but not LEAs) were associated with a delayed 
response of the ipsilateral hemisphere. Our results suggest that REAs can be explained 
by relatively early specialization at the level of the auditory cortex of the contralateral 
hemisphere, as the locus of the auditory N1 has been suggested to lay in the auditory 
cortex (Sandmann et al., 2007). Such early ERP correlates of the EA have been 




reported before in the literature (Eichele, Nordby, Rimol, & Hugdahl, 2005, but for 
conflicting evidence see Greenwald & Jerger, 2003). However, other studies have found 
later ERP components to be correlated with the EA (Ahoniska, Cantell, Tolvanen, & 
Lyytenen, 1993; Teder, Alho, Reinikainen, & Näätänen, 1993; Erhan, Borod, Tenke, & 
Bruder, 1998). As suggested by Erhan, Borod, Tenke and Bruder (1996), the N1 
asymmetry in favor of the left hemisphere might not be related to prosodic processing 
but rather to the detection of phonemes. Thus, although speculative, the REAs found 
in the present study may represent relatively early left hemispheric specialization for 
phonetic processing during prosody processing.  
 
4.4. Strengths and weaknesses 
The present study is the first to systematically test the functional lateralization 
hypothesis of prosody perception using both behavioral evidence (EAs) and ERPs and 
with the highest statistical power to date. Despite relatively high statistical power, we 
failed to find evidence for functional lateralization, which we have argued may reflect 
the modest magnitude of this effect. The task differences found were confounded with 
a task difficulty effect, rendering it uncertain whether these differences reflect 
differences in the linguistic versus emotional mode of processing or differential 
difficulty of the tasks. Lastly, we included only negative emotions, restricting inferences 
about emotion effects to negative valence.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
The present investigation did not find evidence for the functional lateralization 
hypothesis of prosody perception despite relatively high statistical power, suggesting 
that functional lateralization effects are small. Evidence was found in favor of the idea 
that REAs can be explained by a speed of processing advantage of the contralateral 
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With the advent of neuroimaging considerable progress has been made in uncovering 
the neural network involved in the perception of emotional prosody. However, the 
exact neuroanatomical underpinnings of the emotional prosody perception process 
remain unclear. Furthermore, it is unclear what the intrahemispheric basis might be of 
the relative right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception that has 
been found previously in the lesion literature. In an attempt to shed light on these 
issues, quantitative meta-analyses of the neuroimaging literature were performed to 
investigate which brain areas are robustly associated with stimulus-driven and task-
dependent perception of emotional prosody. Also, lateralization analyses were 
performed to investigate whether statistically reliable hemispheric specialization across 
studies can be found in these networks. A bilateral temporofrontal network was found 
to be implicated in emotional prosody perception, generally supporting previously 
proposed models of emotional prosody perception. Right-lateralized convergence 
across studies was found in (early) auditory processing areas, suggesting that the right 
hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception reported previously in the 
lesion literature might be driven by hemispheric specialization for non-prosody-specific 



















For group-dwelling primates including humans the ability to recognize and strategically 
react to the emotions of con-specifics is essential as it promotes reproductive success 
(Silk, 2007). The ‘social brain hypothesis’ even proposes that selective pressure on such 
social processing capacities drove the relative expansion of the neocortex in the course 
of primate evolution (Dunbar, 1998). The importance of the ability to read the 
(emotional) mind of others in modern human society is exemplified by the devastating 
effects that disorders of ‘theory of mind’ processing such as autism spectrum disorders 
can have on daily functioning of affected individuals (for a review on the evolution and 
disorders of theory of mind see e.g. Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006).  
 How something is being said is an important source of information regarding 
the emotional state of the speaker. This emotional prosodic (or suprasegmental, i.e., 
pertaining to a phonological element whose domain is something larger than a single 
segment, Trask, 1996, p. 343) layer of speech uses a variety of acoustic cues such as 
intensity, speaking rate, F0 and spectral balance to signal emotional states (Scherer, 
2003). Cross-cultural studies have found better-than-chance decoding accuracy between 
cultures for basic vocal emotions such as anger and sadness (Scherer, Banse, & 
Wallbott, 2001; Van Bezooijen, Otto, & Heenan, 1983), suggesting that the human 
brain might indeed harbor a dedicated emotional voice recognition system that is 
rooted in our evolutionary history.  
 Our knowledge of how the brain processes emotional prosody has been 
greatly advanced with the advent of neuroimaging techniques. Using this technique 
there generally have been two approaches to delineating the neural network involved in 
emotional prosody perception. On the one hand, it has been tested which regions in the 
brain show a stronger response to emotional prosodic categories (such as anger) than to 
neutral prosody: this network includes areas involved in the extraction of acoustic cues 
that are important for emotional prosody perception and therefore has been called 
‘stimulus-driven’ (Wildgruber, Ethofer, Grandjean, & Kreifelts, 2009). On the other 
hand, it has been investigated which brain areas are more active when attention is 
directed to emotional prosody as compared to direction of attention to a non-emotional 
prosodic dimension of the same stimulus material (such as the segmental structure or 
semantics). As this network of regions is sensitive to emotional prosodic task demands 
independently of acoustics, it has been called ‘task-dependent’ (Wildgruber et al., 2009). 
By comparing these stimulus-driven and task-dependent networks, insight can be 
gained in the regional sensitivity of the brain to earlier and later stages of the emotional 
prosodic perception process respectively despite the relatively low temporal resolution 
of functional neuroimaging.  
 Imaging studies employing stimulus-driven contrasts have generally found a 
network of areas comprising the superior temporal cortex (Beaucousin et al., 2007; 
Brück, Kreifelts, Kaza, Lotze, & Wildgruber, 2011; Dietrich, Hertrich, Alter,  Ischebeck, 
& Ackermann, 2008; Ethofer et al., 2007; Ethofer, Van de Ville, Scherer, & Vuilleumier, 
2009; Ethofer et al., 2011; Frühholz, Ceravolo, & Grandjean, 2011; Grandjean et al., 
2005; Imaizumi et al., 1997; Kotz et al., 2003; Leitman et al., 2010; Mitchell, Elliott, 
Barry, Cruttenden, & Woodruff, 2003; Morris, Scott, & Dolan, 1999; Mothes-Lasch, 
Mentzel, Miltner, & Straube, 2011; Sander et al., 2005; Wiethoff et al., 2007; Wittfoth et 
al., 2009) and frontal cortical areas (Brück et al., 2011b; Ethofer et al., 2009; Frühholz et 
al., 2011; Grandjean et al., 2005; Kotz et al., 2003; Leitman et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 
2003; Morris et al., 1999). Additionally, many of these studies find involvement of 




subcortical structures such as the insula (Ethofer et al., 2009; Leitman et al., 2010; 
Morris et al., 1999; Mothes-Lasch et al., 2011), basal ganglia (Ethofer et al., 2009; Kotz 
et al., 2003; Leitman et al., 2010; Morris et al., 1999) and to a lesser extent the amygdala 
(Ethofer et al., 2009; Mothes-Lasch et al., 2011; Sander et al., 2005; Wiethoff, 
Wildgruber, Grodd, & Ethofer, 2009).  
 Studies using task-dependent contrasts tend to find frontal activations (Bach 
et al., 2008; Brück, Kreifelts,  Kaza, Lotze, & Wildgruber, 2011; Buchanan et al., 2000; 
Ethofer et al., 2006; Ethofer et al., 2009; George et al., 1996; Imaizumi et al., 1997; 
Mitchell et al., 2003; Wildgruber et al., 2004) in addition to superior temporal activation 
(Bach et al., 2008; Ethofer et al., 2006; Ethofer et al., 2009; Frühholz, Ceravolo, & 
Grandjean, 2011; Gandour et al., 2003; Wildgruber et al., 2005). This pattern of results 
seems to suggest that superior temporal regions are primarily involved in the initial 
stages of the emotional prosodic perception process, while frontal areas are involved in 
later stages.  
 This literature together with electrophysiological and clinical data has inspired 
two rather similar multi-stage models (Schirmer & Kotz, 2006; Wildgruber, Ethofer, 
Grandjean, & Kreifelts, 2009) of emotional prosody perception. Both models propose 
that in an initial phase there is extraction of basic acoustic properties from the speech 
signal in the primary and secondary auditory cortex. In the model of Wildgruber et al. 
(2009) the mid-superior temporal gyrus (mid-STG) is explicitly mentioned as an 
important brain region participating in this phase. Furthermore, both models suggest 
that, although processing is bilateral in this stage, there might be relative superiority of 
the right auditory cortex. Both models postulate a second phase in which there is 
integration of acoustic information into an emotional percept or ‘gestalt’ (or where 
meaningful suprasegmental representations of acoustic sequences are realized; 
Wildgruber et al., 2009) but the models differ in the exact neuroanatomical 
underpinnings. While the model of Schirmer and Kotz (2006) and its further 
elaboration by Kotz and Paulmann (2011) suggest that this integration of acoustic cues 
is achieved by moving anteroventrally along the auditory ‘what’-pathway to the anterior 
superior temporal sulcus (STS), the model by Wildgruber et al. (2009) and its further 
expansion by Brück et al. (2011a) proposes that this stage is supported by the posterior 
superior temporal cortex. Both models suggest right-hemispheric specialization in this 
second phase. Finally, both models propose a third phase in which emotional prosody 
is explicitly evaluated and integrated with other cognitive processes. While the model by 
Brück et al. (2011a) assumes that both (left and right) inferior frontal gyri (IFG) have a 
similar evaluative function in this phase, the Kotz and Paulmann (2011) model further 
specifies that the right IFG and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) are involved in the explicit 
evaluation of emotional prosody and that the left IFG is responsible for integrating 
emotional prosodic information with other layers of the speech signal (such as 
semantics). Concerning the role of subcortical structures, the model of Kotz and 
Paulmann (2011) proposes that the amygdala and basal ganglia (BG) are important for 
the detection of emotional salience and evaluation (stage 3) of emotion prosody 
respectively. The model by Brück et al. (2011a) proposes that the amygdala plays a role 
in implicit emotional prosodic perception but leaves the role of the BG unspecified.  
 A longstanding question in the neuropsychological literature is whether there 
is hemispheric specialization within this emotional prosodic perception network. An 
important source of evidence regarding hemispheric specialization is provided by the 
lesion literature as it gives information on the necessity of cerebral structures for 
CHAPTER 2.3:  EMOTIONAL PROSODY: META-ANALYSIS OF FMRI STUDIES  
 
87 
emotional prosody perception. A recent meta-analysis of the lesion literature (Witteman, 
Van IJzendoorn, Van de Velde, Van Heuven, & Schiller, 2011) indeed showed that 
while damage to both cerebral hemispheres degrades emotional prosody perception 
performance, damage to the right hemisphere compromised performance more, 
suggesting that there is relative right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody 
perception. However, it remains unclear through which mechanism such right 
hemispheric specialization for emotional prosodic perception might emerge: 
hemispheric specialization might emerge in any of the three stages proposed by the two 
emotional prosody perception models. 
  Indeed, on the one hand the cue-dependent lateralization hypotheses propose that 
the right-hemisphere specialization for emotional prosody perception can be traced 
back to a (non-prosody specific) advantage of the right hemisphere for early acoustic 
processing such as spectral processing (Van Lancker & Sidtis, 1992) as spectral 
parameters are important for decoding of emotional prosody (Scherer, 2003). The idea 
that there is hemispheric specialization for processing of elementary dimensions of 
speech such as temporal vs. spectral information (Zatorre & Belin, 2001) or integration 
of the speech signal over smaller vs. longer time windows (Poeppel, 2003) in the left 
and right hemisphere respectively has recently indeed been gaining support (see e.g. 
Boemio, Fromm, Braun, & Poeppel, 2005; Jamison, Watkins, Bishop, & Matthews, 
2006). Both proposed models of emotional prosody perception (Brück, Kreifelts, & 
Wildgruber, 2011a; Kotz and Paulmann, 2011) indeed assume relative right hemispheric 
specialization for the first (acoustic) stage of emotional prosody perception in the 
auditory cortex. 
  On the other hand, the functional lateralization hypothesis proposes that the right 
hemisphere is specialized for the processing of the emotional communicative function of 
emotional prosody (Van Lancker, 1980). This proposal might correspond to the more 
abstract processing of emotional prosody in stage 2 (integration of acoustic cues into an 
emotional percept) or stage 3 (explicit evaluation of emotional prosody) in the models 
of emotional prosody perception described above. A closer look at the proposed 
models of emotional prosody perception reveals that while both models assume right-
hemispheric specialization for stage 2 emotional prosody perception, the Kotz and 
Paulmann (2011) model also allows for right-hemispheric specialization in the last 
evaluative stage while the Brück et al. (2011a) model assumes bilateral processing. As a 
consequence of the multi-stage nature of emotional prosodic perception, right-
hemispheric specialization for the whole process of emotional prosody perception (as 
frequently assessed through behavioral tasks in lesion studies) might thus depend on 
right-hemispheric specialization for just one stage or could be additive or even 
interactive (for instance, there might be top-down modulated right-hemispheric 
specialization for acoustic processing based on task demands) across multiple stages.  
 In sum, although considerable progress has been made in delineating the 
neural network involved in emotional prosody perception some questions remain 
unresolved. First, recently proposed models disagree on the exact neuroanatomical 
substrate of the proposed second stage (integration of acoustic cues into an emotional 
percept or representation of meaningful suprasegmental acoustic sequences) of 
emotional prosody perception. Second, is it unclear where in the process of emotional 
prosody perception the right-hemispheric specialization arises that has been found in 
the lesion literature. 




 The exact pattern of results found in fMRI studies is dependent on many 
variables including the scanner hardware, scanning parameters, exact task instructions 
and analysis methods and hence results may vary considerably between studies (Bennett 
& Miller, 2010). Therefore, there seems to be merit in determining which cerebral 
structures are reliably activated across studies that employ a variety of slightly different 
tasks to measure the same hypothesized underlying cognitive process. This will provide 
information about which neural network is generally involved (without study-specific 
idiosyncratic effects) in the hypothesized cognitive process. To the best of our 
knowledge, no such quantitative meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature of 
emotional prosodic perception has as yet been undertaken. Therefore, in the present 
investigation activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis, a commonly used 
and valid coordinate based voxel-wise quantitative meta-analysis method for 
neuroimaging data (Eickhoff et al., 2009; Laird et al., 2005; Turkeltaub et al., 2011; 
Turkeltaub, Eden, Jones, & Zeffiro, 2002), was used to address following questions: 
 
(1) Which neural networks are reliably involved in stimulus-driven and task-dependent 
perception of emotional prosody?  
(2) Can statistically robust lateralization of activation probability be demonstrated for 
these networks? 
 
Two ALE meta-analyses were performed in an attempt to answer these questions: one 
on stimulus-driven processing of emotional prosody and another on task-driven 
processing of emotional prosody. It was hypothesized that these meta-analyses would 
yield the bilateral temporofrontal network with subcortical involvement that has been 
proposed by recent models of emotional prosody perception. Additionally, for each of 
the two meta-analyses subtraction analyses were performed to investigate whether there 
was statistically reliable lateralization of ALE clusters. It was hypothesized that there 
would be multiple lateralized clusters, with clusters in early auditory processing areas 
(reflecting cue-dependent lateralization) and in multimodal temporal or frontal areas 




2.1. Study and experiment selection 
The PubMed database (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/) was searched for relevant 
publications until September 2011 using the following search string for the title or the 
abstract (where the asterisk denotes a wildcard): (brain OR neural) AND emotion* 
AND (prosod* OR vocal OR voice). Additionally, the reference lists of articles and 
recent reviews (Brück et al., 2011a; Kotz & Paulmann, 2011) were checked for 
potentially relevant publications. The following inclusion criteria were applied: (1) an 
emotional prosodic perception task was employed (i.e. studies using nonverbal vocal 
emotional sounds such as laughter were excluded) (2), emotional prosody was the only 
relevant independent variable that was varied (i.e. studies contrasting emotional 
prosody that was congruent with emotional lexical semantics to neutral prosody in 
words with neutral lexical semantics were excluded, since emotional semantics and 
emotional prosody were confounded in that case), (3) subjects were healthy adult 
participants, (4) whole brain analyses were reported (ROI analyses were excluded), (5) 
peak coordinates of significantly activated areas were reported in the MNI (Evans et al., 
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1993) or Talairach (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) standard stereotactic space, and (6) 
the article was published in a peer-reviewed international journal.  
Experiments (contrasts) were selected from each paper as follows. For the 
meta-analysis on the stimulus-driven network of prosodic perception, the active 
condition had to be emotional prosody (i.e. emotional expression superimposed on an 
utterance containing speech segments such as voiced nasals, vowels, words or 
pseudowords) and the control condition either neutral prosody or speech material 
devoid of emotional prosody (synthesized speech). For the meta-analysis on the task-
dependent network of emotional prosodic perception, attention had to be directed to 
the emotional prosody in the active condition, while in the control condition the same 
material had to be presented without attention directed at the emotional prosody. If a 
study reported multiple experiments that were eligible for inclusion in one of the two 
meta-analyses, the contrast was chosen that best answered the question “which network 
in the brain is involved in the processing of emotional prosody?” (e.g. when foci were 
presented for individual emotions separately and for all emotions combined, the latter 
experiment was included as it is more likely that it engages the full emotional prosodic 
perception network) to prevent one study from driving the meta-analysis. 
All included studies used fMRI except George et al. (1996) and Imaizumi et al. 
(1997), which used PET. As can be observed in Table 1, a total of 16 studies (N = 296 
subjects; 93 foci) was included in the meta-analysis on the stimulus-driven network of 
emotional prosodic perception. All of the included studies compared speech with 
emotional prosody to speech with neutral prosody or to synthesized speech without 
prosody.  
 Table 2 lists the 11 studies (N = 153 subjects; 50 foci) that were included in 
the meta-analysis on the task-driven network of emotional prosodic perception. All the 
included studies compared emotional prosody processing to the processing of a 
different dimension (such as speaker gender or lexical semantics) of the same speech 
stimuli. Note that Ethofer et al. (2006) was excluded from the task-driven analysis, as a 
predefined ROI was used in the analyses (i.e. no whole-brain corrected coordinates 
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2.2. ALE meta-analyses  
Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) is a widely used and valid coordinate-based 
meta-analysis procedure that tests for consistent brain activation across studies for a 
given set of (similar) tasks (Laird et al., 2005; Turkeltaub, Eden, Jones, & Zeffiro, 2002). 
In brief, ALE meta-analysis uses the peak-coordinates of activation clusters reported in 
the previous literature and models the location uncertainty of these coordinates as 3D-
Gaussian probability density distributions. The voxelwise convergence of these 
distributions is then tested against a null-distribution and corrected for multiple 
comparisons to test which voxels show above-chance convergence across studies. As a 
last step cluster analysis is performed with a user-specified minimum cluster volume. 
Recently, the ALE-algorithm has been further optimized by adopting a random-effects 
approach (allowing for generalization of the results beyond the experiments analyzed) 
and more precisely modeling location uncertainty (Eickhoff et al., 2009) and by 
minimizing the cumulative effects of multiple neighboring within experiment foci 
(Turkeltaub et al., 2011). All ALE-analyses were performed using the latest version of 
the ALE-algorithm (Turkeltaub et al., 2011) at the time of writing, as implemented in 
GingerALE 2.1.1 (www.brainmap.org/ale).  
 As discussed in the Introduction, an important unresolved question in the 
literature is whether there is hemispheric specialization for emotional prosodic 
perception. Therefore, we additionally applied a lateralization analysis as reported 
previously by Turkeltaub and Coslett (2010) for each of the two meta-analyses. To 
formally test for significant lateralization of ALE-values, we multiplied x-coordinates of 
the input foci by −1 (effectively left-right flipping each coordinate) and performed a 
subtraction analysis where we subtracted the flipped foci from the original (unflipped) 
foci.  
 All meta-analyses were performed in Talairach space. When foci were 
reported in MNI space, they were converted to Talairach space using the Lancaster 
transform (Lancaster et al., 2007) as implemented in the GingerALE software. For the 
two main meta-analyses on stimulus and task-driven emotional prosody perception, 
above-chance voxel wise convergence was tested corrected for multiple comparisons 
using the false discovery rate (FDR) approach (Genovese, Lazar, & Nichols, 2002) as 
implemented in GingerALE with q = 0.05 and a minimum cluster extent of 100 mm3. 
These FDR corrected images were subsequently used as input images for the 
subtraction analyses to test for lateralization effects. At present there is no established 
method to correct ALE subtraction maps for multiple comparisons (Eickhoff et al., 
2011, p. 941). Further, for smaller data-sets with 10-20 experiments as the present, an 
uncorrected threshold with a small extent threshold has been suggested to provide 
sufficient protection against false positive ALE-clusters (Gobras, Beaton, & Eickhoff, 
2012, p. 439). Therefore subtraction results are reported with a 100 mm3 extent 
threshold in combination with an uncorrected threshold at a more lenient p = 0.05 and 
a more conservative p = 0.001 level for ALE-values. Statistical maps were overlaid onto 
the Talairach anatomical template and visualized using Mango software 
(http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). Additionally, similarly to previous studies (Turkeltaub 
& Coslett, 2010; Van der Laan, De Ridder, Viergever, & Smeets, 2011) we applied one 
further conservativeness criterion. To avoid discussing clusters to which only one or 
two studies directly contributed, at least three of the included studies had to contribute 
directly to a significant ALE-cluster in order to be discussed in the discussion-section 
(all significant clusters are reported in the results section).  
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3. Results  
 
3.1. Main analyses 
 
3.1.1. Stimulus-driven network 
The ALE-analysis of experiments contrasting emotional prosody to neutral prosody or 
speech without prosody revealed 15 clusters of above chance convergence (see Table 3 
and Figure 1). Five clusters met our additional criterion of having at least three directly 
contributing studies. The most concurrent ALE-cluster lay in the right mid superior 
temporal gyrus and continued medially into the transverse temporal gyrus (peak 
Talairach coordinates (44, −24, 8), ALE-value = 2.67•10−3, volume = 2696 mm3). In the 
left temporal cortex two significant ALE-clusters were found. The cluster with the 
highest convergence was located in the mid-STG (peak Talairach coordinates (−58, −22, 
2), ALE-value = 1.57•10−3, volume = 2696 mm3), while the other ALE-cluster was 
located in the posterior STG (peak Talairach coordinates (−42, −34, 10), ALE-value = 
1.52•10−3, volume = 848 mm3). Two ALE-clusters were located in the inferior frontal 
gyri. One was located in the lateral left IFG (peak Talairach coordinates (−54, 20, 2), 
ALE-value = 1.23•10−3, volume = 680 mm3). The other cluster was located in the right 
IFG ALE-cluster (peak Talairach coordinates (48, 28, 6), ALE-value = 1.23•10−3, 









Figure 1. Results of the meta-analysis of studies contrasting emotional prosody to 
neutral prosody or synthesized speech. All ALE-clusters were corrected for multiple 
comparisons at an FDR of 0.05 and had a minimum cluster extent of 100 mm3. For 
display purposes the cluster-uncorrected statistical maps are shown. Clusters to 
which at least three studies have directly contributed are marked with a number that 
corresponds to the cluster number in Table 3. In the top-panel A, 1 = left STG, 2 = 
right STG and 3 = left STG. In the bottom-panel B, 4 = right IFG, 5 = left IFG. 
 



















   x y z   
Stimulus-driven analysis: 
1 2696 L Superior Temporal Gyrus  −58 −22 2 1.57 7 
  L Superior Temporal Gyrus  −48 −12 6 1.56  
  L Insula  −42 −14 −4 1.48  
2 2696 R Superior Temporal Gyrus 44 −24 8 2.67 7 
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus  56 −30 8 1.55  
  R Superior Temporal Gyrus 54 −16 4 1.54  
3 848 L Superior Temporal Gyrus  −42 −34 10 1.52 3 
4 808 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus  48 28 6 1.23 3 
  R Inferior Frontal Gyrus  44 28 2 1.18  
  R Inferior Frontal Gyrus  36 24 0 0.91  
5 680 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus  −54 20 2 1.23 3 
  L Inferior Frontal Gyrus  −42 28 6 1.08  
  L Inferior Frontal Gyrus −46 24 0 1.02  
6 528 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus −34 6 −12 1.74 2 
7 504 R Medial Globus Pallidus 8 −2 −2 1.66 2 
8 400 R Medial Frontal Gyrus 16 40 14 1.52 2 
9 400 L Superior Occipital Gyrus −32 −72 30 1.52 2 
10 392 R Middle Occipital Gyrus 24 −86 18 1.48 2 
11 392 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus  −52 20 24 1.47 2 
12 224 R Insula 46 12 2 1.05 2 
13 192 R Superior Temporal Gyrus 50 −4 −4 1.02 2 
14 152 R Subcallosal Gyrus 26 4 −10 0.91 2 
  R Putamen 26 −2 −6 0.89 2 
15 152 L Claustrum −26 18 −2 0.99 2 
Task-driven analysis: 
1 880 R Superior Temporal Gyrus 46 −34 6 1.35 3 
2 512 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 40 34 2 0.93 3 
  R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 36 34 −6 0.81  
3 184 L Middle Frontal Gyrus −42 34 0 0.90 1 
4 168 R Superior Frontal Gyrus 10 20 50 0.86 1 
5 128 R Middle Frontal Gyrus  48  26 24 0.85 1 




L = Left hemisphere; R = Right hemisphere. All reported ALE-clusters 
were thresholded at q < 0.05 corrected and an extent threshold of 100 
mm3 
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3.1.2. Task-driven network  
The ALE-analysis of experiments contrasting processing of emotional prosody to 
processing a different dimension of the same material revealed 5 clusters of above 
chance convergence (see Table 3 and Figure 2). Two of these clusters fulfilled our 
additional criterion of having at least three directly contributing studies. The cluster of 
highest convergence lay in the right posterior STG (peak Talairach coordinates (46, −34, 
6), ALE-value = 1.35•10−3, volume = 880 mm3). The second cluster was located in the 
right lateral IFG (peak Talairach coordinates (40, 34, 2), ALE-value = .93•10−3, volume 
= 416 mm3). Although significant ALE-voxels were also noted in the left IFG, these 





















Figure. 2. Results of the meta-analysis of studies contrasting processing of emotional 
prosody to processing of a different dimension of the same stimulus material. All 
ALE-clusters were corrected for multiple comparisons at a FDR of 0.05 and had a 
minimum cluster extent of 100 mm3. For display purposes the cluster-uncorrected 
statistical maps are shown. Clusters to which at least three studies have directly 
contributed are marked with a number that corresponds to the cluster number in 
Table 4. 1 = right posterior STG, 2 = right IFG.  
 





3.2. Lateralization analyses 
An important issue in the literature is whether there is hemispheric specialization for 
emotional prosodic perception. For the stimulus-driven analysis, convergence seemed 
to be higher in the right temporal lobe than the left. For the task-driven analysis, both 
significant ALE-clusters were right lateralized. These qualitative impressions were 
followed up with a formal test of lateralization of ALE-clusters by subtracting ALE-
maps that were flipped around the x-axis (i.e. right/left flipping the ALE-map) from 
the original ALE-maps. One weakness of the ALE meta-analysis is that activation 
magnitude (effect size) and spatial extent of clusters are not considered. Therefore, 
similarly to Turkeltaub and Coslett (2010), we checked all included studies for whether 
the effect size (Z or T-value) and spatial extent of peak (maximally active) clusters in the 
vicinity of lateralized ALE clusters was larger in the left or right hemisphere. To test 
whether lateralization of cluster activation magnitude and extent was statistically 
significant between the hemispheres, a binomial test was performed.  
 
3.2.1. Stimulus-driven network 
Table 4 lists the two ALE-clusters that showed significant lateralization in the 
subtraction analysis at p = 0.05 uncorrected for the stimulus-driven contrasts. As can 
be seen in Figure 3, the only ALE cluster that fulfilled our additional criterion of having 
at least three directly contributing studies was located in the right transverse temporal 
gyrus (peak Talairach coordinates (50,−24,10), Z = 1.95, volume = 624 mm3). No ALE-
cluster survived the more conservative p = 0.001 threshold. Although peak activation 
of temporal lobe clusters tended to be greater in the right than left hemisphere, this 
effect was not statistically reliable (P(binomial) = 0.27). However, there was a trend for 
peak cluster extent to be larger in the right than left temporal lobe (P(binomial) = 
0.065).  
 
3.2.2. Task-driven network  
As can be observed in Table 4, the lateralization analysis on the task-driven network of 
emotional prosodic perception revealed only one significantly lateralized ALE-cluster 
that was located in the posterior right STG (peak Talairach coordinates (44.25, −38.25, 
8.75), Z = 2.14, volume = 880 mm3) at p = 0.05 uncorrected. No ALE-cluster survived 
the more conservative p = 0.001 threshold. For all included studies reporting clusters in 
the temporal lobe, peak activation and extent were greater in the right than the left 
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   x y z   
Stimulus-driven lateralization analysis: 
1 624 R Transverse 
Temporal Gyrus 
50 −24 10 1.95 3 
  R STG 42 −26 4 1.87  
  R Transverse 
Temporal Gyrus 
40 −24 12 1.82  
  R STG 38 −26 6 1.80  
2 192 L Insula −42 −14 4 2.01 0 
Task-driven lateralization analysis: 







Figure 3. Results of the lateralization analyses. All ALE-clusters were 
significant at p = 0.05 uncorrected and had a minimum cluster size of 100 
mm3. Clusters to which at least three studies have directly contributed are 
marked with a number which corresponds to the cluster number in Table 4.  
 
L = left hemisphere; R=Right hemisphere. All reported ALE-clusters were 
thresholded at p < 0.05 uncorrected and a cluster extent of 100 mm3 





Using activation-likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis, we investigated which 
neural networks are reliably engaged in stimulus-driven and task-driven emotional 
prosody perception and to which extent these networks show hemispheric asymmetry. 
Although all reported clusters in the main analyses passed the criterion of a less than 
5% family-wise probability that the convergence found could have occurred by chance, 
the maximum percentage of experiments directly contributing to a cluster was 41. 
Exactly the same maximum percentage of contributing experiments was found in a 
recent ALE-meta analysis of visual food-cue processing, which the authors qualified as 
a ‘moderate’ level of convergence as compared to other ALE-meta analyses (Van der 
Laan, De Ridder, Viergever, & Smeets, 2011). As these authors pointed out, a recent 
review reported that the test-retest reliability of fMRI results as expressed by the 
intraclass correlation coefficient is 0.5 (Bennett & Miller, 2010) which implies an even 
lower correspondence of results across different experiments (tasks) that intend to 
measure the same neurocognitive process (as has been done in the present 
investigation). Hence, a moderate degree of convergence across experiments as found 
in the present meta-analysis could have been expected.  
 In addition to heterogeneity induced by non-prosody specific variables that 
differed between included studies such as scanning parameters (e.g. whether measures 
were taken to reduce echo planar imaging noise) and analysis details, there was variation 
in factors specific to the subject at hand that might have reduced convergence. For 
instance, in the case of stimulus-driven processing it can be observed in Table 1 that 
there is variation in the exact task instruction, varying from passive listening to 
discrimination and categorization. These different task instructions might engage the 
different components of the stimulus-driven network, lowering overall convergence. 
This also holds for the task-driven analysis: as can bee seen in Table 2 there was 
variation in the exact task instructions for both the active and control conditions, likely 
inducing variation in the exact locations of activation clusters found across studies. 
Another source of variation is whether stimulus-driven processing was implicit or 
explicit: the few studies that have directly compared implicit to explicit stimulus-driven 
emotional prosody processing, suggest that these two modes of processing might tax 
different components of the emotional prosody perception network (Bach et al., 2008; 
Frühholz, Ceravolo, & Grandjean, 2011). A third source of variation might be the 
number and kind of emotions included in the study, which varied from only angry and 
neutral to seven different emotional categories, as can been seen in Table 1. As there is 
evidence for emotion specific processing in the auditory cortex (Ethofer, Van de Ville, 
Scherer, & Vuilleumier, 2009) and since variation in the number of emotions in 
categorization tasks might induce variation in the degree to which the working memory 
system is taxed (Hoekert, Kahn, Pijnenborg, & Aleman, 2007) this factor might have 
compromised convergence of activation clusters across studies.  
 Unfortunately, the number of neuroimaging studies on emotional prosody 
perception published to date was too low to permit a reliable formal meta-analytic 
contrast of these moderating variables. In order to only discuss the part of the 
emotional prosody perception network that converges robustly across studies (and 
therefore represents the general network relatively independent of differential 
engagement of specific neural structures associated with the mentioned moderators), in 
the following only ALE-clusters will be addressed to which at least three of the 
included experiments directly contributed.  
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4.1. Stimulus-driven network  
Contrasting the perception of emotional prosodic categories to neutral prosody (or 
speech devoid of prosody) engages areas involved in the processing of acoustic 
properties that differ between emotional and non-emotional prosody but likely also 
engages systems involved in more abstract processing of emotional information.  
 The clusters of highest convergence for the stimulus-driven contrast lay in the 
bilateral mid-STG, extending posteriorly and laterally with respect to HG. In the right 
hemisphere the STG cluster also extended medially into the transverse temporal 
(Heschl’s) gyrus proper, which likely houses the human primary auditory cortex 
(Galaburda & Sanides, 1980). Indeed, as the mid-STG is located within the zone of 
purportedly speech-specific superior temporal cortex (Belin, Zatorre, Lafaille, Ahad, & 
Pike, 2000) and shows sensitivity to the emotional quality of speech, the mid-STG (and 
its posterolateral extension) has recently been coined the ‘emotional voice area (EVA)’ 
(Ethofer et al., 2011). Previous studies have shown that the mid-STG is sensitive to 
multiple acoustic properties relevant for emotional prosody perception (Wiethoff et al., 
2007) and is active independently of task demands (Ethofer et al., 2009). This suggests 
that the mid-STG (and its posterolateral extension) is involved in the automatic 
integration of emotional prosodic acoustic cues relevant for the perception of 
emotional prosody.  
 In both hemispheres significant convergence in the STG extended from the 
mid-STG to the posterior STG, which produced a separate ALE-cluster in the left 
hemisphere. According to the Brück, Kreifelts, and Wildgruber (2011) model of 
emotional prosody perception, the posterior superior temporal cortex (STC) is involved 
in more abstract representation of emotional prosody (stage 2). Moreover, as will be 
elaborated further in the section on the task-dependent emotional prosody perception 
network, it appears that activity in the posterior STC during auditory processing can be 
influenced by task demands (e.g. Brechmann & Scheich, 2005) making it likely that this 
area participates later in the prosodic perception process than the mid-STG in line with 
the model proposed by Brück et al. (2011a). 
 As could be expected from both models of emotional prosody perception, 
significant clusters of convergence were found in the bilateral IFG. Both models of 
emotional prosody perception implicate the bilateral IFG in a final multimodal stage 
where emotional prosody is explicitly evaluated and integrated with other layers of 
speech. Lesion studies (Breitenstein, Daum, & Ackermann, 1998; Hornak et al., 2003; 
Hornak, Rolls, & Wade, 1996) and a more a recent TMS-study (Hoekert, Vingerhoets, 
& Aleman, 2010) have furthermore indicated that the inferior frontal cortex is not only 
sufficient but also necessary for adequate emotional prosody perception. If the IFG are 
indeed involved in a final multimodal explicit evaluative phase, it would be expected 
that the bilateral IFG are involved in the explicit evaluation of emotion in other 
modalities such as emotional faces or emotional scenes as well, which has been 
confirmed by recent meta-analyses of the respective neuroimaging literature (for 
emotional faces see Fusar-Poli et al., 2009a; for emotional faces and scenes see 
Sabatinelli et al., 2011).  
 In the right inferior frontal gyrus the ALE-cluster extended into the dorsal 
anterior insula. Of the two proposed models of emotional prosody perception 
proposed by Kotz and Paulmann (2011) and Brück, Kreifelts and Wildgruber (2011) 
only the latter proposes a role for the anterior insula, namely in automatic (implicit) 
processing of emotion. However, insula activation is not consistently found in fMRI 




studies during implicit processing of emotional prosody (Bach et al., 2008; Ethofer et al., 
2011; Frühholz, Ceravolo, & Grandjean, 2011; Grandjean et al., 2005) but see (Morris, 
Scott, & Dolan, 1999; Mothes-Lasch, Mentzel, Miltner, & Straube, 2011). Furthermore, 
the neuroimaging literature suggests that there is functional differentiation within the 
anterior insula. For instance, a recent large scale meta-analysis of the functional 
neuroimaging literature reports that the dorsal insula might be an integration zone 
important for general maintenance of the task-set while the ventral insula is specifically 
involved in the recognition of emotion and empathy (Kurth, Zilles, Fox, Laird, & 
Eickhoff, 2010). Although the exact role of insular clusters in the emotional prosody 
perception process is admittedly speculative at this time, the dorsal insula might control 
general prosodic task performance while the ventral insula might specifically support 
emotion recognition and empathy during emotional prosody perception.  
 Although two ALE clusters were found in the basal ganglia (BG), more 
specifically the right medial globus pallidus and caudate body and the left claustrum, 
these clusters did not survive our additional criterion that at least three studies should 
have directly contributed to a cluster. Given the relatively low number of experiments 
in the analysis, this might have been a result of power being just too low to detect these 
clusters above threshold.  Notably, no significant convergence was found in the 
amygdala, a structure often claimed to be essential for emotional processing. Although 
both models of emotional prosody perception implicate the amygdala in emotional 
prosody perception, namely in the detection of emotional salience (Kotz & Paulmann, 
2011) and in automatic (implicit) emotional prosody perception (Brück, Kreifelts, & 
Wildgruber, 2011) lesion studies have failed to find an effect of amygdala damage on 
emotional prosody perception task performance (Adolphs, 2001; Adolphs & Tranel, 
1999), suggesting that the amygdala might not be crucial for emotional prosody 
perception. Possibly the amygdala is only engaged in the emotional prosody perception 
process under specific task conditions, preventing robust convergence of peak activity 
in the amygdala across studies as analyzed by the present meta-analysis. Another 
possibility is that the amygdala habituates quickly to emotional prosody stimulation 
(Wiethoff, Wildgruber, Grodd, & Ethofer, 2009) reducing the ability to detect the 
amygdala activity over prolonged periods of stimulation as is typical for fMRI 
experiments. Lastly, the amygdala response to emotional prosody may vary 
considerably between individuals depending on personality traits as has been shown in 
a recent study (Brück, Kreifelts, Kaza, Lotze, & Wildgruber, 2011). 
 
4.2. Task-driven network 
Contrasting active processing of emotional prosody to processing of the same acoustic 
material while directing attention to a different attribute (such as semantics or speaker 
identity) captures more abstract later stages of the emotional prosody perception 
process. Both proposed models of emotional prosody perception implicate the bilateral 
IFG in the evaluation of emotional prosody (stage 3) but differ in the exact 
neuroanatomical underpinnings of stage 2 (integration of acoustic information into an 
emotional percept or representation of meaningful suprasegmental acoustic sequences). 
While the Brück, Kreifelts and Wildgruber (2011) model proposes that stage 2 
processing occurs in the posterior superior temporal cortex, the Kotz and Paulmann 
model (2011) postulates that this more abstract stage of processing is supported by the 
anterior STS.  
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 The most concurrent ALE-cluster for the task-driven network lay in the 
posterior STG/STS immediately posterior to HG, a region that is sometimes referred 
to as the ‘planum temporale’ (Westbury et al., 1999). Contrarily, no significant 
convergence across studies was found in the anterior STS (not even sub-threshold) for 
task-driven emotional prosody processing. This difference in convergence does not 
seem attributable to methodological factors such as a difference in susceptibility artifact 
in the BOLD signal (Devlin et al., 2000) as both regions lay in the superior temporal 
region, clear from air filled cavities. Therefore, stage 2 emotional prosody processing is 
more likely to be supported by the posterior STG/STS as proposed by Brück, Kreifelts, 
and Wildgruber (2011) than the anterior STS as proposed by Kotz and Paulmann 
(2011). The posterior auditory association cortex in the posterior STG seems (given its 
associative nature) well equipped for the proposed integrative function of stage 2 
emotional prosody processing. Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis has shown that the 
posterior auditory association cortex is specialized in the processing of spectral 
information (Samson, Zeffiro, Toussaint, & Belin, 2010). As spectral parameters are 
important for the recognition of emotional prosody (Scherer, 2003) the posterior 
auditory association cortex might contribute to emotional prosody perception through 
enhanced spectral processing. Furthermore, neuroimaging studies have shown that 
activity of the posterior STG can be (top-down) modulated by task demands 
(Ahveninen et al., 2006; Bunzeck, Wuestenberg, Lutz, Heinze, & Jancke, 2005; Jäncke, 
Mirzazade, & Shah, 1999), which is clearly compatible with a role for the posterior STG 
in task-dependent emotional prosody perception as found in the present analysis and as 
proposed by Brück et al. (2011a).  
 In line with both models, significant convergence across studies was found in 
the right IFG for task-dependent processing of emotional prosody. Although 
significant ALE-values were also found in the left IFG homolog, these voxels did not 
survive cluster thresholding which might be a consequence of the relatively low power 
of the task-dependent analysis. As was already pointed out in the discussion of the IFG 
clusters in the stimulus-driven network, the IFG likely plays a role in explicit 
multimodal emotional evaluation and the integration of emotional prosody with other 
layers of speech. Interestingly, a recent imaging study suggests that there is functional 
connectivity between the right posterior temporal cortex and the right IFG during 
emotional prosody processing (Ethofer et al., 2006). Although in their dynamic causal 
model a forward projection from the posterior temporal cortex to the IFG was more 
probable than vice versa, another interesting possibility might be that activity in the 
posterior auditory association cortex can be selectively enhanced to flexibly augment 
processing of task-relevant (spectral) acoustic properties through top-down mediation 
by the IFG as has been suggested by Leitman et al. (2010). 
 
4.3. Hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody 
As outlined in the introduction, both proposed models of emotional prosody 
perception allow for hemispheric specialization in multiple stages of the emotional 
prosody perception process. More specifically, both models postulate (relative) right-
hemispheric specialization for the first and second stage of emotional prosody 
perception while only the model by Kotz and Paulmann (2011) additionally leaves open 
the possibility of right-hemispheric specialization for emotional evaluation in the final 
stage. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of the lesion literature found a statistically robust 
greater emotional prosodic performance degradation following right than left 




hemispheric damage (Witteman, Van IJzendoorn, Van de Velde, Van Heuven, & 
Schiller, 2011), suggesting that the right cerebral hemisphere is of relatively greater 
importance than the left in the decoding of emotional prosody. However, due to the 
typically limited spatial specificity of acquired lesions this meta-analysis could not 
address at which intrahemispheric loci this right-hemispheric specialization might arise, 
an issue the present meta-analysis is better equipped to address.  
 The lateralization analysis for the stimulus-driven network revealed right-
lateralized convergence of ALE-clusters in the medial transverse temporal gyrus. 
However, the cluster only emerged at a more lenient threshold and therefore has to be 
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, this result suggests that hemispheric 
specialization might emerge very early at the level of the (medial) HG (where the 
human PAC is likely to be located). Previous studies outside the prosody domain have 
indeed found functional lateralization at the level of HG. For instance, it has been 
found that the left and right HG may already show an advantage for temporal (Jamison, 
Watkins, Bishop, & Matthews, 2006; Warrier et al., 2009) and spectral (Mathys, Loui, 
Zheng, & Schlaug, 2010; Warrier et al., 2009; Zatorre, 1988) processing, respectively. 
As spectral variation is an important acoustic dimension for recognizing emotional 
prosody (Scherer, 2003), the right HG might make a relatively greater contribution to 
emotional prosody perception than its left hemispheric homolog through enhanced 
spectral processing. 
 The task-driven lateralization analysis revealed a right-lateralized ALE-cluster 
in the posterior STG, but again only at the more lenient threshold warranting caution in 
interpreting this result. Previous studies have shown that the right posterior STG might 
be specialized in pitch processing (Hyde, Peretz, & Zatorre, 2008; Johnsrude, Penhune, 
& Zatorre, 2000). Hence the right posterior STG, similarly to the right HG, might 
contribute disproportionally as compared to the left posterior STG to the perception of 
emotional prosody through its superior pitch-processing capability. Furthermore, in line 
with a task-dependent role of the posterior STG in emotional prosody perception as 
found in the present investigation, previous studies have shown that lateralization of 
posterior STG activity during auditory processing is dependent on task demands 
(Brechmann & Scheich, 2005; Geiser, Zaehle, Jancke, & Meyer, 2007). For instance, 
Brechmann and Scheich (2005) showed that when subjects had to categorize the pitch 
direction of frequency-modulated tones, the right posterior STG was more active than 
the left, but when the duration of the same material had to be categorized the 
hemispheric specialization shifted to the left STG. As these authors suggest, the left or 
right posterior STG might be recruited through top-down mediation to dynamically 
enhance task-relevant auditory processing. In the case of emotional prosodic processing, 
the right posterior STG might be similarly recruited to enhance spectral processing to 
support emotional prosody perception.  
 The present meta-analyses therefore suggest that the statistically robust 
relative right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception found 
previously in the lesion literature (Witteman, Van IJzendoorn, Van de Velde, Van 
Heuven, & Schiller, 2011) might be explained by multiple (relative) right-hemispheric 
asymmetries in the primary and associative auditory cortex, possibly corresponding to 
the proposed first and second stage of emotional prosody perception, respectively. In 
the latter case increased activity in the right posterior auditory association cortex might 
reflect increased effort to extract acoustic properties relevant to emotional prosody 
perception through top-down modulation by the right IFG (Leitman et al., 2010), 
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which would render hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception an 
interactive dynamic process, although this hypothesis admittedly requires further 
explicit evaluation. These hemispheric asymmetries early in the emotional prosody 
perception process are in line with cue-dependent hypotheses (e.g. Van Lancker & 
Sidtis, 1992) of hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception. More 
generally, the results suggest that hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody can 
be explained by specialization of the left and right cerebral hemisphere for the 
processing of more basic (non-prosody-specific) acoustic dimensions such as spectral 
versus temporal processing (Zatorre & Belin, 2001) or integration over small versus 
large temporal windows (Poeppel, 2003), respectively. Such an early auditory bottom-
up account of hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody has, in fact, been 
suggested previously (Ethofer et al., 2011; Obleser, Eisner, & Kotz, 2008; Robin, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1990) and can also explain why no right hemispheric specialization 
has been found for visual emotional (i.e. facial) expression in a recent large-scale meta-
analysis of the neuroimaging literature (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009b). 
 
4.4. Strengths and limitations 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first quantitative meta-analysis of the 
neuroimaging literature on emotional prosody perception. Individual imaging studies 
generally suffer from small sample size and the results reflect study specific-details in 
the experimental design. Quantitative meta-analysis alleviates these problems and 
enables one to study which neural network is reliably associated with a neurocognitive 
process with high statistical power. A limitation of ALE meta-analysis is that only the 
peak-coordinates of activation clusters are considered and not the effect size or extend 
of activation. However, when an attempt was made to compensate for this weakness by 
manually checking the extent and magnitude of lateralized clusters for the lateralization 
analyses, it was found that these measures largely confirmed the coordinate-based 
analyses. A further limitation was that due to the limited number of neuroimaging 
papers on emotional prosody perception published to date, it was not possible to 
formally test for the influence of moderating variables that have been suggested in the 
literature. Hence, the exact role of factors such as appraisal level and specific emotions 
in the neural processing of emotional prosody warrants further investigation. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In sum, the present meta-analyses implicate a bilateral temporofrontal network of areas 
including the PAC, mid-STG, post-STG and the IFG in the perception of emotional 
prosody, largely confirming recently proposed models of emotional prosody perception. 
Activation likelihood was larger in the posterior-STG than the anterior-STS, suggesting 
that the proposed second stage of emotional prosody perception is more likely to be 
supported by the posterior-STG, as suggested by Brück, Kreifelts and Wildgruber (2011) 
than the anterior-STS as suggested by Kotz and Paulmann (2011). Concerning 
hemispheric specialization, multiple right lateralized ALE-clusters were found in the 
auditory cortex but only at a more lenient threshold. These results suggest that the 
relative right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception found 
previously in the lesion literature (Witteman, Van IJzendoorn, Van de Velde, Van 
Heuven, & Schiller, 2011) might be a multi-stage (and possibly interactive) process that 
might be best explained by relatively early hemispheric specialization for prosody-




relevant acoustic processing. However, future meta- (or mega-) analyses with a larger 
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    Abstract 
Significant progress has been made in delineating the neural network involved in the 
perception of emotional prosody. However, it is still unclear to what extent there is 
differential involvement of neural structures in the intentional (explicit) vs. 
unintentional (implicit) perception of emotional prosody. Further, it is unknown 
whether automaticity of emotional prosody perception found in previous investigations 
is specific for threatening prosody or a general property of emotional prosody 
perception. Therefore, in the present study we used functional magnetic resonance 
imaging to investigate the neural networks involved in the intentional and unintentional 
perception of surprise and anger prosody. The core temporofrontal prosody perception 
network was found to be active independently of instruction, in line with recent models 
of emotional prosody perception. For explicit emotional prosody perception, additional 
activation was found in areas previously implicated in ‘Theory of Mind’ processing. 
Hemispheric specialization within the core emotional prosody perception network 
showed a rightward asymmetry for implicit prosody, but shifted to symmetric activation 
during explicit prosody perception, showing that hemispheric asymmetry for emotional 
prosody perception is relative and can be modulated by task demands only. Last, 
persistent supra-threshold activation of the right superior temporal gyrus was found for 
unintentional perception of anger but not for surprise, supporting models that postulate 













CHAPTER 2.4:  AUTOMATIC NEURAL PROCESSING OF ANGRY PROSODY  
 
113 
1. Introduction  
Accurate perception of non-verbal emotional signals is essential for social interactions. 
Through the voice, the emotional state of the speaker can be conveyed by means of 
prosody (the suprasegmental layer of speech), using various acoustic parameters such as 
speaking rate, fundamental frequency and spectral balance (e.g., Van Heuven & Sluijter 
1996; Scherer, 2003). It can be argued that in every-day life most emotional cues are 
processed spontaneously and only in exceptional situations do we deliberately evaluate 
the emotional state of the speaker through decoding of non-verbal signals (Critchley et 
al., 2000). Thus, implicit perception of emotional prosody may represent the rule and 
explicit perception the exception. The present investigation examined the neural 
network underlying implicit versus explicit perception of emotional prosody.  
Neural models of emotional prosody perception (Kotz & Paulmann, 2011; 
Bruck et al., 2011; for meta-analytic evidence see Witteman, Van Heuven, & Schiller, 
2012) have proposed that emotional meaning is extracted from the speech signal in 
three stages. First, extraction of basic acoustic properties from the speech signal takes 
place in the primary and secondary auditory cortex, i.e., Heschl’s gyrus (HG) and the 
mid-superior temporal gyrus (mid STG), where the terms ‘anterior’, ‘mid’ and ‘posterior’ 
STG will henceforth be used relative to the location of HG (i.e., ‘mid’ lies parallel to 
HG, see Turkeltaub, Branch, & Coslett, 2010). Further, both models propose that in a 
second stage these acoustic properties are integrated into an ‘emotional gestalt’, but 
disagree whether its anatomical substrate lies in the posterior STG (Bruck et al., 2011, 
for meta-analytic support of this model, see Witteman et al., 2012) or anterior STS 
(Kotz & Paulmann, 2011). Last, both models propose a third stage, in which emotional 
prosody is evaluated and integrated with other layers of speech (such as the lexico-
syntactic meaning of the utterance) in lateral frontal areas. Additionally, it has been 
suggested that subcortical areas are involved in emotional prosody perception such as 
the amygdala and basal ganglia (for reviews see Kotz & Paulmann, 2011; Bruck et al., 
2011). However, upon closer inspection, the amygdala may not be essential for 
emotional prosody perception since lesion studies have repeatedly failed to find 
compromised emotional prosody perception after amygdala damage (Adolphs & Tranel, 
1999; Bach, Hurlemann, & Dolan, 2013). The precise role of the various basal ganglia 
nuclei in the emotional prosody perception process remains to be determined. 
Implicit versus explicit processing of emotional processing may tax the 
various components of the core prosody perception network differentially. Additionally, 
as explicit processing of prosody demands an extra stage of information processing as 
compared to implicit emotional prosody processing, additional areas may be recruited 
during explicit processing. Previous neuroimaging studies have examined this issue in 
two ways. First, by comparing a condition in which participants actively evaluate 
emotional prosody with a condition where subjects evaluate a different dimension of 
the same stimuli (such as gender identification), the components of the explicit 
emotional prosody perception network can be extracted. These contrasts have generally 
revealed enhanced processing in the posterior STG and IFG for explicit emotional 
prosody processing (for meta-analytic evidence, see Witteman, Van Heuven, & Schiller, 
2012). Note, however, that these components may additionally reflect other differences 
between the two tasks used than just the explicit versus implicit processing mode.  
Alternatively, this confound can be eliminated by comparing emotional 
prosody vs. neutral prosody perception under an explicit condition to the same 
stimulus-driven contrast under an implicit processing condition (Frühholz, Ceravolo, & 




Grandjean, 2012). When qualitatively comparing studies using such a stimulus-driven 
contrast under an explicit condition (Kotz et al., 2003; Leitman et al., 2010; Frühholz et 
al., 2012) with studies that used a stimulus-driven task under an implicit processing 
condition (Gandjean et al., 2005; Sander et al., 2005; Frühholz et al., 2012; Mothes-
Lasch, Mentzel, Miltner, & Straube, 2011) the explicit studies sometimes find 
involvement of the middle temporal gyrus MTG (Leitman et al., 2010) and the 
temporoparietal junction (Fruhholz et al., 2012), while the implicit studies do not. 
Interestingly, the MTG and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) have been suggested to be 
involved in ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) processing in the previous literature (Bzdok et al., 
2012) and may therefore be part of an extended emotional prosody perception network 
for deliberate (explicit) analysis of non-verbal emotional information. Crucially, the only 
two studies that have compared explicit to implicit processing directly using stimulus-
driven contrasts, suggest involvement of the anterior cingulate and the putamen in 
explicit processing of emotional prosody (Bach et al., 2008: Frühholz et al., 2012). Thus, 
in the present investigation we similarly contrasted explicit and implicit processing of a 
stimulus-driven contrast to examine which regions of the emotional prosody perception 
network are involved in implicit and explicit processing of emotional prosody. 
It has been suggested that emotional processing might be relatively ‘automatic’ 
(Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003; Sander et al., 2005, for a 
recent review see Straube, Mothes-Lasch & Miltner, 2011) and that such automaticity 
might reflect a phylogenetically prepared mechanism for biologically relevant stimuli to 
get privileged access to the limited processing capacity of the brain (Öhman & Mineka, 
2001) due to selective pressure for processing of emotional signals in evolutionary 
history (Dunbar, 1998; Silk, 2007). Upon closer examination, the terms ‘implicit’ and 
‘automatic’ overlap to such an extent that it has been argued that we can replace the 
former with the latter, as the latter is better defined (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
According to Moors and De Houwer, automaticity is a gradual concept that comprises 
several core features such as uncontrollability, efficiency and lack of awareness of the 
process – the more of these features are present the more ‘automatic’ a process can be 
considered to be. One aspect of the uncontrollability aspect of automaticity is whether 
a process is initiated even when the subject does not have the goal to initiate the 
process (i.e., unintentionally of emotional processing). Thus, in the present investigation 
we examined whether emotional prosody processing persists despite lack of the 
participant’s intention to engage in emotional prosody processing. On the neural level, 
we defined the persistence of emotional prosody processing as the continued presence 
of supra-threshold neural activity during unintentional emotional prosody perception, 
as compared to intentional emotional prosody processing (similarly to Anderson et al., 
2003).  
Finally, it has been suggested that there might have been particular selective 
pressure for automatic processing of negative emotions and more specifically threat 
(e.g., anger) since rapid threat detection can prevent harm to the organism and this 
promote fitness (Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & 
Gabrieli, 2003; Schupp et al., 2004). Indeed, some evidence for automaticity of the 
perception of threatening (i.e. anger) prosody has been found previously (Sander et al., 
2005; Grandjean et al., 2005). Further, there is evidence from the visual modality that 
negative emotional signals in particular attract additional processing resources (Holmes, 
Bradley, Kragh, Nielsen, & Mogg, 2009; Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Schupp 
et al. 2004; but for conflicting evidence see Schröder et al., 2006) as compared to 
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positive emotional stimuli. Thus, processing of threat may be relatively automatic as 
compared to processing non-threatening emotional information. To test this hypothesis, 
it is required to examine whether the persistence of neural activity under unintentional 
emotional processing is particularly evident for negative emotions as compared to 
positive emotions, which has not been examined for emotional prosody yet. Thus, as a 
last goal of the present investigation, we examined the persistence of supra-threshold 
neural activity during task-irrelevant processing of positive versus negative (threatening) 
emotional prosody.  
 
2. Methods  
 
2.1. Participants 
A total of 25 participants took part in the experiment. Five participants were excluded 
because of lower than chance level performance and one more due excessive motion 
(average displacement > 2.5 mm), resulting in a total of 19 participants (mean age 24.92, 
SD = 5.65; 6 male, 13 female). All participants were right-handed as determined by the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (M = 88.11, SD = 11.32, minimum = 67), were 
native speakers of Dutch, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no current 
psychiatric disorder or a history of neurological disease. Furthermore, none of the 
participants reported hearing problems or substance dependence. The study was 
approved by the local ethics committee and conducted in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki, and informed consent was obtained from all participants prior 
to the experiment. Participants received € 20 for their participation in the two hour 
fMRI session.  
 
2.2. Materials 
Pseudowords (see appendix A) with a disyllabic structure were generated. All 
pseudowords obeyed Dutch phonotactics and were checked for the absence of 
semantic content. All pseudowords were expressed with neutral, (pleasantly) surprised 
and angry prosody and with stress either on the first or second syllable by two 
professional actors (one male, one female) and recorded at 16 bit resolution and a 44.1 
kHz sampling rate in a sound-proofed booth. Surprised and angry prosody were chosen 
in order to sample both positive and negative emotions - both of which are considered 
to be approach emotions (thus, there was no confounding role of the approach-
withdrawal dimension). Items were intensity-normalized and had a mean duration of 
756 ms (SD = 65 ms). 
 In line with previous literature (e.g., Scherer, 2003), the emotional categories 
differed from neutral prosody in mean F0 and F0 variability; anger differed additionally 
in intensity variability (see Table 1). Note that the three categories did not differ in 
mean intensity as the stimuli had been intensity-normalized. To verify the validity of the 
intended prosodic contrasts, a panel of five healthy volunteers classified each prosodic 
stimulus (in addition to happy and sad prosodic stimuli that were not used in the 
present study) in a forced choice task. Only pseudowords were selected for which all of 
the emotional prosodic categories (neutral, surprised and angry intonation) were 
classified correctly by at least 4 out of 5 panel members for both actors. 
Two categorization tasks were created that presented identical stimuli under 
an implicit and explicit emotional condition. For the explicit (intentional) emotional 
condition, participants were instructed to decide whether the stimulus sounded neutral, 




angry or surprised. For the implicit (unintentional) emotional task participants were 
required to categorize a non-emotional dimension of the same stimuli (whether metrical 
stress was on the first or the second syllable). From the pool of validated stimuli, 32 
items of each emotional category were selected, with half of the words bearing metrical 
stress on the first and the other half on the second syllable. Speaker gender was 
balanced across all items.  
 
 
  Table 1. Acoustic properties of the emotional categories. 
 Neutral Anger Surprise 
    
Mean intensity (dB) 79.45 79.27 80.64 
Mean variation (SD) intensity 8.84 10.74 8.83 
Mean F0 (Hz) 180.73 281.35 282.46 
Mean variation (SD) F0  44.78 78.56 101.19 
Mean total duration (s) 0.79 0.76 0.72 
 
2.3. Procedure 
Each participant performed both tasks, each of which took 12 minutes to complete. 
The implicit emotional task was always presented first to reduce participants’ awareness 
of the emotional dimension of the stimuli (and hence to prevent intentional processing 
of emotional prosody, allowing us to investigate the intentionality dimension of 
automaticity in emotional prosody perception (see Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
Participants were instructed that they would hear a nonsense word and asked to 
categorize the task-relevant dimension (emotion, metrical stress) as fast and accurately 
as possible with a right hand button press. Assignment of individual categories to 
response buttons was counterbalanced across subjects. Participants were instructed that 
they could respond while the stimulus was still playing (i.e., reaction times [RTs] were 
recorded from the onset of the stimulus). All other instructions were exactly the same 
for both tasks except for words describing the task-specific (emotional versus non-
emotional) categories.  
Each categorization task started with 12 practice trials. Participants practised 
the tasks in the scanner with simulated scanner noise and kept practising until a 
performance level of at least 75% correct was reached. Subsequently, the 96 test trials 
(32 items per emotional category) were performed.  
Throughout the experiment a black fixation cross was presented in the center 
of a grey background. Auditory stimuli were presented binaurally through MR-
compatible headphones and a trial ended 2000 ms after stimulus onset. Stimuli were 
presented in an event-related fashion with a jittered inter stimulus interval (between 
4000 and 8000 ms). Stimulus presentation order was (pseudo-)random with the 
restriction that no more than two consecutive presentations of the same stimulus 
category were allowed. Participants were instructed to fix their gaze on the fixation 
cross throughout the experiment.  
Stimulus presentation was controlled using E-prime 1.2 and stimulus material 
was presented at 16 bit resolution and a 44.1 kHz sampling frequency at a comfortable 
intensity level. Subjects reported that the stimuli could be perceived clearly despite of 
the scanner noise.  
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2.4. FMRI data acquisition 
Imaging data were acquired on a Philips 3.0-T Achieva MRI scanner using an eight-
channel SENSE head coil for radiofrequency transmission and reception (Philips 
Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands). For each task, whole-brain fMRI data were 
acquired using T2* - weighted gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) with the 
following scan parameters: 355 volumes (the first 5 volumes were discarded to reach 
signal equilibrium); 38 axial slices scanned in ascending order; repetition time (TR) = 
2200 ms; echo time (TE) = 30 ms; flip angle = 80°; FOV = 220 × 220 mm; 2.75 mm 
isotropic voxels with a 0.25 mm slice gap. A high-resolution anatomical image (T1-
weighted ultra-fast gradient-echo acquisition; TR = 9.75 ms; TE = 4.59 ms; flip angle = 
8°; 140 axial slices; FOV = 224 × 224 mm; in-plane resolution .875 × .875 mm; slice 
thickness = 1.2 mm), and a high-resolution T2*- weighted gradient echo EPI scan (TR 
= 2.2 s; TE = 30 ms; flip angle = 80°; 84 axial slices; FOV = 220 × 220 mm; in-plane 
resolution 1.96 × 1.96 mm, slice thickness = 2 mm) were additionally acquired for 
registration to standard space. 
 
2.5. FMRI data preprocessing 
Prior to analysis, all fMRI data sets were submitted to a visual quality control check to 
ensure that no gross artefacts were present in the data. Next, data were analyzed using 
FSL Version 4.1.3 (Smith et al., 2004). The following preprocessing steps were applied 
to the EPI data sets: motion correction, removal of non-brain tissue, spatial smoothing 
using a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full width at half maximum (FWHM), grand-mean 
intensity normalization of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor, and a 
high pass temporal filter of 70s (i.e., ≈0.014 Hz). The dataset was registered to the high 
resolution EPI image, the high resolution EPI image to the T1-weighted image, and the 
T1-weighted image to the 2 mm isotropic MNI-152 standard space image (T1-weighted 
standard brain averaged over 152 subjects; Montreal Neurological Institute, Montreal, 
QC, Canada). The resulting transformation matrices were then combined to obtain a 
native to MNI space transformation matrix and its inverse (MNI to native space). 
 
2.6. Behavioral analysis  
Repeated-measures analyses of variance (RM-ANOVA) were performed with Task as 
within-subject factor and proportion correct responses and mean reaction time for 
correct responses as dependent variables.  
 
2.7. FMRI-data analysis 
2.7.1. Whole brain analyses 
Data analysis was performed using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 5.98, 
part of FSL (FMRIBs Software Library, http://www.FMRIb.ox.ac.uk/fsl). In native 
space, the FMRI time-series was analyzed in an event-related fashion using the General 
Linear Model with local autocorrelation correction applied (Woolrich, Ripley, Brady, & 
Smith, 2001). For both runs, onsets of each of the stimulus categories (neutral, angry, 
surprised) were modeled as events with 800 ms duration in separate regressors. 
Regressors were convolved with a double gamma hemodynamic response function, and 
temporal derivatives of each of the three regressors were added to the model. If errors 
were present, these trials were included in the model with a separate regressor. At first 
level, every emotional category (neutral, surprise, anger) was contrasted against baseline 
and against the other emotional categories.  




At second level, three whole-brain analyses were performed. First, the main 
effect of emotional (anger and surprise) versus neutral prosody across both tasks was 
analyzed to examine the task-independent effect of emotional prosody. Second, the 
effect of emotional versus neutral prosody was analyzed under the explicit and implicit 
condition separately to examine activations associated with explicit and implicit 
emotional prosody perception. Last, the processing of emotional prosody versus 
neutral prosody was directly compared between the two tasks to examine which brain 
regions might be specifically engaged during implicit versus explicit emotional prosody 
perception. All whole-brain analyses were cluster-corrected for multiple comparisons 
using an initial cluster-forming threshold of Z > 2.3 (p < .01), and a corrected 
significance threshold of p < .05 (Worsley, 2001) was applied. 
 
2.7.2. Regions of Interest (ROI) analyses 
The previous literature suggests that the superior temporal gyrus (STG) and the inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG) are particularly important in the perception of emotional prosody 
(Schirmer & Kotz, 2006; Brück, Kreifelts, & Wildgruber, 2011; Witteman, Van Heuven, 
& Schiller, 2012). Therefore, the whole-brain analyses were followed up with an a priori 
region-of-interest (ROI) analysis on the STG and IFG. Anatomical ROIs were created 
for the IFG (pars opercularis) and STG (posterior part) at the 50% probability 
threshold, as defined by the Harvard-Oxford cortical probability atlas 
(http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/data/atlas-descriptions.html#ho). For these ROIs, the 
mean Z-values were extracted for each stimulus category (anger, surprise, neutral) 
against baseline and for each emotional category (surprise, anger) against neutral, for 
each task and each participant using Featquery 
(http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fsl4.0/feat5/featquery.html). These Z-transformed 
parameter estimates indicate how well the mean signal of each ROI is explained by the 
model (i.e., by the presence of the particular stimulus category). Using these mean Z-
values as dependent variables, two RM-ANOVAs were performed. First, to examine 
the effect of prosodic category (anger, surprise, neutral), a RM-ANOVA was performed 
with the Z-values against baseline as dependent variables and the factors Task, ROI, 
Hemisphere and Emotion as within-subject factors. Secondly, to specifically examine 
lateralization effects for emotional prosody an additional RM-ANOVA was performed 
with the Z-values of each emotional category (anger, surprise) against neutral as 
dependent variable and the factors Task, ROI, Hemisphere and Emotion as within-
subject independents. For this analysis only main effects of and interactions with the 
factor Hemisphere are reported. In case of sphericity-violations, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected p-values are reported. 
 
 
3. Results  
 
3.1. Behavioral results  
As depicted in Figure 1, participants performed well above chance level for the explicit 
task (M = 88%, SD = 7.8%) and the implicit task (M = 83%, SD = 8.5%). Furthermore, 
a RM-ANOVA with the proportion correct responses as dependent variable, Task and 
Emotion as the within-subject factors revealed a main effect of Task (F(1,18) = 6.21, p 
= .02), which was qualified by a Task × Emotion interaction (F(2,17) = 10.74, p = .001). 
Follow up RM-ANOVAs for each task with Emotion as independent variable showed 
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that there were no significant differences in accuracy between the emotional categories 
for the explicit task (for all, p > .08, Sidak corrected). For the implicit task however, 
accuracy was lower when the task-irrelevant emotional category was surprise as 
compared to neutral (p = .03, Sidak corrected) and to anger (p < .001, Sidak corrected), 
while there was no difference between anger and neutral (p = .21). 
A RM-ANOVA with reaction time (RT) for correct categorization as the 
dependent variable revealed a main effect of Task (F(1,18) = 4.83, p = .04) with slower 
responses for the implicit task (M = 1174; SD = 133) than the explicit task (M = 1111; 
SD = 100). Further, there was a main effect of Emotion (F(1,18) = 19.54, p < .001) 
which was qualified by a Task × Emotion interaction (F(2,36) = 7.81, p = .007). 
Follow-up RM-ANOVAs for each task, indicated that for the explicit task surprise (p 
= .02, Sidak corrected) and anger (p <.001, Sidak corrected) were categorized faster 
than neutral, while anger and surprise were not significantly different (p = 0.07, Sidak 
corrected). For the implicit task categorization was slower when the task irrelevant 
emotional category was surprise as compared to neutral (p = .04, Sidak corrected) and 
anger (p < .001, Sidak corrected) while there was no difference between neutral and 
anger (p = .69).  
 In sum, the behavioral results suggest that participants perceived the stimuli 
well and that performance was better for anger and surprise in the explicit task than 
neutral, and that performance improved when anger was the task irrelevant emotional 
category during the implicit task. 
 
Figure 1. Behavioral results. Mean accuracy (upper graph) and reaction time (lower 
graph) for each task and each emotional category. Error bars indicate the 95% 
confidence interval.  
 




3.2. FMRI results  
 
3.2.1. Whole-brain analyses  
All effects for the whole-brain analyses can be found in Table 2. The whole-brain 
cluster-corrected (p < 0.05) analysis for [emotion > neutral] across both tasks revealed 
one cluster with a peak in the right anterior STG/STS (peak MNI coordinates (60, −10, 
−6), peak Z = 4.48, extent = 673 voxels), extending both anteriorly and posteriorly with 
respect to HG. As shown in Figure 2, additional activation in the left STG and IFG was 
observed at a more liberal threshold (p < .001, uncorrected). For [anger > neutral] the 
cluster-corrected analysis revealed a cluster with a peak in the right posterior STG/STS 
(peak MNI coordinates (63, −30, 2), peak Z = 4.49, extent = 1215 voxels) and the left 
mid STG/STS (−54, −22, 0), peak Z = 4.12, extent = 326 voxels), extending posteriorly.  
 As can be observed in Figure 3 [emotion > neutral] for the explicit task 
revealed a large cluster with a peak in the left mid STS (−58, −26, −4), peak Z = 3.56, 
extent = 1381 voxels), extending into the anterior STG and posterior MTG. A second 
cluster was observed in the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ) with a peak in the 
supramarginal gyrus (−52, −54, 32), peak Z = 3.75, extent = 1131 voxels), extending 
into the angular gyrus and the posterior STG. As can be seen in Figure 4 contrasting 
anger against neutral [anger > neutral] revealed a cluster with a peak in the right 
posterior STS (60, −30, 0), peak Z = 3.6, extent = 1250 voxels), extending into the STG 
anteriorly and posteriorly with respect to HG. Contrasting surprise to neutral [surprise 
> neutral] revealed a large cluster with a peak in the left posterior MTG (−60, −54, −2), 
peak Z = 3.81, extent = 2579 voxels), extending anteriorly into the MTG/STS/STG 
and dorsally into TPJ.  
 For the implicit task, contrasting both emotional categories to neutral did not 
reveal any significant clusters. However, as can be seen in Figure 4, contrasting anger to 
neutral [anger > neutral] revealed a large cluster with a peak in the right mid STG/STS 
(70, −24, 4), peak Z = 3.54, extent = 1351 voxels), extending both anteriorly and 
posteriorly along the STG/STS. As can be observed in Figure 4 this cluster overlapped 
to a considerable extent with the cluster found for anger processing in the explicit 
condition. Lastly, contrasting surprise to neutral [surprise > neutral] resulted in a cluster 
with a peak in the medial SFG (0, 12, 58), peak Z = 3.59, extent = 99 voxels), extending 
ventrally into the cingulate gyrus.  
 Directly contrasting emotional prosody processing (versus neutral) in the 
explicit task with processing of the same emotional categories in the implicit condition 
(and vice versa) did not reveal any significant clusters of activation.  
 In sum, the whole-brain analysis indicated that parts of the left and right STG 
were involved in emotional prosody perception. For the explicit task, TPJ was 
additionally activated and surprise activated the left MTG during the explicit task and 
the medial SFG in the implicit task. Interestingly, anger activated the right STG during 
both tasks while surprise did not. Lastly, no area was significantly more active during 
emotional prosody perception in the implicit task as compared to the explicit task or 





















Figure 2.  Activation map for emotional > neutral prosody across tasks overlaid on 
the MNI standard brain. Activation is thresholded at p < .001 uncorrected for 
illustration purposes. The left and right side of the image represent the left and right 
side of the brain. 
 
Figure 3. Activation clusters for emotional > neutral in the explicit task overlaid on 
the MNI standard brain. Clusters of significant activation (p < .05, cluster corrected) 
were observed in the left mid-STS (extending into the anterior STG and posterior 
MTG) and left TPJ (cluster peak in the supramarginal gyrus).   
 






  Table 2. Peak activations for the whole brain analyses. 












[Emotion > neutral] R STG 60, −10, −6 4.48 673 










[Emotion > neutral] L STG;       
L SMG; 
−58, −26, −4; 





 [Anger > neutral] R STG 60,−30, 0 3.6 1250 
 [Suprise > neutral] L MTG −60, −54, −2 3.81 2579 
Implicit 
task 
[Anger > neutral] R STG 70,−24,4 3.54 1351 
 [Surprise > neutral] M SFG 0, 12, 58 3.59 999 





Figure 4. Activation clusters for anger > neutral in the explicit task (red to 
yellow) and the implicit task (green to white). A significant cluster of activation 
(p < .05, cluster corrected) was found in the right STG/STS for both tasks, but 
activation extended more anteriorly for the explicit task and more posteriorly 
for the implicit task.  
L=left, R=Right, M=midline. STG=superior temporal gyrus, MTG = middle 
temporal gyrus, SFG = superior frontal gyrus, SMG = supramarginal gyrus. 
Coordinates are given in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard space. 
All reported clusters surive a p<0.05 cluster correction.  
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3.2.2. ROI-analyses  
ROI analyses were performed to further characterize the effect of emotional prosody in 
the core temporofrontal network, including the STG and IFG, which was robustly 
associated with emotional prosody perception in previous studies. The mean Z-values 
for each ROI in each condition against baseline are shown in Figure 5. A RM-ANOVA 
with Task, ROI, Hemisphere and Emotion as within-subject factors and the Z-values 
against baseline as dependent variables revealed a main effect of Task (F(1,18) = 12.89, 
p = .002), ROI (F(1,18) = 53.66, p < .001), Hemisphere (F(1,18) = 6.01, p = .02) and 
Emotion (F(1,18) = 4.04, p = .04). The Task, ROI and Emotion main effects were 
qualified by a three-way Task × ROI × Emotion interaction (F(1,17) = 21.46 p < .001). 
Decomposing the interaction with separate RM-ANOVAs for each ROI revealed a 
significant Task × Emotion interaction for the STG ((F(2,36) = 4.47, p = .04) but not 
for the IFG (p = .12). Following the interaction up for the STG with separate RM-
ANOVAS for each task revealed a main effect of Emotion in the explicit task (F(1,18) 
= 7.63, p = 0.003) and in the implicit task (F(1,18) = 10.66, p = .001) for the STG. 
Post-hoc tests (Sidak corrected) indicated that for the explicit task, both anger (p = .03) 
and surprise (p = .004) activated the STG more than neutral while anger and surprise 
were not significantly different (p = 1, NS). For the implicit task, anger activated the 
STG more than neutral (p = .002) and surprise (p = .01) while surprise and neutral were 
not significantly different (p = .91, NS).  
 To further characterize lateralization effects of emotional prosody, the Z-score 
of each emotion (anger, surprise) against the neutral condition was used as dependent 
variable. The analysis revealed a Task × Hemisphere interaction ((F(1,18) = 5.86, p 
= .03) and a ROI × Hemisphere × Emotion interaction ((F(1,18) = 5.41, p = .03). 
Following up the Task × Hemisphere interaction with a separate ANOVA for each 
task, revealed that for the explicit task there was no significant difference between the 
hemispheres (p = .39, NS) while for the implicit task right-hemispheric activation was 
significantly larger than left-hemispheric activation ((F(1,18) = 6.39, p = .02). However, 
in the uncorrected statistical map significant activity was noted in the left STG, showing 
that the right-hemispheric advantage was relative. Decomposing the ROI × 
Hemisphere × Emotion interaction with separate ANOVAs for each ROI did not 
reveal a significant Hemisphere × Emotion interaction for the STG ((F(1,18) = .34, p 
= .57) but a significant Hemisphere × Emotion interaction in the IFG ((F(1,18) = 7.57, 
p = .01). Follow up RM-ANOVAs for each emotional category revealed a trend for a 
right-hemispheric advantage for anger in the IFG ((F(1,18) = 4.15, p = .06) but no 
difference between the hemispheres for surprise ((F(1,18) = 1.57, p = .23)  
In sum, the ROI analyses suggest that the bilateral STG was sensitive to both 
emotional categories (versus neutral) when attention was directed at the emotional 
prosody. However, when attention was diverted away from the emotional prosodic 
dimension during the implicit task, only anger maintained more activation than neutral 
in the STG while surprise did not. Thus, diverting attention away from the emotional 
prosody decreased processing of surprise as compared to neutral below the statistical 
significance threshold (although the decrease in activation between tasks was not 
significant) in the STG, while above-threshold activation for anger processing was 
sustained. Lastly, we found a modulation of hemispheric asymmetry by task demands in 
the temporofrontal network, with bilateral activation for emotional (against neutral) 
prosody in the explicit task and relative right lateralization in the implicit task. 




Therefore, the unilateral activation clusters found for the whole-brain analyses in the 






















Figure 5. The mean Z-value for each task and each emotion is shown for the IFG 
and the STG. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.  
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4. Discussion  
The aim of the present study was to investigate the brain areas involved in the implicit 
(unintentional) and explicit (intentional) perception of emotional prosody. Further, it 
was investigated whether automaticity for emotional prosody processing could be 
demonstrated, and if so, whether it might be particularly evident for anger. First, we 
found activation of the core temporofrontal prosody perception network (comprising 
the STG and IFG) independently of task demands. Further, for explicit perception of 
emotional prosody additional activation was found in the left middle temporal gyrus, 
angular gyrus and the supramarginal gyrus. However, comparing both tasks directly for 
both emotions against neutral revealed no differential activation between both modes 
of processing. Last and importantly, anger processing showed sustained supra-
threshold activation of the right STG under both task conditions while surprise only 
showed supra-threshold STG activation in the explicit condition. 
 In line with recent models of emotional prosody perception (Kotz & 
Paulmann, 2011; Brück, Kreifelts, & Wildgruber, 2011) and meta-analytic evidence 
(Witteman, Van Heuven, & Schiller, 2012), activation was found along the STG/STS 
for stimulus driven (i.e., emotion contrasted against neutral) emotional prosody 
perception and additionally in the IFG (uncorrected) independently of task demands. 
Thus, this result adds to the growing evidence base in support of a core temporofrontal 
network that is involved in the (at least) three stage emotional prosody perception 
process, involving extraction of acoustic features relevant to emotional prosody, 
integration of those features into more abstract representations and finally evaluation of 
these representations and integration with other layers of the speech signal.  
Our results further suggest that intentional processing of emotional prosody may 
recruit additional areas beyond the core emotional prosody perception network. During 
intentional emotional prosody perception, additional activation was found in the left 
MTG and the left TPJ extending into the supramarginal and angular gyrus, while during 
unintentional (implicit) emotional prosody processing these areas were not significantly 
activated (however these areas were not more active during the explicit task as 
compared to the implicit task). Involvement of the MTG or TPJ in intentional 
emotional prosody perception has been observed in previous work (Wildgruber, Pihan, 
Ackermann, Erb, & Grodd, 2002; Ethofer et al., 2009; Leitman et al., 2010; Frühholz et 
al., 2012, but see Kotz et al., 2003) and within the context of emotional processing the 
MTG has been suggested to be involved in abstract multimodal processing of emotion 
(Mitchell, Elliott, Barry, Cruttenden, & Woodruff, 2003; Pourtois, De Gelder, Bol, & 
Crommelinck, 2005; Johnstone, Van Reekum, Oakes, & Davidson, 2006). Further, a 
recent meta-analysis (Bzdok et al., 2012) of the neuroimaging literature suggests that the 
MTG and TPJ play a key role in ‘Theory of Mind’, the ability to contemplate about 
others’ thoughts and feelings in an abstract manner. Thus, the MTG and TPJ may be 
optionally recruited in addition to the core emotional prosody perception network for 
more abstract and intentional analysis of others’ feelings as communicated through the 
voice. However, the involvement of these additional structures during intentional 
prosody perception may be a matter of degree rather than type, as the direct statistical 
comparison between both tasks did not reveal any clusters differentiating between both 
tasks. Further, although admittedly this is accepting the null hypothesis, the direct 
comparison between the two tasks suggests that the core prosody perception network 
is also similarly active during intentional (explicit) and unintentional (implicit) emotional 
prosody perception. 




Regarding hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception, 
previous meta-analytic evidence has suggested that there is relative right-hemispheric 
specialization (Witteman, Van IJzendoorn, Van de Velde, Van Heuven, & Schiller, 2011) 
that might be driven by relatively early specialization for the processing of acoustic cues 
relevant to emotional prosody perception (such as F0) in the primary and secondary 
auditory cortex (Witteman, Van Heuven, & Schiller, 2012). Although in the present 
study the whole brain analysis for task independent effects revealed a cluster in the right 
STG, inspection of the uncorrected activation maps revealed bilateral activation in the 
STG. Further, ROI analysis of the STG and IFG showed overall bilateral activation 
independent of task, bilateral activation during the explicit task and relatively greater 
activation in the right than the left hemisphere during implicit (unintentional) emotional 
prosody perception. A problem with interpreting the previous neuroimaging evidence 
regarding hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception is that most 
studies do not perform a formal statistical test for lateralization and only report 
(lateralized) clusters of supra-threshold activation. With this approach the possibility 
cannot be excluded that in reality there is no meaningful difference in activity between 
the hemispheres. Indeed, previous neuroimaging studies that did perform a formal test 
of hemispheric lateralization either found no hemispheric asymmetry (Grandjean et al., 
2005) or relative right hemispheric asymmetry to bilateral activation, depending on the 
specific emotional category analyzed (Leitmann et al., 2010). Thus, in line with these 
studies and meta-analytic work (Witteman et al., 2011; Witteman et al., 2012), our 
results suggest that right hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception is 
relative at best. Further, in accordance with previous work (e.g. Luks, Nusbaum, & 
Levy, 1998; Gandour et al., 2004) the present results suggest that the hemispheric 
asymmetry during prosody perception can be modulated by task demands only (as 
acoustic material was held constant between the tasks), with greater activation of the 
right hemisphere than the left during implicit emotional prosody perception shifting to 
symmetric activation during explicit emotional prosody perception. Although 
speculative, a greater contribution of the left hemisphere during explicit emotional 
prosody perception might be related to the added verbal load required for verbal 
labeling of emotional prosody (Ross et al., 1997). 
 Of note, no significant activation of the amygdala was found in any of the 
activation maps. Although the amygdala is often claimed to be essential for adequate 
emotional prosody perception, a recent meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature of 
emotional prosody perception did not find significant convergence of activity across 
studies in the amygdala (Witteman et al., 2012). Further, lesion studies have repeatedly 
failed to find significant disturbance of emotional prosody perception in patients with 
amygdala lesions as compared to controls (Adolphs & Tranel, 1999; Adolphs, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 2001; Bach, Hurlemann, & Dolan, 2013), suggesting that the amygdala might 
not be necessary for emotional prosody perception. However, it has been suggested 
that amygdala involvement in the emotional prosody perception process might be hard 
to detect with a whole brain analysis because there is differential involvement of the 
various subnuclei (Frühholz et al., 2012) and because the amygdala rapidly habituates to 
emotional prosody (Wiethof, Wildgruber, Grodd, & Ethofer, 2009; but see 
Scheuerecker et al., 2007), preventing its detection with typical fMRI designs that 
involve sustained stimulation, as the present.  
 We were additionally interested in whether automaticity for emotional 
prosody perception could be demonstrated, and if so, whether automaticity would be 
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particularly evident for threat processing, as has been predicted on evolutionary 
grounds (Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 
2003; Schupp et al., 2004). Building on the conceptual work on automaticity by Moors 
and De Houwer (2006), we specifically investigated whether the ‘uncontrollability’ 
aspect of automaticity could be demonstrated for emotional prosody perception – i.e., 
whether emotional prosody processing would persist even when participants do no 
intend to initiate the emotional prosodic perception process. On the neural level, we 
adopted the criterion for automaticity proposed by Anderson et al. (2003) – i.e., the 
persistence of supra-threshold activation of neural structures during unintentional 
emotional prosody perception as compared to intentional emotional prosody 
perception. Indeed, in the present study the right STG remained significantly active 
when subjects did not intentionally analyze emotional prosody for anger (as compared 
to neutral) but not for surprise. Activation of the right temporal cortex during 
unintentional emotional prosody perception has been found previously for anger as 
compared to neutral prosody (Grandjean et al., 2005; Sander et al., 2005). However, in 
these previous studies anger was the only emotional prosody category employed, 
rendering it uncertain the possibility that such automaticity is specific for anger 
processing or that it may be a general property of emotional prosody perception. Thus, 
the present results extent this previous work by providing initial evidence that 
automaticity of emotional prosody perception seems to be specific to threat. Further, 
the results support models postulating prioritized processing of negative and 
particularly threatening emotional signals in the brain (i.e., ‘negativity bias’, see Ito, 
Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998), possibly through a phylogenetically prepared 
mechanism (e.g., Grossman, Striano, & Friederici, 2005; for a seminal review on 
preparedness of threat perception, see Öhman & Mineka, 2001). However, it should be 
noted that even for threat perception automaticity of processing is likely to be relative 
in the sense that if attentional resources are sufficiently depleted, activation during 
unintentional emotional perception is eventually reduced (Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, 
& Ungerleider, 2002; Mothes-Lasch, Miltner, & Straube, 2012; for a review on 
automaticity of emotional processing and its relativity, see Straube, Mothes-Lasch, & 
Miltner, 2011). Thus, future investigations should investigate whether specific 
automatic activation for anger prosody can be replicated and persists under further 
reduced levels of attention.  
 
Strengths and limitations 
The present study had comparably high statistical power as compared to previous 
investigations of implicit and explicit emotional prosody perception (Bach et al., 2008; 
Frühholz et al., 2012). As has been noted before (Straube, Mothes-Lasch, & Miltner, 
2011; Mothes-Lasch, Miltner, & Straube, 2012), research on automaticity of emotional 
prosody perception is still in its infancy and has so far exclusively relied on negative 
emotions. Thus, the present study was the first to include a positive emotional category 
in addition to anger and neutrality under intentional and unintentional emotional 
prosody perception, allowing for the first time a test of the specificity of automatic 
activation during threat perception.  
Our study also had some limitations. First, the unintentional emotional 
perception task was always performed first. Therefore, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that differences between the two tasks may have been influenced by 
habituation or sensitization effects. However, as the main goal of the present 




investigation was to test the specificity of automatic processing of angry prosody, the 
fixed task order was deemed necessary, as has been suggested in previous work (Bach et 
al., 2008) in order to minimize intentional emotional prosody processing during the 
unintentional task. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that participants did 
intentionally analyze emotional prosody during the unintentional perception task after 
all. As suggested in previous work, however (Bach et al., 2008), note that if this had 
been the case, it would have had the net effect of a more conservative estimation of 
differences between the two tasks. Second, there were two response categories during 
the implicit task while there were three during the explicit task. Thus, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that the use of an extra finger during the intentional emotional 




The present study aimed to investigate the brain areas involved in the implicit and 
explicit perception of emotional prosody. Activation of the core temporofrontal 
emotional prosody perception network was found independently of task demands, in 
line with recent models of emotional prosody perception. For intentional (explicit) 
perception of emotional prosody, additional activation was found in the MTG and TPJ, 
possibly reflecting abstract and intentional analysis of others’ emotions. Direct 
comparison between the two tasks, however suggested that the same network is active 
during both intentional and unintentional emotional prosody perception. Further, in 
line with recent meta-analytic evidence, the present results suggest that there is relative 
right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception at best. The results 
further suggest that hemispheric asymmetry during prosody perception can be 
modulated by task demands only. Last, significant persistence of supra-threshold 
activation during unintentional (implicit) emotional prosody perception was found in 
the right STG for anger but not surprise, supporting evolutionary grounded models 
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The phenomenon of affective priming has caught scientific interest for over 30 years, 
yet the nature of the affective priming effect remains elusive. This study investigated 
the underlying mechanism of cross-modal affective priming and the influence of 
affective incongruence in music and speech on negativities in the N400 time-window. 
In Experiment 1, participants judged the valence of affective targets (affective 
categorization). We found that music and speech targets were evaluated faster when 
preceded by affectively congruent visual word primes, and vice versa. This affective 
priming effect was accompanied by a significantly larger N400-like effect following 
incongruent targets. In this experiment, both spreading of activation and response 
competition could underlie the affective priming effect. In Experiment 2, participants 
categorized the same affective targets based on nonaffective characteristics. However, 
as prime valence was irrelevant to the response dimension, affective priming effects 
could no longer be attributable to response competition. In Experiment 2, affective 
priming effects were observed neither at the behavioral nor electrophysiological level. 
The results of this study indicate that both affective music and speech prosody can 
prime the processing of visual words with emotional connotations, and vice versa. 
Affective incongruence seems to be associated with N400-like effects during evaluative 
categorization. The present data further suggest a role of response competition during 

















In daily life, the ability to adequately process emotional information from our 
environment is of vital importance. Central to research on affective processing is the 
long standing 'primacy of emotion' debate, which can be traced back to the founder of 
experimental psychology (Wundt, 1907). The affective primacy hypothesis assumes that 
humans are endowed with an evaluative decision mechanism allowing them to 
automatically evaluate affective stimulus information (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Bartlett, 1932; 
Zajonc, 1980, 1984). In line with this hypothesis, Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell and 
Kardes (1986) showed that participants need less time to judge the affective valence of 
a target stimulus (e.g., ‘ugly’) if it is preceded by an affectively related prime (e.g., ‘hate’). 
This affective priming effect is thought to be an early, fast-acting, automatic process 
that can occur outside of conscious awareness (for a review, see Fazio, 2001; Klauer & 
Musch, 2003). Affective priming has been found for a variety of stimuli, such as 
pictures, prosody (i.e., melodic and rhythmic aspects of speech), music, and odors. The 
affective priming effect has caught scientific interest for more than three decades, yet 
the exact nature of the mechanism causing affective priming remains unclear. 
Early explanations proposed spreading of activation as the mechanism underlying 
affective priming. The spreading of activation account (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, 
& Hymes 1996; De Houwer, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2001; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, 
& Eelen, 2002) assumes an associative network of interconnected concept nodes, in 
which affective valence is represented. An affective prime pre-activates the 
representations of affectively related targets at the conceptual level by spreading of 
activation through this network and thereby leads to faster encoding of targets with the 
same valence as the prime. 
More recently, researchers have begun to conceptualize the affective priming 
effect in terms of conflict at the response stage of processing rather than at the 
conceptual level (e.g., De Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002; Wentura, 
1999, 2000). According to this account, an affective prime automatically triggers a 
response tendency that corresponds to its valence. This leads to response facilitation 
for targets with the same valence as the prime, and to response inhibition when the 
valence of the target is different from the valence of the prime (Stroop-like interference 
process). Note that the two accounts need not be mutually exclusive. 
Music, the “language of the emotions” (Scherer, 1995) and speech prosody, the 
vocal expression of emotions (“melody of speech”), have long been assumed to share a 
common ancestry (Brown, 2000; Dissanayake, 2000; Helmholtz, 1863/1954; Joseph, 
1988; Pinker, 1995; Rousseau, 1761/1986; Spencer, 1857). Recent studies on the 
expression of emotion through music and speech have shown that both involve similar 
emotion-specific acoustic cues (such as pitch, tempo, and intensity) through which 
emotion is conveyed in similar ways (Ilie & Thompson, 2006; Juslin & Laukka, 2003; 
Zatorre, 2002). Such acoustic attributes are thought to be connected with affective 
connotations that are used to communicate discrete emotions in both vocal and musical 
expression of emotion (Ilie & Thompson, 2006; Juslin & Laukka, 2003). Recent studies 
have suggested that both affective speech prosody and music may influence the 
processing of visual affective stimuli (e.g., Bostanov & Kotchoubey, 2004; Schirmer & 
Kotz, 2003; Schirmer, Kotz, & Friederici, 2002; Schirmer, Kotz, & Friederici, 2005 for 
prosody; Daltrozzo & Schoen, 2009; Jolij & Meurs, 2011; Koelsch, Kasper, Sammler, 
Schulze, Gunter, & Friederici, 2004; Kotz & Paulmann, 2007; Logeswaran & 
Bhattacharya, 2009; Sollberger et al., 2003; Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2008, 2011 for music). 




Electrophysiological studies employing affective priming paradigms found that the 
N400, an event-related potential (ERP) known to be elicited by semantic mismatches 
(for a review, see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), also occurs for mismatches in affective 
meaning between speech prosody and visually presented words (e.g., Schirmer et al., 
2002, 2005; Schirmer & Kotz, 2003). Recently, the N400 has additionally been 
observed for mismatches in affective meaning between music and linguistic stimuli 
(Daltrozzo & Schoen, 2009; Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2008, 2011; see Koelsch, 2011 for a 
review on musical meaning processing). In the present study, we employed both speech 
prosody and music to compare the capability of both media of interacting with the 
processing of linguistic stimuli in a cross-modal affective priming paradigm. 
The N400 in response to affectively incongruent prosody and music has generally 
been interpreted to reflect spreading of activation (e.g., Daltrozzo & Schoen, 2009; 
Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2008, 2011). However, studies investigating the underlying 
mechanisms of affective priming have pointed out the importance of response 
competition in such affective evaluation tasks (e.g., Bartholow, Riordan, Saults, & Lust, 
2009; Klauer, Roßnagel, & Musch, 1997; Wentura, 1999). One method to test the 
contribution of response competition to affective priming is to have subjects categorize 
affective stimuli based on non-affective characteristics or to name the affective targets. 
As the prime does not convey response-relevant information in these situations, 
conflict at the response level is eliminated, while spreading of activation remains as a 
possible mechanism of affective priming. Interestingly, affective priming effects have 
been observed less reliably in studies using non-affective categorization of affective 
targets and naming paradigms than in the affective evaluation paradigm (e.g., De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; De Houwer et al., 2002; Klauer & Musch, 2001; 
Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000; Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere, De Houwer, & Eelen, 
2004; but see De Houwer & Randell, 2004; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004; 
Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007a, for positive evidence of affective 
priming in such tasks). Such failures to find affective priming effects during non-
affective categorization tasks illustrate the role of response conflict during affective 
priming. Taken together, a number of studies using behavioral paradigms have 
provided evidence for a contribution of response competition to affective priming in 
the evaluative categorization task. It is important to note, however, that affective 
priming effects may not be exclusively explained by either spreading of activation or 
response competition, but may also depend on contextual and attentional factors. In 
fact, Gawronski and coworkers recently showed that affective priming effects in a 
paradigm based on response conflict (affective evaluation) depended on participants’ 
attention to the category membership of the primes (Gawronski et al., 1010). This 
demonstrates that affective evaluations as assessed by implicit measures may not be as 
rigid and inflexible as previously assumed, but may vary with depth of processing and 
attention under task-specific conditions. 
At the electrophysiological level, two previous studies have investigated the 
contribution of conflict at the response level to affective priming effects during 
evaluative categorization using visual primes and targets. Bartholow and colleagues 
(2009) showed that an important factor in driving affective priming effects between 
words with positive and negative connotations indeed lies in the response system: after 
prime onset, preferred response activation occurred in motor cortex, as the lateralized 
readiness potential (LRP) indicated. In addition, increased N2 amplitudes in affectively 
incongruent conditions suggested that response conflict occurred when the response 
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activated by the prime differed from the target response. Eder and coworkers tested the 
contribution of semantic priming versus response priming on affective priming 
between pictures and words (Eder, Leuthold, Rothermund, & Schweinberger, 2011). 
These authors likewise used the LRP to measure prime-induced response activations 
and further tested the effect of affective incongruence on the P300 and the N400. Their 
findings show an earlier occurring stimulus-locked LRP in affectively congruent 
conditions, and increased amplitudes of the N400 in affectively incongruent conditions, 
whereas the P300 remained unaffected by affective congruence. The authors concluded 
that both semantic priming and response priming are likely to constitute affective 
priming effects in the evaluative categorization task.  
In summary, the view that affective priming is driven only by spreading of 
activation has recently been challenged by studies employing electrophysiology in 
combination with behavioral measures. Using unimodal visual priming paradigms, these 
studies suggested that conflict at the response level contributes to affective priming in 
the evaluative categorization task. The present study tested for the first time the 
mechanisms contributing to cross-modal affective priming between auditory and visual 
stimuli by systematically varying the possibility of response conflict to occur between 
two otherwise identical experiments. Furthermore, we aimed to compare the capability 
of speech prosody and music of affectively priming visually presented linguistic stimuli. 
To this end, we employed a cross-modal paradigm to test affective priming effects 
between music, speech prosody, and visually presented words with affective 
connotations at the behavioral level as well as the impact of affective congruence on 
negativities in the N400 time-window. 
The study comprised two experiments: Experiment 1 aimed to test the occurrence 
of cross-modal affective priming by emotional music and speech on visually presented 
word targets, and vice versa. Participants judged the affective valence of the targets 
(affective categorization task). In this experiment, spreading of activation as well as 
response competition may cause the affective priming effect. We hypothesized to find a 
behavioral affective priming effect (longer reaction times) for affectively incongruent 
music, speech, and word targets, accompanied by increased negativities in the N400 
time-window in affectively incongruent compared to congruent conditions. 
Experiment 2 employed the same stimuli as experiment 1. However, participants 
were now asked to categorize the targets based on non-affective characteristics (non-
affective categorization task), excluding response competition to occur while still 
allowing for spreading of activation. If the affective priming effect and N400-like effect 
in experiment 1 were indeed caused by response competition, no affective priming 
effect and no negativities in the N400 range should be found in experiment 2. 







Thirty-two students (16 male, mean age 23.8, SD 4.4) from the University of 
Groningen participated in experiment 1, 49 different students (24 male, mean age 23.3, 
SD 4.9) in experiment 2. All participants were right-handed native speakers of Dutch, 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no hearing impairment. None of the 
participants were professional musicians. Subjects received € 20 for their participation 
in the two-hour EEG session. Informed consent was obtained from all participants 
prior to the study. The study was approved by the local ethics committee of the BCN-




The stimulus set comprised 48 words for visual presentation (24 positive, 24 negative, 
with 50 % denoting persons and 50 % denoting objects), 48 pseudo-words spoken in 
happy (24) and sad (24) prosody, and 48 music segments expressing happy (24) or sad 
(24) emotion. All stimuli were validated in three separate pilot studies prior to the 
experiment. 
In the visual word pilot, ten independent raters of Leiden University judged the 
words with emotional connotations on a 9-point Likert scale (-4 = very negative, 0 = 
neutral, 4 = very positive). Only words rated 3 or higher by 9 out of 10 raters were 
included as positive word stimuli, only words rated -3 or lower by 9 out of 10 raters 
were included as negative word stimuli. Table 1 shows the positive and negative words 
used as experimental stimuli in both experiments. 
For the prosody pilot, bisyllabic pseudo-words that obeyed Dutch phonotactics 
were recorded with the help of an actress, cut to a length of approximately 600 ms and 
amplitude normalized using the Praat speech processing software (Boersma & Weenink, 
1996). The normalization procedure amplified every stimulus item such that the 
digitalized sample with the maximum amplitude was set at the maximum positive or 
negative value of the converter range, and all other samples were scaled proportionally. 
As a result, all stimuli had about equal intensity. Ten independent raters at Leiden 
University judged the pseudo-words on a 9-point Likert scale (-4 = very sad, 0 = 
neutral, 4 = very happy) with the additional option to choose “other” if another 
emotion than happy or sad was perceived. Only pseudo-words rated 3 or higher for 
happy prosody and -3 or lower for sad prosody by 9 out of 10 raters were included in 
the study. 
Music excerpts were created from a number of piano and guitar compositions by 
Western classical music composers (e.g., Bach, Beethoven, Chopin, Mendelssohn; for a 
full list of compositions see Table 2). From these compositions, segments with a length 
of 600 ms were excerpted in Praat (cut at zero-crossings), amplitude normalized and 
subsequently judged by 13 independent raters at the University of Groningen on a 9-
point Likert scale (-4 = very sad, 0 = neutral, 4 = very happy) with the additional 
option to choose “other” if another emotion than happy or sad was perceived. Only 
music segments rated 3 or higher for happy music and -3 or lower for sad music by 11 
out of 13 raters were included in the study. 
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Table 1. Affective word stimuli (Dutch originals and English translation) used in 
experiment 1 and 2. 






1 Bloem Flower Beul Hangman 
2 Bonbon Candy Bom Bomb 
3 Cake Cake Braaksel Vomit 
4 Echtpaar Married Couple Dief Thief 
5 Expert Expert Galg Gallows 
6 Genie Genius Graf Grave 
7 Geschenk Present Hoer Whore 
8 Goedzak Good Soul Junk Junk 
9 Held Hero Klootzak Asshole 
10 Honing Honey Monster Monster 
11 Ijsje Ice Cream Pijnbank Rack 
12 Kanjer Hunk Pis Piss 
13 Lieverd Darling Pus Pus 
14 Maatje Buddy Racist Racist 
15 Paleis Palace Sadist Sadist 
16 Parel Perl Schijt Shit 
17 Roos Rose Slet Slut 
18 Satijn Satin Sloerie Slut 
19 Schatje Baby Tiran Tyrant 
20 Snoep Candy Tumor Tumor 
21 Vriend Friend Vandaal Vandal 
22 Vriendin Girlfriend Vergif Poison 
23 Winnaar Winner Vetkwab Fat Roll 












Table 2. Piano and guitar compositions used as a basis for the musical stimuli.  
Instrument Valence Composer Composition 
    




Violin Partita in E major 
TN iii/7: Scherzo 
Op. 7: Leicht und Luftig 
Etude in G flat major 
Five Pieces for Piano, Op. 85: Bellis 




Op. 27 No. 2 
“Moonlight”: Adagio sostenuto 
Sonata No. 8 in C minor, Op. 13 
Nocturne Op. 27 No.1 
Nocturne B I 49:  
Op. 6: Sehnsuchtig 













Castillos de Espańa: Turégano 
Castillos de Espańa: Olites 
Aires de la Mancha 
BWV 1003: Allegro 
BWV 1003: Fuga 
Sevilla 
Op. 12 No. 6 
Aire Venezolano  
Maria 




J. S. Bach 
Tárrega 
De Visée 
Suite Compostelana: Canción 
Suite Compostelana: Cuna 
Suite Compostelana: Coral 
Mallorca 
Sonata in A minor, BWV 1003: Grave 
Endecha 
Changing my tune 
 
Only piano segments served as experimental stimuli. Guitar segments were additionally 
included as fillers in experiment 2 for the purpose of an instrument categorization task 













The cross-modal affective priming paradigm used in experiment 1 and 2 included four 
main conditions (see Figure 1): MusicTarget (music target preceded by visual word 
prime), ProsodyTarget (prosody target preceded by visual word prime), MusicPrime (visual 
word target preceded by music prime), and ProsodyPrime (word target preceded by 
prosody prime). Each main condition comprised two congruent and two incongruent 
subconditions (congruent: positive prime – positive target, negative prime, negative 
target, incongruent: positive prime – negative target, negative prime – positive target). 
Each of the four main conditions (MusicTarget, ProsodyTarget, MusicPrime, ProsodyPrime) 
consisted of 96 trials. Overall, each word, prosody, and music stimulus was presented 
twice, once congruent and once incongruent, eliminating stimulus characteristics as an 
explanation of priming effects. Prime – target pairs were created in a randomized 
fashion. The order in which prime – target pairs were presented was random with the 
restriction that consecutive targets or primes were never the same and no more than 3 
targets were presented consecutively. The four main conditions were presented in four 
separate blocks, whose order of presentation was counterbalanced according to a Latin 
square. 
 
Stimulus presentation was controlled using E-Prime (1.2). Each trial started with a 
black fixation cross in the middle of the screen (1500 ms), followed by a red fixation 
cross (500 ms) signaling the occurrence of the prime. To reduce blink artifacts, 
participants were instructed to blink when the fixation cross was black, and not to blink 
anymore when it turned red. When the red fixation cross disappeared, the prime was 
presented, followed by the target after 200 ms. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) 
of 200 ms was chosen based on findings that the affective priming effect dissipates 
after 300 ms (Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001). Reaction time was recorded from 
the onset of the target. 
In experiment 1, participants were to judge the pleasantness of the target as fast 
and accurately as possible (affective categorization task). In experiment 2 (non-affective 
semantic/phonological categorization task), participants judged whether a visual target 
 
 
Figure 1. The cross-modal affective priming paradigm.  
 




word was an object or a person, whether a spoken pseudo-word contained a 
monophthong (pure vowel) or a diphthong (gliding vowel), or whether a music 
segment was played by a piano or a guitar. 
 
2.4. ERP Recordings 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64 tin electrodes mounted in an 
elastic electro cap organized according to the international 10/20 system. EEG data 
were recorded with a linked mastoid physical reference and were re-referenced using an 
average reference. Bipolar vertical and horizontal electrooculograms (EOGs) were 
recorded for artifact rejection purposes. The ground electrode was applied to the 
sternum. Impedance of all electrodes was kept below 5 kΩ for each participant. EEG 
was continuously recorded with a sampling rate of 500 Hz, amplified, and off-line 
digitally low-pass filtered with a cut-off frequency of 30 Hz. Participants were seated in 
front of a monitor at a distance of approximately 50 cm in a dimly lit, electrically 
shielded and sound-attenuated booth. Music and speech stimuli were presented via 
loudspeakers placed at the left and right side of the participant at approximately 70dB. 
 
2.5. Data Analysis 
The EEG data were analysed with Brain Vision Analyzer (version 1.05). Prior to 
averaging, trials with eye-movement and blink artifacts were excluded from analysis. 
Criteria for artifact rejection within an epoch were a maximal voltage step of 50 µV, a 
maximal difference between two values in a segment of 100 µV, and a minimum and 
maximum amplitude of -100 µV and 100 µV, respectively. 
For experiment 1, all 32 subjects (16 male) were included in the analysis. For 
experiment 2, one subject was excluded due to noisy ERP data, leaving a total of 48 
subjects (25 male) for analysis. ERP epochs for each subject were computed in a 1000 
ms time-window and aligned to a 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Mean amplitudes for 
music, speech, and word targets were computed at the N400 time-window (400 to 500 
ms after target-onset) for affectively congruent and incongruent conditions in each 
participant. This time-window was chosen based on previous N400 literature and on 
visual inspection of the data, which showed consistent differences between conditions 
for affectively congruent and incongruent targets between 400 and 500 ms. 
Regional repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (RM-ANOVA) was conducted 
in SPSS (17.0) using 30 electrodes in six regions (anterior, central, posterior) in the left 
and right hemisphere. The left anterior region included electrodes F3, F5, F7, FC3, and 
FC5, the right anterior region electrodes F4, F6, F8, FC4, and FC6. The left central 
region included electrodes C3, C5, CP3, CP5, and T7, the right central region electrodes 
C4, C6, CP4, CP6, and T8. The left posterior region included electrodes P3, P5, P7, 
PO3, and PO5, the right posterior region electrodes P4, P6, P8, PO4, and PO6. Figure 


































To test for the effect of prime valence on target processing, the factors Prime Valence 
(positive vs negative) and Target Valence (positive vs negative) were entered into the 
analysis separately. A significant interaction between Prime Valence and Target Valence, 
indicating ERP differences between affectively congruent and incongruent conditions 
was interpreted as an affective priming effect. As the main goal of the present study 
was to examine affective priming effects, only the results of the Prime Valence × 
Target Valence interaction (i.e., the affective priming effect) and factors qualifying this 
interaction at the behavioral and electrophysiological level are presented. In case of 















Figure 2. Electrode array used in the experiment. Gray circles indicate the 
electrodes used.  






3.1. Behavioral Results 
Behavioral data analysis showed that performance was higher than 90% in all 
conditions, indicating ceiling effects. Therefore, only the results of the reaction time 
(RT) analyses on correctly identified targets are reported. Significant interactions 
between prime and target indicate an affective priming effect. Table 3 shows the mean 
reaction times to positive and negative targets in affectively congruent and incongruent 
conditions in both experiments. Further information on the percentage of affective 
priming effects is provided by Table 4 for experiment 1 (N = 32), and by Table 5 for 
experiment 2 (N = 49). 
 
First, a full ANOVA including the factors Condition (MusicTarget vs ProsodyTarget vs 
MusicPrime vs ProsodyPrime), Prime Valence (positive vs negative), and Target Valence 
(positive vs negative) was conducted, with Sex (male vs female) and Experiment (1 vs 2) 
as between-subjects factors. Results showed that there were significant prime-target 
interactions for RT in experiment 1 (see Figure 3) but not in experiment 2 (see Figure 
4), indicated by a significant 3-way interaction Prime Valence × Target Valence × 
Experiment, F(1,77) = 24.29, p < 0.001 (see Figure 5 for a comparison of the overall 
affective priming effect between the two experiments). Follow-up ANOVAs were 
subsequently performed in each condition for experiment 1 (affective categorization) 
and experiment 2 (non-affective categorization). 
 
3.1.1. Experiment 1: Affective Categorization 
 
MusicTarget 
Participants evaluated music segments preceded by affectively congruent visual word 
primes significantly faster than music segments preceded by affectively incongruent 
word primes. RM-ANOVA revealed a significant 2-way Prime Valence × Target Valence 
interaction [F(1,30) = 27, p < 0.001], indicating a behavioral affective priming effect for 
congruent music targets. 
 
ProsodyTarget 
Prosody targets were evaluated significantly faster when preceded by affectively 
congruent visual word primes compared to prosody targets preceded by incongruent 
word primes. RM-ANOVA revealed a significant 2-way Prime Valence × Target Valence 
interaction for reaction time [F(1,30) = 13.1, p < 0.001], indicating a behavioral 
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Table 3. Reaction times (means and standard deviations) in response to positive and 
negative targets in congruent compared to incongruent conditions in experiment 1 
(affective categorization) and experiment 2 (non-affective categorization). 
Experiment 1 





SD (ms) Mean 
(ms) 
SD (ms) 
Music Target Positive 589.39 84.24 625.66 85.31 
 Negative 615.21 80.23 644.66 100.33 
Prosody Target Positive 691.13 128.89 736.66 129.28 
 Negative 700.00 140.29 715.99 122.89 
Music Prime Positive 578.85 63.91 601.08 64.61 
 Negative 591.26 71.13 586.50 53.58 
Prosody Prime Positive 612.42 94.11 637.85 96.52 
 Negative 628.72 90.34 631.97 96.28 
Experiment 2 





SD (ms) Mean 
(ms) 
SD (ms) 
Music Target Positive 707.68 122.03 697.59 116.91 
 Negative 771.69 128.75 780.85 128.68 
Prosody Target Positive 903.98 146.82 890.03 155.47 
 Negative 913.24 162.15 919.63 144.12 
Music Prime Positive 599.98 78.15 606.10 81.65 
 Negative 617.38 81.84 614.21 80.29 
Prosody Prime Positive 651.00 97.18 650.57 91.87 











Table 4. Frequency of affective priming effects in the 32 participants of experiment 1. 
Mean and standard deviations (SD) of the difference in reaction times between 
affectively congruent and incongruent conditions are shown. 
Condition Frequency (%) Mean (ms) SD (ms) 
Music Target 87.50 41.31 29.44 
Prosody Target 75.00 47.98 42.16 
Music Prime 56.25 26.56 20.71 
Prosody Prime 75.00 23.71 13.58 
 
Table 5. Frequency of affective priming effects in the 49 participants of experiment 2. 
Mean and standard deviations (SD) of the difference in reaction times between 
affectively congruent and incongruent conditions are shown. 
Condition Frequency (%) Mean (ms) SD (ms) 
Music Target 55.00 13.35 14.32 
Prosody Target 41.00 25.55 20.56 
Music Prime 57.00 11.25 12.67 
Prosody Prime 55.00 25.84 19.85 
 
 
Figure 3. Behavioral results for experiment 1. Shown are reaction times for prime 
valence and target valence for MusicTarget (A), ProsodyTarget(B),  MusicPrime (C) 
and ProsodyPrime (D).  




There was a trend to evaluate visual word targets faster when preceded by affectively 
congruent music primes compared to incongruent music primes. RM-ANOVA 
revealed a trend of the Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction for reaction time 
[F(1,30) = 3.4, p = 0.073]. Music excerpts as primes elicited behavioral affective priming 
effects in only 56 % of the participants (Table 4). 
 
ProsodyPrime 
When preceded by affectively congruent prosody primes, visual words were evaluated 
significantly faster than words preceded by affectively incongruent prosody primes. 
RM-ANOVA revealed a significant 2-way Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction for 
reaction time [F(1,30) = 14.6, p < 0.001]. Table 4 shows the frequency of affective 
priming effects in the four conditions of experiment 1. 
 
3.1.2 Experiment 2: Non-Affective Categorization 
 
MusicTarget 
Repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the 2-way Prime Valence × Target Valence 
interaction was not significant for reaction time [F(1,47) < 1], indicating the absence of 
an affective priming effect for music targets preceded by word primes during non-
affective semantic/phonological categorization. 
 
ProsodyTarget 
RM-ANOVA revealed a non-significant 2-way Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction 
for RT [F(1,47) < 1], indicating the absence of an affective priming effect for prosody 
targets preceded by word primes during semantic/phonological categorization. 
 
MusicPrime 
No affective priming effect during semantic/phonological categorization was found for 
word targets preceded by music primes, as a non-significant 2-way Prime Valence × 
Target Valence interaction [F(1,47) < 1] indicated.  
 
ProsodyPrime 
No affective priming effect was found during semantic/phonological categorization of 
target words preceded by prosody primes. RM-ANOVA revealed a non-significant 2-
way Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction for RT [F(1,47) = 1.7, p = 0.200]. Table 5 
shows that the frequency of affective priming effects in the four conditions of 
experiment 2 was at chance level. 
 







Figure 5. Behavioral results for experiment 1 (affective categorization) vs. 
experiment 2 (non-affective categorization). Shown are the reaction times for 
correct responses for congruent and incongruent conditions for prosody and 
music as targets and as primes.   
Figure 4. Behavioral results for experiment 2. Shown are reaction times for prime 
valence and target valence for MusicTarget (A), ProsodyTarget(B),  MusicPrime 
(C) and ProsodyPrime (D).  
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3.2. ERP Results 
First, a full RM-ANOVA was conducted on mean voltages within the N400 time-
window including the factors Condition (MusicTarget vs ProsodyTarget vs MusicPrime vs 
ProsodyPrime), Prime Valence (positive vs negative), Target Valence (positive vs negative), 
Region (anterior vs central vs posterior), and Hemisphere (left vs right), with Sex (male vs 
female) and Experiment (1 vs 2) as between-subjects factors. Mean N400 amplitudes 
served as the dependent measure. 
Results showed that the prime-target interactions significantly differed between 
Experiment 1 (see Figure 6) and experiment 2 (see Figure 7) at the N400 time-window, 
indicated by a significant 3-way interaction Prime Valence × Target Valence × Experiment 
[F(1,77) = 11.39, p < 0.001]. This interaction was further qualified by the factor 
Condition, as suggested by a significant 4-way interaction Prime Valence × Target Valence × 
Experiment × Condition [F(3,231) = 3.38, p < 0.02]. Follow-up ANOVAs were 
subsequently performed for each of the four conditions in experiment 1 (affective 
categorization) and experiment 2 (non-affective categorization). 
 
3.2.1. Experiment 1: Affective Categorization 
 
MusicTarget 
Repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant 2-way Prime Valence × Target Valence 
interaction for music targets at the N400 time-window [F(1,30) = 4.8, p = 0.036], 
indicating larger negativities for incongruent compared to congruent music targets. The 
data also showed a significant 3-way interaction Prime Valence × Target Valence × Sex for 
music targets [F(1,30) = 7.6, p = 0.010], suggesting that this effect was stronger in 
female than in male participants. However, sex as between-subject factor did not reach 
significance [F(1,30) < 1]. The Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction was not 
qualified by region or hemisphere, suggesting a global scalp distribution of the N400-
like effect. See Figure 8 for a comparison between topographies of this N400-like effect 
between the four conditions of experiment 1. 
 
ProsodyTarget 
A significant 2-way Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction was observed for prosody 
targets at the N400 time-window [F(1,30) = 4.8, p = 0.036], indicating larger negativities 
for incongruent compared to congruent prosody targets. The Prime Valence × Target 
Valence interaction was not qualified by region or hemisphere, suggesting a global scalp 
distribution of the N400-like effect. 
  
MusicPrime 
A significant 3-way interaction Prime Valence × Target Valence× Region was found for 
visual word targets preceded by music primes at the N400 time-window [F(1.1,33.1) = 
8.3, p = 0.006], accompanied by a main effect of region [F(1.1,33.5) = 45.7, p < 0.001], 
while the 2-way interaction Prime Valence × Target Valence did not reach significance 
[F(1,30) < 1]. This indicates significantly larger negativities for word targets following 
incongruent music primes compared to congruent primes only at anterior regions, as 
separate ANOVAs for each region revealed: at anterior regions, the 2-way interaction 
Prime Valence × Target Valence was significant [F(1,30) = 10.3, p = 0.003], but not at 
central [F(1,30) < 1] and posterior regions [F(1,30) = 2.3, p = 0.137]. 
 





A significant 2-way Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction was observed for visual 
word targets preceded by prosody primes at the N400 time-window [F(1,30) = 6.6, p = 
0.015], indicating larger negativities for incongruent compared to congruent targets. 
The Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction was not qualified by region or hemisphere, 
suggesting a global scalp distribution of the N400-like effect. 
 
3.2.2. Experiment 2: Non-Affective Categorization 
 
MusicTarget 
RM-ANOVA revealed a significant 2-way Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction for 
music targets at the N400 time-window [F(1,47) = 6.2, p < 0.001]. In contrast to 
experiment 1, the effect was reversed: larger negativities were found for affectively 
congruent compared to affectively incongruent music targets during semantic 
classification. A significant 3-way interaction Prime Valence × Target Valence × Sex 
[F(2,47) = 6.2, p = 0.004] indicated that this effect was significantly larger in female 




In contrast to experiment 1 (affective categorization), the 2-way Prime Valence × Target 
Valence interaction for prosody targets was not significant at the N400 time-window 
[F(1,47) = 1.1, p = 0.300], indicating that the same affectively incongruent prosody 




Figure 6. N400-like effect in response to affectively incongruent targets (gray) versus 
affectively congruent targets (black) during affective categorization in Experiment 1. 
Grand averages of 32 participants for a 1000 msec time-window post target onset at 
electrode site P3 are shown for (A) MusicTarget, (B) ProsodyTarget, (C) 
MusicPrime, and (D) ProsodyPrime. 




Figure 7. Lack of N400-like effect in response to affectively incongruent targets (gray) 
versus affectively congruent targets (black) during non-affective categorization in 
Experiment 2. Grand averages of 48 participants for a 1000 msec time-window post 
target onset at electrode site P3 are shown for (A) MusicTarget, (B) ProsodyTarget, (C) 
MusicPrime, and (D) ProsodyPrime. 
 
 
Figure 8. Topographic maps of N400-like effects during affective categorization in 
Experiment 1. Scalp distributions are shown for the difference waves of affectively 
incongruent conditions subtracted by affectively congruent conditions in the time-
window 400–500 msec post target onset. N400-like effects showed a global scalp 
distribution for MusicTarget(A), ProsodyTarget (B), and ProsodyPrime (D), and an 
anterior locus of the N400-like effect for MusicPrime (C). 





The 2-way Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction was not significant at the N400 
time-window during semantic/phonological categorization of word targets preceded by 
music primes [F(1,47) < 1]. 
 
ProsodyPrime 
In contrast to experiment 1, the 2-way Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction was not 
significant at the N400 time-window [F(1,47) = 1.4, p = 0.241], indicating that the word 
targets preceded by affectively incongruent prosody primes did not elicit larger 




The present study was designed to systematically test the mechanisms underlying cross-
modal affective priming between music, speech, and visually presented words. In 
experiment 1, participants categorized music, prosody, and word targets on the basis of 
their valence (affective categorization). In this experiment, both spreading of activation 
and response competition may underlie the affective priming effect. In experiment 2, 
participants categorized the targets based on non-affective characteristics. This design 
rendered affective prime characteristics irrelevant to the response dimension, excluding 
response competition as a possible mechanism of the affective priming effect, while 
leaving the possibility of spreading of activation to occur. 
Our results revealed a consistent pattern at the behavioral and the 
electrophysiological level. During affective categorization (experiment 1), both music 
and prosody targets were evaluated faster when preceded by affectively congruent word 
primes, and vice versa. This affective priming effect was observed for prosodic primes 
and targets as well as for music targets. Significantly larger N400-like effects were 
observed for incongruent compared to congruent targets during affective categorization 
in each of the four conditions of experiment 1. In contrast, during non-affective 
categorization of the same stimuli in experiment 2, an affective priming effect was 
neither observed at the behavioral nor at the electrophysiological level in any of the 
four conditions.  
The results of experiment 1 confirm previous findings of priming effects between 
musical and linguistic stimuli (Daltrozzo & Schoen, 2008, 2009; Sollberger et al., 2002; 
Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2008, 2009). Affective priming effects between music, prosody, 
and visually presented words at the behavioral level were accompanied by significantly 
larger negativities at the N400 time-window for affectively incongruent versus 
congruent targets during affective categorization. 
 
The role of response conflict 
Previous findings of affective priming effects accompanied by negativities at the N400 
time-window have often been interpreted to reflect interference at the conceptual level, 
i.e. in terms of the spreading of activation account (Daltrozzo & Schoen, 2008, 2009; 
Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2008, 2009; Zhang, Lawson, Guo, & Jiang, 2006). Indeed, in a 
previous cross-modal affective priming study by Steinbeis and Koelsch (2008) using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), words preceded by affectively 
incongruent music chords elicited activity in the right medial temporal gyrus (MTG), 
and music chords preceded by affectively incongruent words were found to be related 
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to activity in the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), areas that are associated 
with semantic processing and which have been found in ERP studies using source 
localization to identify the locus of the N400 (Khateb, Pegna, Landis, Mouthon, & 
Annoni, 2010; Koelsch et al., 2004). In contrast, the N450 observed in ERP studies 
employing Stroop paradigms has been suggested to arise in the anterior cingulate cortex, 
an area related to error processing and conflict monitoring by studies using source 
localization techniques (Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Liotti et al., 2000; Szűcs and Soltész, 
2010). 
However, a body of empirical evidence is accumulating that argues against 
spreading of activation to be the sole cause of affective priming effects. The occurrence 
of affective priming seems to depend on the nature of the task employed: when 
participants are asked to evaluate targets based on their valence, affective priming 
effects are readily observed (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2002, Klauer & Musch, 2002, 
Klinger et al., 2000). When asked to evaluate targets based on non-affective features or 
to pronounce the targets, however, affective priming is less reliably found (e.g., De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998, Klauer & Musch, 2001, Spruyt et al., 2004; but see 
De Houwer & Randell, 2004; Hermans et al., 2004; Spruyt et al., 2007a, for positive 
evidence of affective priming in such tasks). Task-induced modulation of affective 
priming was also reported by Daltrozzo and Schoen (2009) using musical and linguistic 
stimuli. These authors observed that affectively incongruent targets elicited a much 
smaller N400 effect during a more implicit lexical decision task than during affective 
categorization. 
Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that spreading of activation 
may not be the only mechanism underlying affective priming, but that conflict at the 
response level may contribute to priming effects in the affective evaluation task. 
Bartholow and colleagues (2009) were the first to directly show with 
electrophysiological measurements that response competition contributes to affective 
priming between words in the evaluative categorization task by demonstrating the 
occurrence of preferred response activation after prime onset in motor cortex. 
Confirming a contribution of response competition during evaluative categorization, 
Eder and coworkers (2011) concluded that response priming as well as semantic 
priming contributes to affective priming effects between words and pictures, as 
indicated by an earlier occurring stimulus-locked LRP in affective congruent conditions 
and a larger N400 in affective incongruent conditions, respectively. Our findings of 
N400-like effects for music, prosody, and word targets in a task allowing for response 
conflict (experiment 1) but not in a task eliminating response conflict (experiment 2) 
are in line with a role of response conflict during affective priming. 
 
The N400 and the N450 
Affective priming tasks such as used in the present study are quite similar to stimulus-
response compatibility tasks such as the Stroop task, which induces a high level of 
response competition (e.g., De Houwer, 2003; Klauer et al., 1997; for a review, see 
Klauer et al., 2011). In the classical Stroop paradigm, participants are asked to name the 
color a word is printed in. A mismatch between the color word and the color it is 
printed in slows down reaction times (Stroop effect). Interestingly, a number of ERP 
studies employing Stroop paradigms have also reported negativities at the N400 time-
window (Rebai, Bernard, & Lannou, 1997; Liotti, Woldorff, Perez, & Mayberg, 2000; 
Hanslmayr, Pastötter, Bäuml, Gruber, Wimber, & Klimesch, 2008; Szűcs & Soltész, 




2007, 2010). While those negativities have sometimes been interpreted as N400 effects 
(e.g., Rebai, Bernand, & Lannou, 1997), the authors of these studies tend to interpret 
them as a different effect, the N450, which has been proposed to reflect conflict at the 
response level (Qiu, Luo, Wang, Zhang, & Zhang, 2006; Szűcs & Soltész, 2007, 2010; 
West & Alain, 2000). ERP studies using source localization techniques corroborated 
this conclusion by showing that the source of the N450 is the anterior cingulate cortex, 
an area known to be involved in conflict monitoring and error processing (Hanslmayr 
et al., 2008; Liotti et al., 2000). 
In sum, even though a contribution of conceptual level interaction cannot be 
excluded in those studies, the results of ERP studies employing Stroop paradigms 
provide indirect evidence for negativities at the N400 time-window being sensitive to 
conflict at the response level. This is in line with the present finding of N400-like 
effects in a task allowing for response conflict (experiment 1), but an absence of such 
effects when eliminating response conflict as a contributing factor to affective priming 
(experiment 2). 
Given previous findings of conflict at the response level as a contributor to affective 
priming in the evaluative categorization task (Bartholow et al., 2009; Eder et al., 2011) 
on the one hand and negativities in the N400 time-window elicited by response conflict 
in Stroop tasks on the other hand, the question emerges whether negativities in the 
N400 range during affective priming reflect interference at the conceptual level (N400 
interpretation), whether they are caused by conflict at the response level (N450 
interpretation), or whether both mechanisms contribute to such negativities. The 
negativities in the N400 range observed in experiment 1 of the current study do not 
correspond to the centro-parietal (sometimes more right-hemispheric) topographic 
distribution of the classical N400 (e.g., Kutas & Federmaier, 2011) but show a global 
topography, indicated by the fact that neither the factor Region nor the factor Hemisphere 
qualified the Prime Valence × Target Valence interaction. For musical excerpts presented 
as primes, however, the N400-like effect had an anterior locus, as suggested by a 
significant 3-way interaction Prime Valence × Target Valence × Region (see Figure 8 for 
scalp topographies of the N400-like effects for the four conditions). 
The current results do not allow for an unambiguous classification of the observed 
negativities in the N400 range (experiment 1) as corresponding to the classical N400 
effect or to an N450. For this reason, we refer to the negativities observed here as an 
‘N400-like effect’. 
 
Reversed priming effects 
The only condition in experiment 2 that elicited significant differences at the N400 
time-window was MusicTarget. In contrast to the negativities observed during affective 
categorization in experiment 1, this negativity pattern was reversed: larger negativities 
were found in response to affectively congruent conditions as compared to incongruent 
ones. This effect was found to be larger in female participants and did not surface at 
the behavioral level. Reversed N400-like priming effects such as observed in 
experiment 2 of the current study have been reported previously (Bermeitinger et al., 
2008; Paulmann & Pell, 2010). These effects have been interpreted in the light of the 
center-surround inhibition theory (Carr & Dagenbach, 1990), arguing that briefly 
presented primes only weakly activate the concept associated with the prime; in order 
to increase activation of the prime concept surrounding concepts become inhibited, 
which leads to hampered access of the related targets, reversing the priming effect. 
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However, considering that the reversed N400-like effect in the present study 
occurred only during non-affective categorization (experiment 2) of music instruments 
(participants decided whether a music excerpt was played on the piano or with the 
guitar), and that the effect was significantly larger in female than in male participants, 
another explanation appears to be more plausible. Gender differences have been 
frequently observed in semantic tasks such as object decision or semantic fluency tasks 
(e.g., Barbarotto et al., 2002 for biological versus man-made objects; Capitani et al., 
1999 for naming fruits versus tools; Laws, 2004 for tools and vehicles). Specifically, 
females seem to have a processing advantage for natural objects, whereas males show 
an advantage for artifactual objects (e.g., Laws, 1999; Laws & Hunter, 2006). 
Bermeitinger and colleagues (2008) tested this gender difference for natural versus 
artifactual objects in a semantic priming paradigm. In two experiments, they found that 
female participants showed positive priming effects for natural categories but reversed 
priming effects for artifactual categories. Males, however, showed positive priming for 
both natural and artifactual categories. A third experiment further showed that this 
priming pattern in females could be manipulated by focusing their attention on 
perceptual versus functional features. The authors interpreted these results as evidence 
for specific default processing modes that differ between females and males. Such a 
difference in processing modes could account for the reversed N400-like priming 
effects during the categorization of music instruments (= artifactual categories) 
observed in experiment 2 of the present study, which we found to be significantly larger 
in female compared to male participants. However, this interpretation remains 
speculative until future research replicates such reversed priming effects in the different 
genders during music processing. 
 
Limitations 
An important limitation of the current study is that the presence of response 
competition was confounded by attention directed to the affective dimension of the 
targets. Attentional factors have indeed been shown to influence affective priming 
effects in the evaluative categorization task (Gawronski et al., 2010). Therefore, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that in experiment 2, the absence of attention to the 
affective dimension prevented affective processing of the targets, undermining affective 
priming effects to occur (see, for example, Spruyt et al., 2007a, 2009). Future studies 
should attempt to control for the amount of attention devoted to the affective 
dimension to elucidate to what extent attention influences cross-modal affective 
priming between music and language and the accompanying N400-like effects. 
Although our results quite consistently showed effects for experiment 1 but not 
for experiment 2, we inferred a contribution of response competition as a mechanism 
driving affective priming from the absence of an effect, rendering our evidence indirect. 
Though our findings are in line with recent studies that have found direct evidence for 
response competition during evaluative categorization, it may well be the case that both 
interference at the conceptual level and at the response level could contribute to 
affective priming effects. Future studies should investigate the relative contribution of 
each mechanism to affective priming. 
Further, on the basis of the current data it remains unclear whether the observed 
N400-like effect for affective incongruence between music, speech, and words with 
emotional connotations resembles more closely the classical N400 effect or the N450 
effect observed in ERP studies using Stroop paradigms. Future studies should use 




neuroimaging methods that allow localization of the brain regions mediating affective 
incongruency in music, prosody, and linguistic stimuli. 
 
Conclusions 
The results of the present study support the notion that affective music and speech 
prosody are capable of interfering with the processing of words with affective 
connotations, and vice versa. Affective incongruence seems to be associated with 
N400-like effects during evaluative categorization. Our findings further suggest a role 
of response competition during the affective categorization of music, prosody, and 
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Alexithymia, a condition characterized by deficits in interpreting and regulating feelings, 
is a risk factor for a variety of psychiatric conditions. Little is known about how 
alexithymia influences the processing of emotions in music and speech. Appreciation of 
such emotional qualities in auditory material is fundamental to human experience and 
has profound consequences for functioning in daily life. We investigated the neural 
signature of such emotional processing in alexithymia by means of event-related 
potentials. Affective music and speech prosody were presented as targets following 
affectively congruent or incongruent visual word primes in two conditions. In two 
further conditions, affective music and speech prosody served as primes and visually 
presented words with affective connotations were presented as targets. Thirty-two 
participants (16 male) judged the affective valence of the targets. We tested the 
influence of alexithymia on cross-modal affective priming and on N400 amplitudes, 
indicative of individual sensitivity to an affective mismatch between words, prosody, 
and music. Our results indicate that the affective priming effect for prosody targets 
tended to be reduced with increasing scores on alexithymia, while no behavioral 
differences were observed for music and word targets. At the electrophysiological level, 
alexithymia was associated with significantly smaller N400 amplitudes in response to 
affectively incongruent music and speech targets, but not to incongruent word targets. 
Our results suggest a reduced sensitivity for the emotional qualities of speech and 
music in alexithymia during affective categorization. This deficit becomes evident 


















Alexithymia (literally translated “no words for feelings”) has been recognized as a major 
risk factor for a variety of psychopathological and medical conditions, including chronic 
pain, somatization, depression, and anxiety (Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1997). This 
condition is characterized by deficits in the identification and verbalization of one’s 
feelings and the cognitive processing and regulation of emotions (Larsen, Brand, 
Bermond, & Hijman, 2003). 
Previous research has shown that alexithymic individuals have difficulty identifying 
emotional facial expressions (Prkachin, Casey, & Prachin, 2008; Swart, Kortekaas, & 
Aleman, 2009), matching verbal and non-verbal emotional stimuli (Lane et al., 1996), 
and remembering words with emotional connotations (Luminet et al., 2006). 
Neuroimaging studies have provided additional evidence for an association of 
alexithymia with differences in brain activation for a variety of tasks that involve 
emotional processing, such as the processing of emotional pictures (Berthoz et al., 2002) 
and the processing of facial expressions of emotion (Mériau et al., 2006), the imagery of 
autobiographical emotional events (Mantani, Okamoto, Shirao, Okada, & Yamawaki, 
2005), the observation of fearful body expressions (Pouga, Berthoz, De Gelde, & 
Grèzes, 2010), and during empathy for pain (Bird et al., 2010). 
 Since such impairment during the conscious processing of emotional information 
may be dependent upon dysfunctions at earlier processing stages, the investigation of 
automatic sensitivity to affective stimuli is of great importance to understanding the 
emotion processing deficits individuals with alexithymia exhibit. Recent studies have 
suggested impaired processing of emotions even at pre-attentive, automatic processing 
stages in this condition. When presented with emotionally aversive videos, for instance, 
individuals scoring high on alexithymia did not show an increase in electrodermal 
activity as low-scorers on alexithymia did, while no difference in self-reported arousal 
between high- and low-alexithymics was found (Franz, Schaefer, Schneider, Sitte, & 
Bachor, 2010). Smaller electrodermal responses were also found in a study using 
negative masked pictures, likewise suggesting a deficit in early emotional reactivity 
associated with alexithymia (Pollatos, Schubö, Herbert, Matthias, & Schandry, 2008). 
Other studies, however, report higher autonomic baseline levels in alexithymia (e.g., 
Gundel et al., 2004; see Lumley, Neely, & Burger, 2007 for a review). Aftanas and 
colleagues measured event-related synchronization (ERS) in participants watching 
emotional film clips. Results indicated greater emotional reactivity in the right 
hemisphere in high-scorers on alexithymia, suggesting enhanced negative affect and 
autonomous arousal associated with this condition (Aftanas & Varlamov, 2004). 
Three recent studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (Duan, Dai, 
Gong, & Chen, 2010; Kugel et al., 2008; Reker et al., 2010) further support the view 
that individuals with alexithymia show impairment during the subconscious processing 
of emotions. All of these studies assessed the influence of alexithymia on the automatic 
processing of masked facial expressions of emotions. Sad faces were found to be 
associated with lower responsiveness of the left (Reker et al., 2010) and right amygdala 
(Kugel et al., 2008) as a function of alexithymia. Additionally, Reker and colleagues 
found reduced activations of the insula, superior temporal gyrus, middle occipital and 
parahippocampal gyrus in response to sad and happy facial expressions with increasing 
scores on alexithymia (Reker et al., 2010). Masked surprised faces elicited decreased 
activation of the parahippocampal gyrus and fusiform gyrus as a function of alexithymia 




(Duan et al., 2004). In sum, these studies providence evidence for a hypoactivation of 
brain areas related to the subconscious processing of facial emotions, suggesting that 
alexithymia is associated with reduced processing of automatic emotional information. 
Affective Priming 
A powerful technique to assess automatic processing of emotions is the affective 
priming paradigm. The affective priming effect refers to the observation that the 
affective connotation of a target stimulus, e.g., ‘ugly’ will be judged faster when 
preceded by an affectively related prime, e.g., ‘hate’ as compared to an affectively 
unrelated prime, e.g., ‘love’ (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). The effect 
is thought to be an early, fast-acting, automatic process that can occur outside of 
conscious awareness (Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch, 2003). It has been demonstrated 
for a variety of stimuli, such as pictures, prosody (“melody of speech”), music, and even 
odors. 
Few studies have employed the affective priming paradigm in alexithymia. The first 
study to examine affective priming effects as a function of alexithymia was conducted 
by Suslow (Suslow, Junghanns, Donges, & Arolt, 2001). Positive and negative word 
targets (adjectives) primed by positive or negative words (nouns) were to be 
pronounced (pronunciation task) or evaluated as positive or negative as quickly as 
possible (evaluation task). Pearson’s correlations revealed no influence of alexithymia 
on affective word priming during target pronunciation. During affective evaluation, 
however, alexithymia correlated positively with the affective priming effect for positive 
word targets, whereas the correlation with negative word targets failed to reach 
significance (Suslow, 1998). 
In a follow-up study, the same word evaluation task as in the previous study (word 
– word prime – target pairs) was employed, and in addition a face evaluation task (face 
– face prime – target pairs) including happy and sad faces. The positive correlation of 
alexithymia with affective priming for positive word targets could not be replicated: In 
both the word evaluation task and the face evaluation task alexithymia did not correlate 
with the affective priming effect, neither for positive nor for negative targets (Suslow et 
al., 2001). 
Suslow and Junghanns (2002) employed a lexical decision task on neutral or 
emotional target words and non-words primed by sentences with congruent or 
incongruent emotional content. High scorers on alexithymia showed a negative 
situation priming effect, indicated by faster lexical decisions for targets preceded by 
affectively incongruent primes. 
Vermeulen and colleagues (Vermeulen, Luminet, & Corneille, 2006) used verbal 
(positive and negative words) and non-verbal (happy and sad schematic faces) as primes 
and targets to investigate affective priming effects in alexithymia. Regression analyses 
on the effect of prime type (happy and angry faces, positive and negative words) 
showed reduced affective priming with increasing alexithymia scores only for angry face 
primes, indicative of reduced emotion processing at an automatic level in alexithymia. 
Based on these findings, the authors suggest a specific impairment during the automatic 
processing of threatening stimuli (as represented by angry faces) associated with 
alexithymia (Vermeulen et al., 2006). 
Taken together, previous studies using affective priming paradigms in alexithymia 
provide preliminary evidence for an impact of alexithymia on the automatic processing 
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of visual emotional stimuli. However, no consistent picture has emerged with respect to 
the question of whether alexithymia is associated with reduced or increased affective 
priming effects during the automatic processing of emotions. 
Music and Speech Prosody 
An adequate processing of emotional qualities in auditory material such as emotional 
prosody (“melody of speech”) and music is fundamental to human experience and has 
profound consequences for functioning in daily life. Both music and speech prosody 
have been shown to be capable of influencing the processing of visual emotional 
material (for prosody see Bostanov & Kotchoubey, 2004; Koelsch et al., 2004; Kotz & 
Paulman, 2007; Schirmer & Kotz, 2003; Schirmer, Kotz, & Friederici, 2002; Schirmer, 
Kotz, & Friederici, 2005; for music see Koelsch et al., 2004; Chen, Yuan, Huang, Chen, 
& Li, 2008; Daltrozzo & Schön, 2008; Logeswaran & Bhattacharya, 2009; Sollberger, 
Reber, & Eckstein, 2003; Steinbein & Koelsch, 2008; Steinbein & Koelsch, 2009; for a 
review see Marin & Bhattacharya, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, only two 
previous studies have addressed the impact of alexithymia on the processing of 
emotions conveyed by speech prosody and music. Swart and colleagues observed no 
behavioral differences for spoken sentences with incongruent semantics and affective 
prosody in individuals with alexithymia as compared to controls (Swart et al., 2009). 
Vermeulen and colleagues found that during the presentation of angry, but not happy 
background music, high scorers on alexithymia recognized fewer anger and joy words 
than low scorers, indicating hampered memory performance during angry music 
perception associated with alexithymia (Vermeulen, Toussaint, & Luminet, 2010). 
In sum, the literature on the emotion processing deficit in alexithymic individuals 
demonstrates that alexithymia influences not only the conscious processing of emotion, 
but that aberrant emotion processing is evident already at very early, automatic 
processing stages. However, there is no consensus as to whether alexithymia is 
associated with decreased or increased automatic processing of emotions. In particular, 
little is known about the manifestation of this automatic processing deficit at the 
auditory processing level. We investigated the neural signature of automatic affective 
priming of words, speech prosody, and music as a function of alexithymia by means of 
event-related potentials (ERPs). 
The present study is the first ERP study to investigate the neural signature of 
auditory emotional processing in alexithymia using affective speech prosody and music 
in a cross-modal priming paradigm. We hypothesized reduced affective priming effects 
with increasing scores on alexithymia at the behavioral level. Given the difficulty to 
identify emotions in alexithymia, we further hypothesized a reduced sensitivity to 
affective mismatches in alexithymia, reflected in diminished N400 amplitudes in 
response to affectively incongruent compared to congruent conditions as a function of 
alexithymia. The results of this study show that alexithymia was indeed associated with 













Thirty-two students (16 male, mean age 23.8, SD 4.4) from the University of 
Groningen participated in the experiment. All participants were right-handed native 
speakers of Dutch, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no hearing impairment 
and no psychiatric condition in present or past. Participants received €20 for their 
participation in the two-hour EEG session. The Neuroimaging Center Institutional 
Review Board approved the experimental protocol and written informed consent was 
obtained from all participants prior to the study. 
2.2. Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) 
The TAS-20 is the most widely used measure of alexithymia (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 
1994a; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994b) with a demonstrated validity, reliability, and 
stability (see Taylor, 2000). A validated Dutch translation of the scale (Kooiman, 
Spinhoven, & Trijsburg, 2002) was used for the present study. The scale consists of 20 
self-report items rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 5: strongly agree), 
with five negatively keyed items. 
The TAS-20 comprises the subscales: (1) difficulty identifying feelings (e.g., “I 
often don’t know why I’m angry”), (2) difficulty describing feelings (e.g., “I find it hard 
to describe how I feel about people”), and (3) externally oriented thinking (e.g., “I 
prefer talking to people about their daily activities rather than their feelings”). Possible 
scores range from 20 to 100, higher scores indicate higher degrees of alexithymia. 
It has been suggested that alexithymia comprises two related, but distinct types 
(Vorst & Bermond, 2001; but see Bagby et al., 2009), which can be assessed with 
another self-report questionnaire, the BVAQ (Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia 
Questionnaire, 45). Type I alexithymia is thought to be characterized by a general lack 
of responsiveness to emotion at any level, whereas in type II alexithymia, basic 
responses to affective stimuli are assumed to be intact, whereas the ability to cognitively 
access and verbalize them is impaired (Lumley et al., 2007). Note that the TAS-20 
assesses only type II alexithymia. Thus, the findings presented here allow conclusions 
with regard to type II alexithymia but might not be applicable to type I alexithymia. 
Individuals with TAS-20 scores lower or equal to 51 are considered non-alexithymic, 
a score from 52 to 60 indicates moderate alexithymia. The clinical threshold for 
alexithymia is a score of 61 (Taylor et al., 1997). Alexithymia scores of our study sample 
ranged from 31 to 68 (mean: 43.25, SD: 9.89, median: 41.5, skewness: 0.98). 
2.3. Materials 
The stimulus set consisted of 48 words for visual presentation (24 positive, 24 negative), 
48 pseudo-words spoken in happy (24) and sad (24) prosody, and 48 music segments 
expressing happy (24) or sad (24) emotion. All stimuli were validated in three separate 
pilot studies prior to the experiment. 
In the visual word pilot, ten independent raters of Leiden University judged the 
words with emotional connotations on a 9-point Likert scale (-4 = very negative, 0 = 
neutral, 4 = very positive). Only words rated 3 or higher by 9 out of 10 raters were 
included as positive word stimuli, only words rated -3 or lower by 9 out of 10 raters 
were included as negative word stimuli (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Affective word stimuli (Dutch originals and English translation) used in 
experiment (identical to Table 1 of Chapter 2.5 but repeated here for ease of reference). 






1 Bloem Flower Beul Hangman 
2 Bonbon Candy Bom Bomb 
3 Cake Cake Braaksel Vomit 
4 Echtpaar Married Couple Dief Thief 
5 Expert Expert Galg Gallows 
6 Genie Genius Graf Grave 
7 Geschenk Present Hoer Whore 
8 Goedzak Good Soul Junk Junk 
9 Held Hero Klootzak Asshole 
10 Honing Honey Monster Monster 
11 Ijsje Ice Cream Pijnbank Rack 
12 Kanjer Hunk Pis Piss 
13 Lieverd Darling Pus Pus 
14 Maatje Buddy Racist Racist 
15 Paleis Palace Sadist Sadist 
16 Parel Perl Schijt Shit 
17 Ross Rose Slet Slut 
18 Satijn Satin Sloerie Slut 
19 Schatje Baby Tiran Tyrant 
20 Snoep Candy Tumor Tumor 
21 Vriend Friend Vandaal Vandal 
22 Vriendin Girlfriend Vergif Poison 
23 Winnaar Winner Vetkwab Fat Roll 












For the prosody pilot, bisyllabic pseudo-words that obeyed Dutch phonotactics 
were recorded with the help of an actress, cut to a length of approximately 600 ms and 
amplitude normalized using the Praat speech processing software (Boersma & Weenink, 
1996). The normalization procedure amplified every stimulus item such that the 
digitalized sample with the maximum amplitude was set at the maximum positive or 
negative value of the converter range, and all other samples were scaled proportionally. 
As a result, all stimuli had about equal intensity. Ten independent raters at Leiden 
University judged the pseudo-words on a 9-point Likert scale (−4 = very sad, 0 = 
neutral, 4 = very happy). Only pseudo-words rated 3 or higher for happy prosody and 
−3 or lower for sad prosody by 9 out of 10 raters were included in the study. 
Music segments were created from a number of piano pieces by composers of 
Western classical music (e.g., Bach, Beethoven, Chopin). Segments with a length of 600 
ms were excerpted in Praat (cut at zero-crossings), amplitude normalized and judged by 
13 independent raters at the University of Groningen on a 9-point Likert scale (−4 = 
very sad, 0 = neutral, 4 = very happy). Only music segments rated 3 or higher for 
happy music and −3 or lower for sad music by 11 out of 13 raters were included in the 
study. 
2.4. Procedure 
The cross-modal affective priming paradigm included four main conditions (see Figure 
1): MusicTarget (music targets preceded by visual word prime), ProsodyTarget (prosody 
target preceded by visual word prime), MusicPrime (visual word target preceded by music 
prime), and ProsodyPrime (visual word target preceded by prosody prime). Each main 
condition comprised two congruent and two incongruent sub-conditions (congruent: 
positive prime – positive target, negative prime, negative target, incongruent: positive 
prime – negative target, negative prime – positive target). 
Each of the four main conditions (MusicTarget, ProsodyTarget, MusicPrime, 
ProsodyPrime) consisted of 96 trials. Overall, each word, prosody and music stimulus was 
presented twice, once congruent and once incongruent, eliminating stimulus 
characteristics as an explanation of priming effects. All stimuli (primes as well as targets) 
were presented for 600 ms. Prime – target pairs were created and presented in a 
randomized fashion. The four main conditions were presented in four separate blocks, 
the order of which was presented counterbalanced according to a Latin square. 
Stimulus presentation was controlled using E-Prime version 1.2 (Schneider, 
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). Each trial started with a black fixation cross in the 
middle of the screen (1500 ms), followed by a red fixation cross (500 ms) signaling the 
occurrence of the prime. When the red fixation cross disappeared, the prime was 
presented. Two hundred ms after prime onset, the target was presented. An SOA of 
200 ms was chosen based on findings that the affective priming effect dissipates after 
300 ms (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Reaction time was recorded from the onset of the 
target. To reduce blink artifacts, participants were instructed to blink when the fixation 
cross was black, and not to blink anymore when it turned red. 
The task of the participants was to judge the valence of the word targets (positive 
or negative) and music and prosody targets (happy or sad) as fast and accurately as 
possible (affective categorization). Directly after the EEG session, participants 
completed the TAS-20 questionnaire. 










2.5. ERP Recordings 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64 tin electrodes mounted in an 
elastic electro cap organized according to the international 10/20 system. EEG data 
were recorded with a linked mastoid physical reference and were re-referenced by using 
an average reference. Bipolar vertical and horizontal electrooculograms (EOGs) were 
recorded for artifact rejection purposes. 
The ground electrode was applied to the sternum. Impedance of all electrodes was 
kept below 5 kΩ for each participant. EEG was continuously recorded with a sampling 
rate of 500 Hz, amplified, and off-line digitally low-pass filtered with a cut-off 
frequency of 30 Hz. Participants were seated in front of a monitor at a distance of 
approximately 50 cm in a dimly lit, electrically shielded and sound-attenuated cabin. 
Music and speech stimuli were presented via loudspeakers placed at the left and right 
side of the participant at approximately 70dB. 
2.6. Behavioral Data Analysis 
First, we aimed to establish the occurrence of cross-modal affective priming in each of 
the four experimental conditions. To this end, behavioral data were analyzed in a 2 
(congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) by 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) repeated-
measures analysis of variance (RM-MANOVA) with sex as a between-subjects factor. 
The analysis of accuracy showed that performance was higher than 90 percent in all 
conditions, indicating ceiling effects. Therefore, only the results of the reaction time 
(RT) analyses on correctly identified targets are reported (see Figure 3). 
Secondly, the impact of alexithymia on affective priming was tested in a 2 
(congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) by 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) repeated-
measures analysis of covariance (RM-MANCOVA) with alexithymia as a covariate and 
sex as a between-subjects factor. 
Lastly, Pearson’s correlations were conducted to test the impact of alexithymia on 
differences in reaction time between affectively congruent and incongruent targets. In 
order to test for an effect of valence, alexithymia scores were further correlated with 
differences in reaction time for positive and negative targets separately. 
 
Figure 1. Design of the cross-modal affective priming paradigm. 




2.7. ERP Data Analysis 
The EEG data were analysed with Brain Vision Analyzer (version 1.05). Prior to 
averaging, trials with eye-movement and blink artifacts were excluded from analysis. 
Criteria for artifact rejection within an epoch were a maximal voltage step of 50 µV, a 
maximal difference between two values in a segment of 100 µV, and a minimal and 
maximal amplitude of -100 µV and 100 µV, respectively. A total mean number of 360.1 
trials (SD 21.8) was recorded for each of the 32 participants (mean 89.2, SD 5.2 per 
experimental condition). Artefact rejection excluded a mean percentage of 3.4 percent 
of all trials (ranging from 0.3 percent to 23.3 percent across participants), leaving a total 
mean number of 343.7 trials (SD 27.1) for analysis, with a mean number of 85.7 trials 
(SD 6.7) per experimental condition. 
ERP epochs for each subject were computed in a 1000 ms time-window following 
the onset of the targets, which were aligned to a 100 ms pre-target baseline. Visual 
inspection of the data revealed negativities in response to affectively incongruent 
compared to congruent targets between 400 and 500 ms following the onset of the 
targets. These negativities were found consistently between 400 and 500 ms for music 
and prosody targets as well as for visual word targets, indicating that regardless of 
modality, affectively incongruent targets elicited N400 effects in a time-window of 400 
– 500 ms following target onset. Based on this observation and previous N400 
literature, the time-window 400 – 500 ms post-target onset was chosen for statistical 
analysis. Mean amplitudes for positive and negative music, speech, and word targets 
were computed at the N400 time-window (400 – 500 ms after target-onset) in each 
participant, beginning at the onset of the targets. RM-MANOVA was conducted in 
SPSS (17.0) using a total of 30 electrodes in six topographic regions (anterior, central, 
posterior) in the left and right hemisphere (see Figure 2). The left anterior region 
included electrodes F3, F5, F7, FC3, and FC5, the right anterior region electrodes F4, 
F6, F8, FC4, and FC6. The left central region included electrodes C3, C5, CP3, CP5, 
and T7, the right central region electrodes C4, C6, CP4, CP6, and T8. The left posterior 
region included electrodes P3, P5, P7, PO3, and PO7, the right posterior region 
electrodes P4, P6, P8, PO4, and PO8.To test for an effect of affective congruence (i.e., 
affective priming) between primes and targets as well as for effects of valence, 
congruence and valence were entered into the analysis as separate factors. Topographic 
region and hemisphere were additionally included as within-subject factors. Based on 
previous findings of sex differences in emotional prosody processing (Schirmer & Kotz, 
2003; Schirmer et al., 2002; Schirmer et al., 2005) and the processing of emotions 
conveyed by music (Altemüler, Schürmann, Lim, & Parlitz, 2002; Flores-Gutiérrez et al., 
2009; Nater, Abbruzzese, Krebs, & Ehlert, 2006), sex was included as a between-
subjects factor. In case of sphericity violations, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values 
are reported. A Sidak correction of p-values was used in pairwise comparisons between 
the levels of factors. 
Secondly, in order to test for the impact of alexithymia on affective priming and 
valence of primes and targets, RM-MANCOVA was carried out using the same factors 
as above and additionally including scores on the alexithymia questionnaire TAS-20 as a 
covariate. 
Lastly, as in previous studies on affective priming in alexithymia (Suslow, 1998; 
Suslow et al., 2001; Vermeulen et al., 2006), correlation analyses were conducted to test 
the impact of alexithymia on N400 amplitudes in response to an affective mismatch 
CHAPTER 3.1:  ROLE OF ALEXITHYMIA IN PROSODY PERCEPTION: ERPs 
 
173 
between primes and targets. Given that the N400 reflects the processing and 
integration of meaning (for a recent review, see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), its 
amplitude can be used as an indicator of individual sensitivity to mismatches in 
affective meaning between stimuli such as music, prosody, and words. To obtain an 
index of the relative increase in N400 amplitudes in affectively incongruent compared 
to congruent conditions, N400 mean voltages following congruent target onsets were 
subtracted from N400 mean voltages following incongruent target onsets at each 
electrode site. 
In order to reduce the number of comparisons and thereby the probability of false 
positives, correlations were not carried out at the 30 electrode sites separately, but N400 
means of the five electrodes contained in each of the six topographic regions (left 
anterior, central, posterior; right anterior, central, posterior) were collapsed. The 
resulting N400 amplitude means for the six regions were used in subsequent correlation 
analyses. 
 Standardized alexithymia scores (31 - 68, mean: 43.25, SD: 9.89) were then 
correlated with the absolute difference in N400 amplitude means between affectively 
incongruent and congruent conditions. In order to test for effects of valence, Pearson’s 
correlations with alexithymia were further conducted separately for positive and 
negative targets. For this purpose, separate N400 means for positive and negative 
targets (indexes of valence effects) were obtained by subtracting N400 means for 
positive (negative) targets in congruent conditions from N400 means for positive 
















Figure 2. Map of electrode sites used for analysis with left and right anterior, 
central, and posterior regions identified 






3.1. Behavioral Results 
MusicTarget 
RM-MANOVA revealed a significant affective priming effect for music targets primed 
by words with affective connotations. Participants evaluated music segments preceded 
by affectively congruent visual word primes significantly faster than music segments 
preceded by affectively incongruent word primes, as indicated by a main effect of 
congruence [F(1,30) = 27, p < 0.01]. A main effect of valence [F(1,30) = 11.1, p < 0.05] 
revealed faster categorization of happy music targets compared to sad music targets 
(608 ms vs. 630 ms). Further, a main effect of sex was found [F(1,30) = 4.2, p = 0.05], 
indicating that female participants categorized affective music targets significantly faster 
than male participants (590 ms vs. 647 ms). 
After controlling for alexithymia in RM-MANCOVA, the effect of congruence 
[F(1,29) = 6.6, p < 0.05] and sex [F(1,29) = 4.2, p = 0.05] remained significant. 
However, the effect of valence failed to reach significance [F(1,29) = 2.2, p = 0.15]. 
Alexithymia as a between-subjects effect was not significant [F(1,29) < 1], and no 
interactions with alexithymia were observed. 
Pearson’s correlations revealed no significant impact of alexithymia on the 
behavioral affective priming effect for music targets preceded by visual word primes (r 
= −.24, p = 0.19). There was no effect of valence (r = −.15, p = 0.42). 
ProsodyTarget 
RM-MANOVA demonstrated a significant affective priming effect for prosody targets 
primed by words with affective connotations. Prosody targets were evaluated 
significantly faster when preceded by affectively congruent as opposed to affectively 
incongruent visual word primes, as indicated by a main effect of congruence for 
reaction time [F(1,30) = 13.1, p < 0.01]. No main effect of valence was observed 
[F(1,30) < 1]. A significant two-way interaction between congruence and valence 
showed that sad prosody was categorized significantly faster than happy prosody in 
affectively incongruent, but not congruent conditions (716 ms vs 737 ms, p < 0.01). 
Including alexithymia as a covariate in RM-MANCOVA showed that the effect of 
congruence remained significant [F(1,29) = 6.7, p < 0.05]. A trend toward an 
alexithymia × congruence interaction [F(1,29) = 3.3, p = 0.08] suggested that this 
affective priming effect tended to be reduced in individuals with higher alexithymia 
scores. As between-subjects effect, alexithymia was not significant [F(1,29) < 1]. No 
main effect of valence was observed [F(1,29) = 1.6, p = 0.21], and the alexithymia × 
valence interaction failed to reach significance [F(1,29) = 1.3, p = 0.27]. 
Correlation analyses confirmed a trend toward a negative correlation between 
alexithymia and reaction times for prosody targets preceded by visual word primes (r = 
−.30, p = 0.09), suggesting a trend toward reduced affective priming with increasing 
alexithymia scores. No correlation between alexithymia and the valence of prosodic 
targets was found (r = −.22, p = 0.23). 




RM-MANOVA showed a trend to categorize affective word targets faster when 
preceded by affectively congruent vs. incongruent music primes (i.e., affective priming 
effect) as suggested by a marginally significant effect of congruence [F(1,30) = 3.4, p 
= .07]. A main effect of valence was not observed [F(1,30) < 1]; however, a significant 
interaction between valence and congruence [F(1,30) = 12.9, p < 0.01] suggested that 
affective priming by music on words was stronger for positive word targets. The effect 
of sex was not significant [F(1,30) < 1]. 
RM-MANCOVA including alexithymia as a covariate showed no significant main 
effects or interactions for word targets preceded by music primes. 
Correlation analyses confirmed the absence of an effect of alexithymia on affective 
priming in this condition: no significant correlations were observed between 
alexithymia and affective congruence (r = −.08, p = 0.66) and the valence of affective 
words (r = −.23, p = 0.21). 
ProsodyPrime 
RM-MANOVA revealed a significant affective priming effect for word targets primed 
by emotional prosody. Words with emotional connotations were evaluated significantly 
faster when preceded by affectively congruent as opposed to affectively incongruent 
prosody primes, as indicated by a main effect of congruence [F(1,30) = 14.6, p < 0.01]. 
There was no main effect of valence [F(1,30) < 1] and sex [F(1,30) = 1.5, p = 0.23]. A 
significant congruence × valence interaction F(1,30) = 12.4, p < 0.01] showed that the 
affective priming effect was stronger for positive than for negative words. This effect 
tended to be qualified by sex differences: a marginally significant three-way congruence 
× valence × sex interaction [F(1,30) = 3.8, p = 0.06] suggested that in female 
participants, affective priming of words was evident regardless of valence, whereas male 
participants showed affective priming only for positive word targets.  
When including alexithymia as a covariate (RM-MANCOVA), the affective 
priming effect was only marginally significant [congruence: F(1,30) = 3.8, p = 0.06]. No 
further main effects were observed in this condition. Alexithymia did not reach 
significance as between-subjects effect [F(1,30) < 1] and did not interact with 
congruence [F(1,30) = 1.3, p = 0.27] or valence F(1,30) < 1]. The three-way interaction 
congruence × valence × sex remained marginally significant [F(1,30) = 3.8, p = 0.06]. 
Correlation analyses confirmed the absence of an effect of alexithymia on words 
primed by emotional prosody: no significant correlations were observed between 
alexithymia and affective congruence (r = −.22, p = 0.24) and the valence of affective 

















3.2. ERP Results 
MusicTarget 
RM-MANOVA revealed a main effect of congruence at the N400 time-window [F(1,30) 
= 4.8, p = 0.04], indicating a larger N400 for incongruent compared to congruent music 
targets (see Figure 4 for all conditions). There was no main effect of valence [F(1,30) < 
1]. A significant congruence × sex interaction [F(1,30) = 7.5, p = 0.01] indicated that 
N400 amplitudes were larger in female than in male participants. Further, a significant 
three-way interaction of congruence × valence × sex [F(1,30) = 7.6, p = 0.01] suggested 
that in female participants, affectively incongruent music targets elicited larger N400 
amplitudes regardless of valence, whereas in male participants the N400 occurred only 
for happy music targets. Sex as a between-subject factor did not reach significance 
[F(1,30) < 1]. 
Further, a main effect of region [F(1,60) = 96.6, p < 0.01] showed that negativities 
were largest at anterior regions. A significant interaction between region and 
hemisphere [F(1,60) = 14.8, p < 0.01] further suggested more negative voltages at left 
anterior and central regions (compared to their right counterparts) and more negative 
voltages at the right posterior region (compared to its left counterpart). 
After controlling for alexithymia, RM-MANCOVA yielded no main effect of 
congruence [F(1,29) < 1]. However, a significant congruence × sex interaction [F(1,29) 
= 7.4, p = 0.01] revealed that the N400 for emotional music occurred only in female 
participants. The main effect of region remained [F(1,58) = 12.1, p < 0.01]. No further 
 
Figure 3. Behavioral affective priming effects. Behavioral affective priming effects 
during affective categorization of the targets. MusicTarget, p < 0.01, ProsodyTarget, p < 
0.01, MusicPrime, p = 0.07, ProsodyPrime, p < 0.01. Error bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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main effects were observed. The two-way interaction region × hemisphere [F(1,60) = 
14.8, p < 0.01] remained significant. Alexithymia showed a marginally significant 
interaction with hemisphere [F(1,29) = 4.0, p = 0.06], indicating a trend toward larger 
negativities in the left hemisphere in individuals with higher alexithymia scores. 
Pearson’s correlations confirmed an association of alexithymia with N400 
amplitudes for affectively incongruent compared to congruent music targets (Figure 5). 
This effect was found to be left-lateralized. For affectively incongruent music 
irrespective of valence, alexithymia correlated negatively with N400 amplitudes at the 
left central region (r = −.36, p = 0.04), and tended to correlate negatively with N400  
amplitudes at the left posterior region (r = −.33, p = 0.07). For happy music targets only, 
alexithymia also correlated negatively with N400 amplitudes in the left anterior region (r 
= -.40, p = 0.02). 
ProsodyTarget 
A main effect of congruence was observed for prosody targets at the N400 time-
window [F(1,30) = 7.1, p = 0.01], indicating a larger N400 for affectively incongruent 
compared to congruent targets. No main effect of valence was found [F(1,30) < 1]. A 
main effect of region [F(1,30) = 7.9, p < 0.01] suggested that most negative voltages 
occurred at anterior regions. No further main effects or interactions reached 
significance. 
After controlling for alexithymia, the effect of congruence for prosody targets 
failed to reach significance [F(1,29) < 1]. RM-MANCOVA revealed no significant main 
effects. There was a trend toward a congruence × hemisphere interaction [F(1,29) = 3.1, 
p < 0.09], indicating that the N400 for affectively incongruent prosody tended to be 
larger in the left hemisphere compared to the right hemisphere. This lateralization 
effect tended to be stronger in individuals with high scores on alexithymia, as indicated 
by a marginally significant three-way congruence × hemisphere × alexithymia 
interaction [F(1,29) = 3.5, p < 0.07]. 
Pearson’s correlations confirmed an association of alexithymia with N400 
amplitudes in response to affectively incongruent prosody (see Figure 5). This effect 
was found to be located at the posterior region in the left hemisphere. Alexithmia 
showed a significant negative correlation with N400 amplitudes in response to happy 
prosody (r = −.35, p = 0.05), and tended to correlate negatively with N400 amplitudes 
to sad prosody (r = −.30, p = 0.09). 
MusicPrime 
For words primed by affective music, RM-MANOVA revealed no significant effect of 
congruence [F(1,30) < 1] or of valence [F(1,30) < 1]. No significant interactions with 
congruence were found. Thus, the occurrence of an N400 effect to affectively 
incongruent words primed by music could not be established. 
The effect of alexithymia when included as a covariate was not significant [F(1,29) 










As RM-MANOVA and RM-MANCOVA showed that there was no N400 in response 
to affectively incongruent words primed by music, Pearson’s correlations between 
alexithymia and N400 amplitudes could not be conducted in this condition. 
 
Figure 4. The N400 to Affective Incongruency. N400 in response to affectively 
incongruent targets (gray) versus affectively congruent targets (black) during 
affective categorization. Grand averages of 32 subjects at electrode site P3 are 
shown for A: MusicTarget, B: ProsodyTarget, C: MusicPrime, D: ProsodyPrime. 
 
Figure 5. Correlation of alexithymia with the N400. Panel A: Negative correlation 
of alexithymia with amplitudes of the N400 in response to happy music at the left 
anterior region. Panel B: Negative correlation of alexithymia with amplitudes of 
the N400 in response to happy prosody at the left posterior region. 
 




A main effect of congruence was observed for visual word targets preceded by prosody 
primes at the N400 time-window [F(1,30) = 6.6, p = 0.02], indicating a larger N400 for 
affectively incongruent compared to congruent target words. No main effect of valence 
was found [F(1,30) < 1]. The congruence effect was qualified by a three-way 
congruence × valence × hemisphere interaction [F(1,30) = 4.6, p = 0.04], which 
indicated that in the left hemisphere, the N400 was elicited by both positive and 
negative words, while in the right hemisphere this was only true for negative words. 
A main effect of region [F(1,60) = 50.7, p < 0.01] suggested more negative voltages 
at anterior (mean: -1.9 µV) and central regions (mean: -1.0 µV) compared to posterior 
regions (mean: 2.5 µV). The effect of sex reached significance [F(1,30) = 4.8, p = 0.04], 
indicating more negative voltages in females as compared to male participants. A 
significant region × hemisphere interaction [F(1,60) = 14.3, p < 0.01] showed more 
negative voltages in the left anterior region, but more negative voltages at central and 
posterior regions in the right hemisphere. This interaction was further qualified by a 
three-way interaction region × hemisphere × sex [F(1,60) = 6.7, p < 0.01], suggesting 
more negative voltages at right central and posterior regions in both genders, and more 
negative voltages in the left anterior region in females but no anterior lateralization in 
male participants. 
Including alexithymia as a covariate in RM-MANCOVA, the congruence effect 
became insignificant [F(1,29) < 1], instead a main effect of valence was observed 
[F(1,29) = 4.5, p = 0.04], indicative of more negative voltages in response to negative 
compared to positive target words. Alexithymia interacted with this valence effect 
[F(1,29) = 4.7, p = 0.04]: for negative targets the difference in voltages did not vary as a 
function of alexithymia, whereas positive words elicited more negative voltages with 
increasing alexithymia scores. However, the interaction congruence × valence × 
alexithymia was insignificant [F(1,29) < 1], indicating that the interaction between 
alexithymia and valence did not qualify the N400 effect to incongruent vs congruent 
conditions. As a between-subjects effect, alexithymia was not significant [F(1,29) < 1]. 
The effect of region remained significant [F(1,58) = 8.4, p < 0.01], and so did the effect 
of sex [F(1,29) = 4.4, p = 0.04]. Lastly, the three-way interaction region × hemisphere × 
sex was still significant [F(1,58) = 6.3, p < 0.01]. 
Pearson’s correlations confirmed that there was no significant impact of 
alexithymia on N400 amplitudes in response to affective words primed by prosody (p > 

















The results of the present study indicate that alexithymia is associated with impairment 
in the automatic processing of emotion conveyed by music and speech prosody during 
affective categorization. At the electrophysiological level, alexithymia scores correlated 
negatively with amplitudes of the N400, an ERP component indicative of individual 
sensitivity to affective incongruence. This correlation was observed in the left 
hemisphere in response to affectively incongruent music and speech prosody. For 
prosodic targets, the effect had a posterior locus; for music targets, differences in N400 
amplitudes were more broadly distributed over central and posterior regions for happy 
and sad music, and additionally included the left anterior region for happy music targets 
only. No difference was found during affective categorization of word targets. At the 
behavioral level, we observed a trend toward a reduced affective priming effect with 
increasing alexithymia scores for prosodic targets (irrespective of valence), and no 
impact of alexithymia on affective priming for music and word targets. 
The results of the present study replicate previous findings of cross-modal 
affective priming effects between speech prosody and visually presented words 
(Bostanov & Kotchoubey, 2004; Koelsch et al., 2004; Kotz & Paulman, 2007; Schirmer 
& Kotz, 2003; Schirmer, Kotz, & Friederici, 2002; Schirmer, Kotz, & Friederici, 2005) 
and between music and linguistic stimuli (Koelsch et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2008; 
Daltrozzo & Schön, 2008; Logeswaran & Bhattacharya, 2009; Sollberger et al., 2003; 
Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2008; Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2009). Our results further confirm the 
occurrence of an N400 effect in response to affectively incongruent music, prosody, 
and linguistic stimuli in a cross-modal priming paradigm (Daltrozzo & Schön, 2008; 
Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2008; Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2009). However, we failed to replicate 
the N400 effect for words primed by affective music. In contrast to the studies by 
Steinbeis and colleagues (Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2008; Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2009) we 
used short natural music excerpts rated as happy or sad instead of music chords. 
Dissonant chords such as used in those previous studies are perceived as unpleasant, 
which was presumably (though not formally tested) not the case for our sad piano 
music excerpts. This difference in pleasantness of the stimuli used could account for 
the higher potency of chords in priming visual words compared to natural music 
excerpts such as used in the present study. Our finding of an only marginally significant 
affective priming effect for music primes at the behavioral level supports this 
hypothesis. 
Furthermore, our findings support the notion of sex differences in the perception 
of emotion in music and prosody. Female participants categorized both happy and sad 
music targets faster than men in the present study. This behavioral difference was 
accompanied by significantly larger N400 amplitudes in response to affectively 
incongruent music in women compared to men. In addition, women showed an N400 
effect irrespective of music valence, whereas in men this effect was only observed for 
happy music. These differences, indicative of a higher sensitivity to musical emotions in 
women are in line with previous reports of larger brain activation and greater positive 
attribution to affective music in women compared to men (Altenmüller et al., 2002), 
larger networks of coherent brain oscillations in response to pleasant music in female 
participants (Flores-Gutiérrez et al., 2009), and greater psychophysiological reactivity 
reflected by elevated finger temperature and skin conductance level in women 
compared to men (Nater et al., 2006). 
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Sex differences in emotional prosody perception have likewise been reported 
repeatedly: women recognized emotional prosody faster than men (Schirmer et al., 
2002), and showed an N400 in an emotional prosody Stroop task while no such effect 
was observed in men (Schirmer & Kotz, 2003). Even at pre-attentive processing levels 
sex differences seem to exist: deviants in emotional prosody elicited larger amplitudes 
of the Mismatch Negativity (MMN) in response to prosodic deviants in women, but 
not in men (Schirmer et al., 2005). We did not find significant effects of sex for 
emotional prosody targets, however, when prosody served as a prime women tended to 
show an affective priming effect for word targets irrespective of target valence, whereas 
this effect occurred in men only for positive word targets. This behavioral difference 
was accompanied by generally larger negativities to words primed by emotional prosody 
in women compared to men (an effect not found when the same words were primed by 
emotional music). The absence of a sex difference for prosody as a target in our study 
could be due to the low task difficulty, indicated by a ceiling effect in performance. Low 
task difficulty may have masked possible differences in emotional prosody 
categorization in our study, and could explain why sex differences did occur when 
emotional prosody functioned as a prime, but not as a target. 
The present study is the first to provide electrophysiological evidence for an 
emotional categorization deficit in alexithymia for music and speech prosody. Our 
finding of decreased N400 amplitudes both for emotions conveyed by music and by 
speech prosody seems conceivable given that music and speech prosody have been 
shown to use the same acoustic features to convey emotions (Ilie & Thompson, 2006; 
Juslin & Laukka, 2003; Zatorre, Belin, & Penhune, 2002). In light of this similarity, it 
seems reasonable to assume that individuals with alexithymia, a condition characterized 
by a difficulty to identify emotions, will exhibit comparable differences in brain 
responses to emotions conveyed by both music and speech prosody. Future studies 
should employ auditory affective material to provide further evidence for the generality 
of the emotion processing deficit in alexithymia, which so far has been investigated 
using almost exclusively visual emotional information. 
Our results of reduced N400 amplitudes during affective priming in response to 
emotional music and speech as a function of alexithymia confirm and extend previous 
findings of studies employing electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) that have indicated impaired subconscious processing of 
visual affective material in alexithymia. Corresponding to our finding of reduced left-
hemispheric N400 amplitudes for affective music and speech, decreased early theta 
synchronization (brain oscillations related to the cortico-hippocampal-limbic interaction 
during cognitive-emotional processing) was observed in the left hemisphere of 
alexithymic individuals during the processing of emotional pictures. This was 
interpreted as a disruption in automatic affective processing and as an analytical, 
categorical decoding difficulty of emotional stimuli in alexithymia (Aftanas & Varlamov, 
2004). Our findings are further in line with fMRI studies on the automatic processing 
of facial expressions of emotions in alexithymia. These studies found that alexithymia 
was associated with reduced activation of several brain areas during the automatic 
processing of masked happy, sad, and surprised faces (Duan et al., 2010, Kugel et al., 
2008, Reker et al., 2010), suggesting that alexithymia is associated with reduced 
emotional processing at an automatic processing level. 
The observed trend toward a negative correlation between alexithymia and 
affective categorization of prosodic targets at the behavioral level is partially in line with 




a previous study (Swart et al., 2009). Although individuals with alexithymia showed 
lower accuracy and longer reaction times during prosody identification of sentences 
with mismatching prosody and semantics in that previous study, these differences did 
not reach significance. Possibly, this was due to the long duration of the sentences 
presented (20 s), while the current study employed very short prosodic targets with a 
length of 600 ms, thereby increasing task demands. 
We did not find a relationship between alexithymia levels and N400 amplitudes 
during affective categorization of visual word targets following music and prosody 
primes. This finding reveals an asymmetry regarding the effect of alexithymia on the 
processing of emotional music and prosody: During the categorization of word targets 
primed by emotional music and prosody, alexithymia had no significant impact on 
N400 amplitudes. In contrast, when affective music and prosody targets were to be 
categorized, alexithymia scores were associated with significantly decreased N400 
amplitudes. This asymmetry for affective categorization of music and prosody targets 
versus word targets could be due to the fact that in order to categorize the auditory 
targets (music and prosody), they had to be (internally) verbalized before they could be 
categorized as happy or sad. In contrast, in conditions in which music and prosody 
served as primes, such verbalization of auditory affective information was not necessary 
as the decision was to be made on the visual word targets. 
Difficulties to identify and verbalize emotions are diagnostic criteria of alexithymia 
(Nemiah, Freyberger, & Sifneos, 1976). Hitherto, the question as to whether 
alexithymia is associated with impairment in verbalizing emotions conveyed by prosody 
and music has not been addressed. However, alexithymia exhibits a high comorbidity 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004; Bethoz & Hill, 
2005). In a recent study on the experience of music in ASD, Allen and colleagues report 
that individuals with diagnoses on the autism spectrum showed conscious awareness of 
the emotional arousal induced by music, but exhibited limitations in the terms used to 
describe the emotional effect of music (Allen, Hill, & Heaton, 2009). Such difficulty to 
verbalize emotions conveyed by music could underlie our observation of diminished 
N400 amplitudes with increasing alexithymia levels during the affective categorization 
of emotional music and prosody targets, but not word targets. 
Our finding of unaffected emotional word processing is seemingly at odds with 
previous studies suggesting an impact of alexithymia on affective priming for word 
targets (Suslow, 1998; Vermeulen et al., 2006). However, it should be born in mind that 
the larger affective priming effect for positive word targets with increasing scores on 
alexithymia (Suslow, 1998) could not be replicated in a follow-up study (Suslow et al., 
2001), despite the fact that the same word evaluation task was employed in a larger 
sample of participants. Instead, the follow-up study revealed no correlations between 
alexithymia and the affective priming effect, neither for positive word targets nor for 
negative word targets. Our findings confirm these results. Moreover, Suslow and 
colleagues used an SOA of 300 ms, although it has been shown that strategic 
components can come into effect below an SOA of 300 ms (Klauer, Rossnagel, & 
Musch, 1997) and that the affective priming effect dissipates already at 300 ms 
(Hermans et al., 2001). Therefore, an involvement of non-automatic, strategic processes 
cannot be ruled out in these studies. 
Vermeulen and colleagues showed that alexithymia correlated negatively with the 
affective priming effect for word targets when these were primed by angry faces 
(Vermeulen et al., 2006). This reduced affective priming effect was not found for happy 
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face primes and neither for positive and negative word primes. The authors interpreted 
this finding as an anger/threat-related automatic processing deficit associated with 
alexithymia. This interpretation found further support in findings of hampered memory 
performance during the perception of angry, but not happy background music in 
alexithymia (Vermeulen et al., 2010). The present study used happy and sad prosody 
and music as primes for affective word targets and found that alexithymia did not 
correlate with the affective priming effect for word targets. These results do not 
contradict the findings of Vermeulen and colleagues (Vermeuen et al., 2006), nor can 
they confirm these results as angry emotion was not included in our paradigm. It would 
be interesting to test in future studies whether the hypothesis of an anger-specific 
processing deficit in alexithymia holds when angry speech prosody and anger/threat 
evoking music are used to prime word targets during affective categorization. 
Limitations 
It should be kept in mind that the alexithymia construct may comprise two related, but 
distinct types, type I and type II alexithymia (Vorst & Bermond, 2001), though a recent 
study failed to find empirical support for this distinction (Bagby et al., 2009). The TAS-
20 questionnaire, used here in agreement with previous studies on affective priming in 
alexithymia (Suslow, 1998; Suslow et al., 2001, Suslow et al., 2002; Vermeulen et al., 
2006; Vermeulen et al., 2010), covers only type II alexithymia. This type is characterized 
by deficits to cognitively access and verbalize emotions, while the general emotional 
responsiveness is thought to be intact. Type I alexithymia, characterized by a general 
lack of emotional responsiveness could not be controlled for in the present study. 
Varying scores on type I alexithymia might have confounded the present results and 
could contribute to the fact that the present findings are not in line with previous 
studies on affective priming in alexithymia, which likewise used the TAS-20 and thus 
did not control for this possible confound. Future studies should additionally use the 
BVAQ questionnaire, which distinguishes between the two types of alexithymia and 
would thus makes it possible to control for this possible confound. 
A further limitation of the present study is the lack of a correction for multiple 
comparisons during product-moment correlations between alexithymia and N400 
amplitudes in response to affective words, music, and prosody. The number of 
comparisons conducted in the present study was relatively small, however, the present 
findings should be treated as preliminary for this reason. Future studies should attempt 
to overcome these limitations. 
Conclusions 
In sum, the results of this study suggest a reduced sensitivity to emotional qualities of 
speech and music in alexithymia at a neurophysiological level. Our findings of 
differential brain responses to affective categorization of music and speech prosody as 
compared to visual words with emotional connotations indicates that alexithymia 
impairs the categorization of affective stimuli primarily in situations in which a 
verbalization of the emotional information is required. However, this interpretation 
remains speculative until future research provides further insight into the nature of the 
emotional processing deficit in alexithymia. 
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How we perceive emotional signals from our environment depends on our personality. 
Alexithymia, a personality trait characterized by difficulties in emotion regulation has 
been linked to aberrant brain activity for visual emotional processing. Whether 
alexithymia also affects the brain’s perception of emotional speech prosody is currently 
unknown. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the impact of 
alexithymia on hemodynamic activity of three a-priori regions of the prosody network: 
the superior temporal gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the amygdala. Twenty-two 
subjects performed an explicit task (emotional prosody categorization) and an implicit 
task (metrical stress evaluation) on the same prosodic stimuli. Irrespective of task, 
alexithymia was associated with a blunted response of the right superior temporal gyrus 
and the bilateral amygdalae to angry, surprised, and neutral prosody. Individuals with 
difficulty describing feelings deactivated the left superior temporal gyrus and the 
bilateral amygdalae to a lesser extent in response to angry compared to neutral prosody, 
suggesting that they perceived angry prosody as relatively more salient than neutral 
prosody. In conclusion, alexithymia seems to be associated with a generally blunted 
neural response to speech prosody. Such restricted prosodic processing may contribute 



















The perception and interpretation of emotional signals is an important part of social 
communication. Body gestures and posture, facial expressions as well as the tone of 
voice provide crucial insight into another person’s mind (Van Kleef, 2009). However, 
how emotional signals are perceived and interpreted may differ considerably across 
individuals, and the same emotional signal can evoke a different response in different 
people (Hamann & Canli, 2004; Ormel et al., 2012). Indeed, recent neuroimaging 
studies indicate that personality modulates the brain’s response to emotional signals in 
our environment (e.g., Brück, Kreifelts, Kaza, Lotze, & Wildgruber., 2011); Brühl et al., 
2011; Canli, 2004; Frühholz, Ceravolo, & Grandjean, 2011; Hooker, Verosky, 
Miyakawa, Knight, & D’Esposito,  2008). 
 Difficulties interpreting emotions lie at the core of alexithymia (‘no words for 
feelings’), a personality construct referring to a specific deficit in emotional processing 
(Sifneos, 1973). Individuals scoring high on alexithymia have difficulty identifying, 
analyzing, and verbalizing their feelings, reading emotions from faces (e.g., Parker, 
Prkachin, & Prkachin, 2005; Prkachin, Casey, & Prkachin., 2009; Swart, Kortekaas, & 
Aleman, 2009) and describing other’s emotional experiences (Bydlowski et al., 2005). 
These difficulties in the cognitive processing of emotions, which constitute the 
cognitive alexithymia dimension, may be accompanied by reduced capacities to 
experience emotional arousal (affective alexithymia dimension). Flattened affect paired 
with diminished empathy for the feelings of others (Grynberg, Luminet, Corneille, 
Grezes, & Berhoz, 2010; Guttman & Laporte, 2002) may lead to a perception of 
alexithymic individuals as cold and distant (Spitzer, Barnow, Grabe, & Freyberger, 2005) 
and interpersonally indifferent (Vanheule, Desmet, Meganck, & Bogaerts, 2007), 
resulting in problems in social life. 
In the past decade, neuroimaging studies have begun to reveal the neural basis 
of emotion processing deficits associated with alexithymia. By means of functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), these studies demonstrated aberrant brain activity 
in individuals scoring high on alexithymia for a variety of emotional processing tasks, 
such as the viewing of facial and bodily expressions of emotions (Berthoz et al., 2002; 
Kugel et al., 2008; Mériau et al., 2006; Pouga, Berthoz, De Gelder, & Grezes, 2010), 
during empathy for pain (Bird et al., 2010), and during the imagery of autobiographic 
emotional events (Mantani, Okamoto, Shirao, Okada, & Yamawaki, 2005). Such 
differences were not only found during explicit processing (i.e. when participants were 
asked to explicitly evaluate the emotional dimension of the stimuli), but also during 
implicit processing (i.e., when participants were asked to direct their attention toward 
another dimension than emotion or were unaware of the emotional dimension; see De 
Houwer, 2006), such as during the brief presentation of masked emotional faces (Duan, 
Dai, Gong, & Chen, 2010; Kugel et al., 2008; Leweke et al., 2004; Reker et al., 2010; see 
Grynberg et al., 2012, for a review). 
 Previous research into the neural basis of alexithymia has mostly focused on 
the processing of visual emotional stimuli such as facial or bodily expressions of 
emotions or emotional pictures and videos. Surprisingly, the impact of alexithymia on 
the perception of emotional prosody (the melody of speech) has received little attention 
despite its importance in conveying emotion through the voice in daily conversation. In 
an electroencephalography (EEG) study using a cross-modal affective priming 
paradigm, we tested the impact of alexithymia on the N400 component, an indicator of 
the perception of mismatches in affective meaning, in response to music and speech 




(Goerlich, Witteman, Aleman, & Martens, 2011). Alexithymia correlated negatively with 
N400 amplitudes for mismatching music and speech, suggesting that people scoring 
high on this personality trait may be less sensitive to aurally perceived emotions. The 
suggestion of a reduced sensitivity to emotional speech prosody in alexithymia was 
confirmed in a further EEG study, in which we additionally observed that alexithymia 
did not only affect the explicit, but also the implicit perception of emotional prosody 
qualities (Goerlich, Aleman, & Martens, 2012). 
 Taken together, these findings suggest that alexithymia is linked to differences 
in the way the brain processes emotions conveyed through the voice. However, the 
brain regions underlying such differences remain unknown as neuroimaging studies 
with the necessary higher spatial resolution to identify them are currently lacking. 
Therefore, the present fMRI study aimed to investigate how alexithymia affects the 
neural processing of emotional prosody. As the impact of alexithymia may vary 
depending on whether attention is directed toward the emotional prosodic dimension 
or not, we investigated both explicit processing (participants categorized emotional 
prosody, i.e. attention was directed toward the emotional dimension) and implicit 
processing of the same prosodic stimuli (participants evaluated the metrical stress 
position, i.e. attention was directed toward a different dimension than emotional 
prosody). 
The neural network underlying emotional prosody perception has been 
investigated by numerous studies over the past decades (for a recent review, see e.g. 
Kotz & Paulmann, 2011). A recent meta-analysis of the lesion literature concluded that 
the right hemisphere is relatively more involved in prosodic processing than the left 
(Witteman, Van Ijzendoorn, Van de Velde, Van Heuven, & Schiller, 2011). Regarding a 
specific network for prosodic processing, converging evidence suggest the involvement 
of fronto-temporal regions and subcortical structures (for a recent meta-analysis, see 
Witteman, Van Heuven, & Schiller, 2012). The processing of emotional prosody has 
been proposed to involve three phases (Schirmer & Kotz, 2006). In the initial phase, 
basic acoustic properties are extracted, a process presumably mediated by the middle 
superior temporal gyrus (Wildgruber, Ethofer, grandjean, & Kreifelts, 2009). In the 
second phase, the extracted acoustic information is integrated into an emotional 
percept or ‘gestalt’. This process takes place in the superior temporal cortex, with the 
laterality and anterior-posterior distribution of activity within this structure being 
sensitive to stimulus-specific features (medium, valence) as well as to task conditions 
such as attentional focus (for a meta-analysis on the functional segregation of the 
superior temporal cortex, see Frühholz & Grandjean, 2013). In the third and final phase, 
emotional prosody is explicitly evaluated and integrated with other cognitive processes 
in the inferior frontal gyrus (Brück et al., 2011a). With respect to the involvement of 
subcortical structures, the amygdala has been implicated by several studies in emotional 
prosody processing (Brück et al., 2011a; Ethofer et al., 2009; Frühholz & Grandjean, in 
press; Jacob et al., 2012; Leitman et al., 2010; Mothes-Lasch, Mentzel, Miltner, & 
Straube, 2011; Sander et al., 2005; Wiethoff, Wildgruber Grodd, & Ethofer, 2009; 
Wildgruber, Ethofer, Kreifelts, & grandjean, 2008, but see Adolphs & Tranel, 1999; 
Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2001; Wildgruber et al., 2005; Witteman et al., 2012), with 
the role ascribed to the amygdala in this context being the initial detection of emotional 
salience and relevance (Kotz & Paulmann, 2011). The amygdala is a crucial structure for 
the processing of emotions in general (see Armony, 2013, for a recent review), and has 
further been suggested to act as a general detector of personal significance (Sander et al., 
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2003). Amygdala responsiveness seems to depend on personality characteristics, as has 
recently been demonstrated for the case of neuroticism (Brück et al., 2011a), and 
several studies reported a reduced responsiveness of the amygdala during the implicit 
and explicit processing of visual emotional information in alexithymia (Leweke et al., 
2004; Kugel et al., 2008; Pouga et al., 2010). 
Taken together, previous evidence suggests that the superior temporal gyrus 
(STG), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and the amygdala are critically involved in the 
neural processing of emotional prosody. Therefore, these three regions were chosen as 
a-priori regions of interest (ROIs) for present study. The aim of the study was to 
investigate the impact of alexithymia on the neural processing of emotional prosody 
under explicit as well as under implicit task conditions. Given previous evidence of a 
reduced sensitivity to emotional prosody and a reduced responsiveness of the amygdala 
to visual emotional information in alexithymia, we hypothesized diminished ROI 
activity during the implicit and explicit processing of emotional prosody with higher 




A total of 22 subjects (9 males; mean age 24.8 ± 5.3) participated in the study. Three 
subjects performed at chance level on the implicit task while performing normally on 
the explicit task. Therefore, analyses of the implicit task did not consider the data of 
these subjects. All participants were right-handed as determined by the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (mean 88.11 ± 11.32, minimum 67). Participants were native 
speakers of Dutch, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no hearing problems, 
and no psychiatric or neurological disorder in present or past. All participants gave 
informed consent prior to the experiment and received € 20 compensation for 
participation. The study was approved by the local ethics committee and conducted in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
2.2. Materials 
Pseudowords (see appendix A) with a bisyllabic structure were generated. All 
pseudowords obeyed Dutch phonotactics and were verified for absence of semantic 
content. All pseudowords were expressed with neutral, (pleasantly) surprised and angry 
prosody, with stress on the first and second syllable by two professional actors (one 
male, one female). Stimuli were recorded at 16 bit resolution and a 44.1 kHz bit sample 
rate in a sound proofed cabin. Surprised and angry in addition to neutral prosody was 
chosen in order to sample positive and negative emotions that are both considered to 
be approach emotions (thus, there was no confounding role of the approach-
withdrawal dimension). Items were intensity normalized (i.e. did not differ in mean 
intensity between categories) and had a mean duration of 756 ± 65 ms. In line with 
previous literature (Scherer, 2003), the emotional categories differed from neutral 
prosody in mean F0, and F0 variability and anger additionally in intensity variability 
(Table 1). The validity of the intended prosodic contrasts was verified by a panel of five 
healthy volunteers who classified each stimulus in a forced choice task (categories: 
angry, surprised, happy, sad, neutral, other). Only pseudowords whose prosodic 
category was classified correctly by at least 80% of the participants for both actors were 
chosen. 




 Two categorization tasks were created presenting identical stimuli in an 
implicit and an explicit emotional task. For the implicit task, the subjects’ attention was 
directed toward a non-emotional dimension as they were asked to decide whether the 
metrical stress lay on the first or the second syllable of the pseudoword. For the explicit 
task, the subjects’ attention was explicitly directed toward the emotional prosody 
dimension as subjects decided whether the pseudowords were spoken with neutral, 
angry, or surprised intonation. Tasks and instructions were identical except for the 
words that instructed participants to either respond to non-emotional (implicit task) or 
emotional (explicit task) prosodic characteristics. 
 From the pool of validated stimuli, 32 items of each emotional category were 
selected, half of which had metrical stress on the first syllable, the other half on the 
second syllable. Speaker gender was balanced across items. 
 
2.3. Procedure 
Each subject completed both tasks (12 minutes each). The implicit task was always 
presented first in order to prevent subjects from devoting attention explicitly to the 
emotional dimension of the stimuli in this task. Subjects were instructed that they 
would hear a nonsense word and to categorize the task-relevant category (emotion or 
metrical stress) as fast and accurately as possible with a right hand button press. 
Assignment of individual categories to response-buttons was counterbalanced across 
subjects. Participants were instructed that they could respond while the stimulus was 
still playing (i.e., RT was recorded from the onset of the stimulus). 
Subjects first practiced the tasks in the scanner with simulated scanner noise 
until reaching at least 75 % performance accuracy. Then, the experimental trials started 
which encompassed a total of 96 trials (32 items per emotional category). Throughout 
the experiment a black fixation cross was presented in the center of a grey background. 
Auditory stimuli were presented binaurally through MR-compatible headphones and a 
trial ended 2 sec after stimulus onset. Stimuli were presented in an event-related fashion 
with a jittered inter-stimulus interval (between 4 and 8 sec).  The order of stimulus 
presentation was pseudo-random with the restriction of no more than two consecutive 
presentations of the same stimulus category.  
Subjects were instructed to fix their gaze on the fixation cross throughout the 
experiment. Stimulus presentation was controlled using E-prime 1.2 and stimulus 
material was presented at 16 bit resolution and a 44.1 kHz sampling frequency at a 
comfortable intensity level. All subjects reported that the stimuli could be perceived 
clearly despite the scanner noise. 
 
 
Table 1. Acoustic properties of the prosodic stimuli for each emotional category. 
 Neutral Anger Surprise 
    
Mean intensity (dB) 79.45 79.27 80.64 
Mean variation (SD) intensity 8.84 10.74 8.83 
Mean F0 (Hz) 180.73 281.35 282.46 
Mean variation (SD) F0  44.78 78.56 101.19 
Mean total duration (s) 0.79 0.76 0.72 
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2.3.1. Twenty-Item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) 
The TAS-20 is the most widely used measure of alexithymia with a demonstrated 
validity, reliability, and stability (Bagby et al., 1994 a,b). A validated Dutch translation of 
the scale was used (Kooiman, Spinhoven, & Trijsburg, 2002). The TAS-20 consists of 
20 self-report items rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 5: strongly 
agree), with five negatively keyed items. It comprises three subscales: (1) difficulty 
identifying feelings (e.g., “I often don’t know why I’m angry”), (2) difficulty describing 
feelings (e.g., “I find it hard to describe how I feel about people”), and (3) externally 
oriented thinking (e.g., “I prefer talking to people about their daily activities rather than 
their feelings”). Possible scores range from 20 to 100, higher scores indicate higher 
degrees of alexithymia. 
 
2.3.2. State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) 
The STAI (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) differentiates between the 
temporary condition of “state anxiety” and the more general and long-standing quality 
of “trait anxiety”. For the present study, the Trait Anxiety version of the STAI (T-STAI) 
was used in order to control for trait anxiety, which has been reported to be closely 
linked to alexithymia (Berthoz et al., 1999). The T-STAI evaluates relatively stable 
aspects of anxiety proneness (general states of calmness, confidence, and security), and 
thus refers to a general tendency to respond with anxiety to perceived threats in the 
environment. The scale consists of 20 items rated from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost 
always); higher scores indicate more trait anxiety.  
 
2.3.3. fMRI data acquisition 
Imaging data were acquired on a Philips 3.0-T Achieva MRI scanner with an eight-
channel SENSE head coil for radiofrequency transmission and reception (Philips 
Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands). For each task, whole-brain fMRI data were 
acquired using T*2 - weighted gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) with the 
following scan parameters: 355 volumes (the first five were discarded to reach signal 
equilibrium); 38 axial slices scanned in ascending order; repetition time (TR) = 2200 ms; 
echo time (TE) = 30 ms; flip angle = 80°; FOV = 220 × 220 mm; 2.75 mm isotropic 
voxels with a 25 mm slice gap. A high-resolution anatomical image (T1-weighted ultra-
fast gradient-echo acquisition; TR = 9.75 ms; TE = 4.59 ms; flip angle = 8°; 140 axial 
slices; FOV = 224×224 mm; in-plane resolution .875×.875 mm; slice thickness = 1.2 
mm), and a high-resolution T*2- weighted gradient echo EPI scan (TR = 2.2 s; TE = 
30 ms; flip angle = 80°; 84 axial slices; FOV = 220 × 220 mm; in-plane resolution 1.96 
× 1.96 mm, slice thickness = 2 mm) were additionally acquired for registration to 
standard space. 
 
2.3.4. fMRI data preprocessing 
Prior to analysis, all fMRI data sets were submitted to a visual quality control check to 
ensure that no gross artifacts were present in the data. Data were analyzed using FSL 
Version 4.1.3 (Smith et al., 2004). The following preprocessing steps were applied to 
the EPI data sets: motion correction, removal of non-brain tissue, spatial smoothing 
using a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full width at half maximum (FWHM), grand-mean 
intensity normalization of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor, and a 
high pass temporal filter of 70s (i.e., ≥ 0.07 Hz). The dataset was registered to the high 
resolution EPI image, the high resolution EPI image to the T1-weighted image, and the 




T1-weighted image to the 2 mm isotropic MNI-152 standard space image (T1-weighted 
standard brain averaged over 152 subjects; Montreal Neurological Institute, Montreal, 
QC, Canada). The resulting transformation matrices were then combined to obtain a 
native to MNI space transformation matrix and its inverse (MNI to native space). 
 
2.4. Data analysis 
2.4.1 Behavioral data analysis 
Accuracy (ACC, proportion correct responses) and reaction times (RT for correct 
responses) were entered as dependent variables in analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) 
with the within-subjects factors Task (Explicit vs. Implicit), Emotion (Neutral vs. 
Angry vs. Surprised), Sex as a between-subjects factor, and scores on the TAS-20 
alexithymia questionnaire and the T-STAI anxiety scale included as covariates. 
 
2.4.2. fMRI data analysis 
Data analysis was performed using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 5.98, 
part of FSL (FMRIBs Software Library, http://www.FMRIb.ox.ac.uk/fsl). In native 
space, the fMRI time-series was analyzed in an event-related fashion using the General 
Linear Model with local autocorrelation correction applied (Woolrich et al., 2004). 
For both runs, onset of each of the stimulus categories (neutral, angry, 
surprised) were modeled separately as an event with an 800 ms duration at the first level. 
Each effect was modeled on a trial-by-trial basis using a square wave function 
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function and its temporal derivative. 
At second level a whole-brain analysis was performed across both tasks to examine the 
main effect of emotional (angry and surprised) versus neutral prosody, using clusters 
determined by p < 0.01 (z > 2.3), and a cluster-corrected significance threshold pFDR < 
0.05. If errors were present, these trials were included in the model but not in the 
contrasts of interest. 
 
2.4.3. ROI analyses 
Region of interest analyses were performed on three a-priori regions: the STG (mid and 
posterior part), the IFG (pars opercularis), and the amygdala (all bilaterally). Anatomical 
ROIs for these regions were created as defined by the Harvard-Oxford atlas 
(http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/data/atlas-descriptions.html#ho). Mean z-scores of 
each ROI were calculated for each stimulus category (anger, surprise, neutral) against 
baseline for each task and extracted for each participant using Featquery 
(http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/ feat5/featquery.html). These z-transformed 
parameter estimates indicate how well the mean signal of each ROI is explained by the 
model. In order to identify emotion-specific ROI activity, mean z-scores were further 
extracted for the contrasts angry versus neutral and surprised versus neutral prosody. 
 
2.4.4. Statistical analyses of ROI data 
The first analysis used the z-scores against baseline as a dependent variable in a 
repeated-measures (RM) ANCOVA with Task (Explicit vs. Implicit), ROI (STG vs. 
IFG vs. Amygdala), Hemisphere (Left vs. Right), and Emotion (Angry vs. Surprised vs. 
Neutral) as within-subject factors, Sex as between-subject factor, and TAS-20 
alexithymia and T-STAI anxiety scores as covariates. This analysis served to identify the 
impact of alexithymia on ROI activity in response to angry, surprised, and neutral 
prosody compared to baseline (scanner noise). 
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 In the second analysis, emotional prosody (angry, surprised) was contrasted to 
neutral prosody in an RM-ANCOVA using the mean z-scores of the contrasts angry 
versus neutral and surprised versus neutral prosody as dependent variable, with all 
other factors being identical to the first analysis. In keeping with the common 
procedure of contrasting emotional to neutral stimuli employed in the alexithymia 
literature, this analysis served to identify the impact of alexithymia on ROI activity 
specifically in response to emotional (angry / surprised) relative to neutral prosody. 
 For both analyses, follow-up tests and Pearson’s correlations were conducted 
to identify the sources of the observed effects. As the aim of the current study was to 
investigate the influence of alexithymia on prosodic processing, results will be reported 
with a focus on main effects of and interactions with the TAS-20 alexithymia scale (the 
effects of Task and Emotion are reported elsewhere). 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Behavioral data 
TAS-20 alexithymia scores of the 22 (9 male) participants ranged from 26 to 60 (mean: 
42.18 ± 7.45), i.e. none of the participants had clinical alexithymia (cut-off score ≥ 61, 
see Taylor et al., 1997). Alexithymia scores were unrelated to age (r = −.143, p = 0.526) 
and did not differ between male and female participants (t = 1.19, p = 0.245). TAS-20 
scores were significantly correlated with T-STAI anxiety scores (r = .498, p = .018), 
indicating more trait anxiety in individuals with higher alexithymia scores. T-STAI 
scores were included in all analyses as covariates of no interest in order to control for 
the impact of trait anxiety. 
Analysis of the accuracy data revealed no significant effect of Task (F(1,15) = 
2.695, p = 0.121). Neither TAS-20 nor T-STAI scores showed a significant effect on 
accuracy (TAS-20: F(1,15) = 1.290, p = 0.274, STAI: F < 1), suggesting that 
alexithymia did not impair the identification of neutral, angry, and surprised prosody 
(explicit task) and of metrical stress (implicit task). Analysis of RT data likewise revealed 
no significant main effects or interactions. 
 
3.2. fMRI Data 
3.2.1. Whole-brain analysis 
The whole brain cluster-corrected (pFDR < 0.05) analysis for emotional > neutral 
prosody across both tasks revealed a large cluster in the right STG (Table 2). Figure 1 
shows the global brain activity for prosodic stimuli compared to baseline (scanner noise) 
across tasks, Figure 2 the specific brain activity for emotional compared to neutral 













Table 2. Results of the whole brain cluster-corrected analysis for emotional versus 
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 Figure 1. Global brain activity during prosodic processing across tasks at the 
threshold Puncorr < 0.001. 
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3.2.2. ROI analyses 
3.2.2.1. Prosody versus baseline 
Figure 3 shows the mean ROI activity (STG, IFG, amygdala) in the left and right 
hemisphere in response to angry, surprised, and neutral prosody versus baseline in the 
implicit (top panel) and the explicit (bottom panel) prosody task. RM-ANCOVA with 
z-scores of angry, surprised, and neutral prosody versus baseline as dependent variable 
revealed a significant main effect of TAS-20 alexithymia scores as a between-subjects 
factor [F(1,15) = 7.119, p = 0.018]. T-STAI scores and Sex as between-subjects factors 
were not significant [F < 1]. There was no main effect of Emotion and no interaction 
of Emotion with alexithymia, suggesting that effects applied to neutral prosody as well 
as to angry and surprised prosody. There was a significant main effect of ROI [F(2,30) 
= 3.663, p = 0.038] and of Hemisphere [F(1,15) = 4.785, p = 0.045] as well as a three-
way interaction ROI × Hemisphere × TAS-20 scores [F(2,30) = 3.698, p = 0.037]. 
Follow-up tests on the factor ROI showed a significant main effect of TAS-20 
scores as a between-subjects factor for the amygdala [F(1,15) = 8.302, p = 0.011], 
suggesting reduced activity of the left and right amygdala for neutral, angry, and 
surprised prosody in individuals with high alexithymia scores. For the STG, there was a 
trend for TAS-20 alexithymia scores as a between-subjects factor [F(1,15) = 3.883, p = 
0.068]. Further, a main effect of Hemisphere [F(1,15) = 8.353, p = 0.011] and a 
Hemisphere × TAS-20 scores interaction [F(1,15) = 8.740, p = 0.010] was found, 
indicative of reduced activity of the right STG for neutral, angry, and surprised prosody 
with increasing scores on alexithymia. Pearson’s correlations confirmed these effects. 
 Figure 4 visualizes the correlations of alexithymia with activity of the left and 
right amygdala and the right STG for neutral, angry, and surprised prosody versus 
baseline. Additional Pearson’s correlations on the three alexithymia facets showed that 
none of these correlations was driven by a particular facet but rather by the entire 
personality construct. For the IFG, there was no significant main effect or interaction 
with TAS-20 alexithymia scores. 
 
3.2.2.2. Emotional versus neutral prosody 
A second RM-ANCOVA with z-scores of angry versus neutral and surprised versus 
neutral prosody as dependent variable was conducted in order to identify emotion-
specific effects of alexithymia. The results revealed a trend toward a main effect of 
TAS-20 alexithymia scores as a between-subjects factor [F(1,15) = 4.027, p = 0.063] 
and no main effect of T-STAI and Sex (F < 1). There was a significant Task × ROI × 
Hemisphere × Emotion × TAS-20 interaction [F(2,30) = 7.989, p = 0.002]. Follow-up 
Pearson’s correlations indicated positive correlations of alexithymia with activity of the 
left amygdala during the explicit evaluation of angry ( > neutral) prosody (r = 0.547, p 
= 0.015). During the implicit perception of angry ( > neutral) prosody, positive 
correlations of alexithymia with activity of the left STG (r = 0.481, p = 0.037) and the 
left (r = 0.582, p = 0.009) and right amygdala (r = 0.515, p = 0.024) were observed as 
shown in Figure 5. 
However, rather than indicating higher ROI activity with increasing 
alexithymia scores, these seemingly positive correlations were caused by a relatively 
stronger ROI deactivation in response to neutral prosody ( > baseline) than to angry 
prosody ( > baseline) with increasing alexithymia scores, as visualized in Figure 6. Thus, 
individuals with higher alexithymia scores deactivated the left STG and the bilateral 
amygdalae less in response to angry prosody than in response to neutral prosody, 




suggesting that angry prosody was perceived as relatively more salient than neutral 
prosody. 
Additional Pearson’s correlations with the three alexithymia facets showed 
that the correlation with the left amygdala in the explicit and implicit task and the 
correlation with the left STG in the implicit task were mainly driven by the facet 
‘difficulty describing feelings’. 
 
 
Figure 2. ROI activity for emotional > neutral prosody across tasks at the threshold 
Puncorr < 0.001. 
 
Figure 3. Left-hemispheric (left) and right-hemispheric (right) ROI activity (mean z-
scores) in response to angry, surprised and neutral prosody compared with baseline, 
in the implicit (top) and the explicit prosody task (bottom). Error bars indicate the 
standard error of the mean. 





Figure 4. Alexithymia correlations with ROI activity in response to angry, surprised 
and neutral prosody vs baseline across tasks. Top panel: Negative correlation of 
alexithymia with activity of the right STG. Bottom panel: Negative correlation of 
alexithymia with the left and right amygdala. 
 
Figure 5. Alexithymia correlations with ROI activity for angry prosody directly 
contrasted to neutral prosody. Top panel: Positive correlation of alexithymia with 
activity of the left amygdala in the explicit (left) and the implicit task (right). Bottom 
panel: Positive correlations of alexithymia with activity of the right amygdala (left) 
and the left STG (right) in the implicit task. 















Figure 6. Comparison between alexithymia correlations with ROI activity for neutral 
prosody > baseline (dashed lines) and angry prosody > baseline (solid lines), 
demonstrating stronger ROI deactivation for neutral than for angry prosody. Top 
panel: Negative correlation of alexithymia with activity of the left amygdala in the 
explicit (left) and the implicit task (right). Bottom panel: Negative correlations of 
alexithymia with activity of the right amygdala (left) and the left STG (right) in the 
implicit task. 




The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of alexithymia on the neural 
processing of emotions conveyed by speech prosody. Our initial analysis contrasting 
prosody to baseline showed that activity of the right STG and the bilateral amygdalae 
for angry, surprised, and neutral prosody was reduced with increasing scores on 
alexithymia, both during implicit and explicit emotional processing. When specifically 
contrasting emotional versus neutral prosody, we observed a relatively stronger 
deactivation of the left STG and the bilateral amygdalae for neutral compared to angry 
prosody, particularly in individuals with difficulty describing feelings. 
The present study is the first to investigate the neural basis of emotional 
prosody processing in alexithymia. Our finding of modulated brain activity in response 
to emotional prosody confirm previous findings of alexithymia-related deficits in visual 
emotional processing (e.g., Berthoz et al., 2002; Karlsson et al., 2008; Pouga et al., 2010) 
and suggest that such aberrant emotional processing extends to the auditory level. Our 
results further confirm previous EEG findings indicating a reduced sensitivity to the 
emotional qualities of speech prosody in alexithymia (Goerlich et al., 2011; 2012), and 
extend these findings by suggesting that such blunted processing may be localized to 
the STG and the amygdala. In line with our result of a deactivation in these regions, the 
same regions have previously been observed to be less responsive to facial expressions 
of emotion in alexithymia (for a review, see Grynberg et al., 2012). Reduced STG 
activity has been found during the implicit (masked) processing of surprised (Duan et 
al., 2010) and happy and sad faces (Reker et al., 2010). Deactivation of the amygdala has 
been observed in response to fearful bodily expressions (Pouga et al., 2010) and during 
the implicit and explicit processing of emotional faces (Leweke et al., 2004; Kugel et al., 
2008). The present findings extend these results by suggesting that the amygdala and 
the STG also show a blunted response to emotions conveyed through the voice with 
increasing alexithymia scores. In addition, they confirm that also in the auditory domain, 
alexithymia affects emotional processing not only when attention is explicitly directed 
toward the emotional dimension but also when emotion is implicitly processed. 
In line with a previous behavioral study on prosodic processing in alexithymia 
(Swart et al., 2009), we observed no alexithymia-related differences at the behavioral 
level. This pattern of differences at the neural or electrophysiological level in the 
absence of behavioral differences has been observed repeatedly in alexithymia during 
the processing of visual emotional information (Franz et al., 2004; Mériau et al., 2006; 
Vermeulen et al., 2008). In our previous EEG studies (Goerlich et al., 2011, 2012), we 
did not observe significant alexithymia-related differences in behavioral performance 
for angry and sad prosody either. In addition, a recent study investigating prosodic 
processing as a function of neuroticism found a similar pattern of differences at the 
neural level in the absence of behavioral differences (Brück et al., 2011a). Thus, it 
appears that deficits in emotional prosody processing in a non-clinical alexithymia 
sample such as the current one might be of a rather subtle nature, and can thus be 
detected at the neural level even though they do not tend to surface at the behavioral 
level. A subtle deficit in emotional prosody processing seems not surprising considering 
that alexithymic individuals are generally high-functioning and socially adapted people. 
The pursuit of social conformity is a characteristic feature of alexithymia (Taylor et al., 
1997) and implies learning to interpret emotional signals encountered in social life to 
the best of one's ability. 




In favor of this interpretation, alexithymia was associated with reduced activity in the 
STG and the amygdala, regions that are involved in earlier phases of emotional prosody 
processing (Brück et al., 2011b; Kotz & Paulmann, 2011; Wildgruber et al., 2009), but 
not in the IFG. The IFG is thought to mediate the final phase of emotional prosody 
processing, in which emotional prosodic information is explicitly evaluated and 
integrated with other cognitive processes (Brück et al., 2011b). The lack of a 
modulation of IFG activity in relation to alexithymia could be due to the good 
performance of participants and the absence of behavioral differences as a function of 
alexithymia. Taken together, our findings of alexithymia-dependent modulations of 
neural activity in earlier phases of emotional prosody processing in the absence of such 
modulations at the final stage and of behavioral differences suggests that alexithymia 
might predominantly affect earlier stages of prosodic processing, while these processing 
differences may be compensated in the final (pre-response execution) stage of this 
process, resulting in adequate behavioral performance. 
Interestingly, we found that individuals with high alexithymia scores showed 
reduced ROI activity not only for emotional (angry and surprised) but also for neutral 
prosody, irrespective of whether they focused on emotional aspects of the stimuli or 
not. In fact, direct comparisons between angry and neutral prosody revealed that 
alexithymia was associated with a significantly higher deactivation of the left STG and 
the bilateral amygdalae for neutral compared to angry prosody. This association was 
driven particularly by the alexithymia facet difficulty describing feelings. On the one 
hand, this suggests that also individuals with difficulty describing feelings perceive an 
angry tone of voice as relatively more salient and attention-capturing than a neutral one, 
in line with the well-known phenomenon of emotional stimuli being more attention-
capturing than neutral ones (for a review on emotional attention, see Vuilleumier, 2005). 
On the other hand, this finding indicates that individuals with difficulty describing their 
feelings may assign less personal significance to human voices conveying emotions, and 
even less to those using neutral prosody. This would indicate an opposite pattern than 
in psychopathological conditions such as borderline personality disorder, in which 
neutral faces can be perceived as threatening (Wagner & Linehan, 1999) and elicit the 
same degree of amygdala hyperactivity as emotional faces (Donegan et al., 2003), and in 
schizophrenia, in which amygdala deactivations for fearful compared to neutral faces in 
fact resulted from increased amygdala activity for neutral faces (Hall et al., 2008). 
Recent advances in neuroscience suggest that the role of the amygdala does not seem to 
be restricted to emotional stimuli but that this structure may represent a more general 
relevance detector for salient, personally and socially relevant, or novel stimuli (for 
reviews, see Armony, 2013; Sander, Grafan, & Zalla, 2003). For instance, amygdala 
activity was found to be higher for neutral stimuli if these were socially relevant 
compared to neutral, non-social stimuli (Vrtička, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2012). In this 
line of reasoning, our findings of diminished neural responses to human voices 
regardless of emotionality could hint to the existence of a more general deficit in the 
processing of not only emotional but also socially relevant information including 
speech prosody in alexithymia. However, this hypothesis should be considered 









While the use of the TAS-20 scale facilitates comparability of our results to previous 
findings, it should be noted that this scale assesses only the cognitive dimension of 
alexithymia. Recent evidence suggests that the affective dimension of alexithymia, the 
dimension of emotional experience, may differentially affect emotional processing 
(Bermond et al., 2010; Moormann et al., 2008). In addition, while the present study 
controlled for the influence of trait anxiety, alexithymia may also be associated with 
depression (Picardi et al., 2011) not assessed here, and levels of depression may alter the 
perception of emotional prosody (Naranjo et al., 2011; for a review, see Garrido-
Vásquez, Jensen, & Kotz, 2011). Thus, it may be worthwhile to take both alexithymia 
dimensions into account and to additionally control for levels of depression in future 
studies on prosodic perception in alexithymia. 
 
Conclusions 
Alexithymia seems to be associated with a blunted response of the superior temporal 
gyrus and the amygdala to speech prosody. This diminished response does not seem to 
be specific for emotional prosody but occurs also for neutral prosody, hinting to the 
possibility of a more general deficit in the processing of socially relevant information in 
alexithymia. Neural alterations in the processing of speech prosody may contribute to 
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4.1. Recapitulation of research questions 
Imagine again that you are sitting in a train, absorbed by a good book, and suddenly 
hearing a mother shouting angrily to her child: “Tim, you are going to annoy the other 
passengers!” As we have observed in Chapter 1 (‘Introduction’), many people would be 
familiar with the involuntary tendency to turn one’s head into the direction of Tim’s 
mother, revealing that the utterance apparently constitutes a powerful social signal that 
our brain seems to process even we when we do not intend to. 
In Chapter 1, I have explained that the communicative layer of speech that 
Tim’s mother is using to convey anger is called ‘prosody’ in linguistics. Further, we have 
elucidated that prosody cannot only be used to convey emotional meaning (which we 
have called ‘emotional prosody’) but also part of the linguistic structure of an utterance 
(which we have called ‘linguistic prosody’). The first empirical section of the present 
thesis was concerned with what network in the brain supports these two communicative 
functions of prosody, how the network does so (i.e., using what series of operations), 
whether this network indeed sometimes processes this information ‘automatically’ and, if 
so, why this might be the case. Concerning the last question, we have hypothesized that 
the existence of a ‘hard-wired’ system in the brain that prioritizes the processing of 
social signals that indicate potential harm to the organism (such as an angry mother, in 
the example above) can explain such automaticity of processing (Öhman & Mineka, 
2001). To test this hypothesis, we have directly contrasted processing of emotional 
prosody with an artificial acoustic signal that has probably emerged more recently in 
evolutionary history (and is therefore probably not supported by a hard-wired dedicated 
system) that can also powerfully convey emotion – music.  
Although the basic architecture of the prosody perception network would be 
expected to be relatively stable across individuals (otherwise, it would be hard to explain 
why communication through the prosodic layer of speech is relatively stable in its 
efficiency across individuals), there are also subtler differences in affective processing 
style among individuals (Canli, 2004). One personality trait that is associated with 
affective processing style is called alexithymia (‘no words for feelings’), a trait that is 
associated with difficulties in recognizing, identifying and verbalizing emotions (Sifneos, 
1973). As variation along the alexithymia continuum is associated with emotional 
processing differences, it is plausible that such differences are reflected in the emotional 
prosody perception network. Therefore, in the second empirical section of the present 
thesis, it was investigated whether (non-clinical) variation in alexithymia indeed 
modulates activity within the emotional prosody perception network, and if so, whether 
alexithymia is primarily reflected at a relatively early (and hence potentially ‘automatic’) 
or a relatively late stage of emotional processing (or both).  
 
4.2. Towards a cognitive neuroscience of prosody perception and its modulation by alexithymia 
4.2.1. Interhemispheric models of prosody perception 
In Figure 1 (identical to Figure 1 of Chapter 1, repeated here for ease of reference), a 
schematic visualization is presented of the prosody perception pathway, as 
hypothesized by the two major models of (emotional) prosody perception (Schirmer & 
Kotz, 2006; Wildgruber, Ethofer, Grandjean, & Kreifelts, 2009) that existed when the 
work for the present thesis was initiated. As has been pointed out in Chapter 1 and will 
be explained in more detail in the next section, these models suggest that prosody 
perception is a multi-stage process, with elementary acoustic processing first taking 
place in the primary auditory cortex (Heschl’s gyrus, or HG) and the middle part of the 
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superior temporal gyrus (m-STG). Subsequently, more abstract and complex auditory 
processing would take place in either the anterior STG (a-STG) or posterior STG (p-
STG). Finally, abstract evaluation of prosody is hypothesized to be sub-served by the 





























Figure 1 (repetition of Figure 1 of Chapter 1). Schematic visualization of the prosody 
perception pathway as hypothesized by two dominant models of (emotional) prosody 
perception, superimposed on an axial slice of an MRI scan. Solid circles and arrows 
indicate regions and connections that are hypothesized to be important in (emotional) 
prosody perception by both models. Dashed circles and arrows indicate areas and 
connections hypothesized to be involved in prosody perception by only one of the two 
models. White circles indicate areas hypothesized to be involved in the first stage, light-
grey circles in the second stage and dark-grey circles in the final stage of prosody 
perception. Bold circles in the right hemisphere as compared to the left indicate 
hypothesized right hemispheric superiority for emotional prosody perception.  
Abbreviations: HG = Heschl’s Gyrus, m-STG = mid superior temporal gyrus, p-STG = 
posterior superior temporal gyrus, a-STG = anterior superior temporal gyrus, IFG = 
inferior frontal gyrus. 
 




Early work in the cognitive neuroscience of prosody perception used the lesion-deficit 
approach in an attempt to answer the question of whether one cerebral hemisphere 
might be superior at (or ‘specialized’ in) processing of emotional prosody. As I have 
argued in Chapter 1, lesion-deficit data indeed provide the most powerful test of 
hemispheric specialization hypotheses since such data inform us about whether a 
hemisphere is necessary for a hypothesized mental function such as prosody perception. 
Three hypotheses concerning hemispheric specialization for prosody perception had 
been put forward: 
(1) The right-hemisphere hypothesis (Ross, 1981) proposes that the right 
hemisphere is specialized in emotional prosody perception; 
(2) The functional lateralization hypothesis (Van Lancker, 1980) adds that the 
hemispheres are specialized in the processing of different functional categories 
with the left and right hemisphere being specialized at the processing of 
linguistic and emotional categories, respectively;  
(3) Acoustic lateralization hypotheses, in contrast, propose that hemispheric 
specialization for prosody perception can be traced back to specialization of 
the hemispheres for different acoustic dimensions of the speech signal. A 
prominent acoustic lateralization hypothesis states that the left hemisphere is 
better at processing of temporal information while the right is better at the 
processing of spectral information (Van Lancker & Sidtis, 1992). Because 
spectral information is important for the perception of emotional prosody, a 
right-hemisphere specialization for emotional prosody perception could then 
be explained by a low-level specialization for spectral processing.  
Note that the functional lateralization hypothesis can be seen as an elaboration of the 
right-hemisphere hypothesis. Further note that the acoustic and functional lateralization 
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive – they could both be true and represent different 
stages of the prosody perception process (symbolized by the circles with different 
shades of grey in Figure 1).  
 When the work for the present thesis was initiated, the lesion-deficit literature 
had not provided consensus about whether there is hemispheric specialization for 
prosody perception and, if so, which of the above hypotheses can best explain it. 
Therefore, in Chapter 2.1, a test of these hypotheses was performed using quantitative 
meta-analysis of the lesion-deficit literature. Using the power of the combined sample 
size of all lesion-deficit studies on emotional and linguistic prosody perception 
published to date, it was found that both hemispheres are necessary for emotional and 
linguistic prosody perception (i.e., damage to each hemisphere significantly degraded 
linguistic and emotional prosodic perception performance). However, damage to the 
right hemisphere was more detrimental to emotional prosody perception performance 
than equivalent left-hemispheric damage. Thus, we found meta-analytic evidence for 
relative right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception and no 
evidence in favor of hemispheric specialization for linguistic prosody perception. In 
conclusion, based on the lesion-deficit studies to date, there is no support for the 
functional lateralization hypothesis (because no left-hemispheric specialization for 
linguistic prosody perception was found) and only evidence in favor of a weak (relative) 
version of Ross’ (1981) right hemisphere hypothesis. However, the meta-analysis did 
not allow for a direct test of the acoustic lateralization hypothesis versus the functional 
lateralization hypothesis.  
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Therefore, in Chapter 2.2, a systematic test of the functional versus acoustic 
lateralization hypotheses of prosody perception was performed. This was achieved by 
presenting participants with bi-dimensional pseudowords that had both either angry or 
sad prosody and either linguistic stress on the first or second syllable. Exactly the same 
pseudowords were presented dichotically to participants while event related potentials 
(ERPs) were recorded. However, about half of the participants were instructed to 
categorize the emotional prosody dimension of the stimuli, while the other half 
categorized the linguistic prosody dimension. If the functional lateralization hypothesis 
were correct, we would expect to find a shift from a right to left hemispheric advantage 
in activation over the scalp for the emotional versus the linguistic task. Note that, since 
the acoustic material that was presented to both groups of participants was identical, 
such a shift would be evidence for the hypothesis that the functional processing mode 
(emotional versus linguistic mode of prosody perception) pre se can indeed drive 
hemispheric asymmetry. However, no such shift in hemispheric advantage was found, 
neither as indicated by the ear advantage nor on the electrophysiological level, even 
though the statistical power of our study was relatively high. Thus, in Chapter 2.2 we 
did not find evidence in favor of the functional lateralization hypothesis of prosody 
perception, which is in keeping with the results of the quantitative meta-analysis 
performed in the preceding chapter. 
 Can acoustic lateralization hypotheses, then, better account for the relative 
right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody found using meta-analysis of the 
lesion-deficit literature in Chapter 2.1? Note that, if the relative right-hemispheric 
specialization would indeed be driven by superiority of the right hemisphere in 
processing of acoustic cues relevant for emotional prosody perception, we would 
expect a right-hemispheric advantage to emerge somewhere relatively early (at the level 
of the auditory processing centers) in the prosody perception pathway visualized in 
Figure 1. In Chapter 2.3 of this thesis, a quantitative meta-analysis was performed on 
the neuroimaging literature of emotional prosody perception, which will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section. This meta-analysis revealed a bilateral temporo-frontal 
network involved in emotional prosody perception, again illustrating that both 
hemispheres are involved in emotional prosody perception. Formal meta-analyses of 
hemispheric asymmetry, however, revealed higher activation probability in the right 
transverse temporal gyrus (HG) and p-STG than in their left-hemispheric homotopes, 
albeit only at a liberal statistical threshold. Thus, meta-analytic evidence again points to 
relative hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception in the context of 
bihemispheric involvement. Further, there is initial evidence that relative right-
hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception is driven by specialization 
for elementary (HG) and more abstract (p-STG) acoustic processing within the prosody 
perception pathway, in line with acoustic lateralization hypotheses of emotional prosody 
perception. This result is also in line with our primary neuroimaging study of emotional 
prosody perception reported in Chapter 2.4, where we found a relative rightward 
hemispheric asymmetry for emotional prosody perception across tasks in the STG. 
To summarize, regarding interhemispheric models of prosody perception, the 
present thesis finds evidence in support of relative right-hemispheric specialization for 
emotional prosody perception and no hemispheric specialization for linguistic prosody 
perception, based on meta-analysis of the lesion-deficit literature. Further, in a primary 
study using electroencephalography to systematically test the functional lateralization 
hypothesis, we do not find evidence for the functional lateralization hypothesis of 




prosody perception. Quantitative meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature further 
points to the involvement of a bihemispheric network in emotional prosody perception. 
Formal meta-analytic analyses of hemispheric asymmetry within this network, suggest 
that relative right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception is driven 
by superiority of the right-hemisphere auditory processing centers, in line with acoustic 
lateralization hypotheses of emotional prosody perception. These results are in keeping 
with a mounting evidence base in support of hemispheric specialization for basic 
dimensions of the speech signal (Boemio, Fromm, Braun, & Poeppel, 2005) and hence 
bottom-up explanations of hemispheric specialization for more complex auditory 
signals, such as prosody.  
In Figure 2, the insights gained from this thesis regarding the interhemispheric 
models of prosody perception are visualized by the bold circles that indicate a 
hemispheric advantage in the right prosody perception pathway as compared to the left, 

























Figure 2. Adaptation of the model presented in Figure 1 based on the insights gained 
from the present thesis regarding interhemispheric models of prosody perception. The 
bold circles indicate right hemispheric processing centers in the emotional prosody 
perception pathway where initial evidence for a relative right hemispheric advantage 
has been found in this thesis (for further details, see Figure 1). 
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4.2.2. Intrahemispheric models of prosody perception 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allows us to further probe the brain to 
investigate which areas within each cerebral hemisphere are involved in prosody 
perception. When the work for this thesis was initiated, there already was a substantial 
body of fMRI literature available on emotional prosody perception. These 
neuroimaging studies had inspired two very similar three-stage models (Schirmer & 
Kotz, 2006; Wildgruber, Ethofer, Grandjean, & Kreifelts, 2009) of emotional prosody 
perception. In Figure 2, a schematic visualization can be found of the neural network of 
prosody perception these models propose (and the disagreement between the two 
models). Briefly, both models propose that in an initial stage (white circles in Figure 2) 
basic acoustic processing of (emotional) prosody takes place in the transverse temporal 
gyrus or Heschl’s gyrus (HG) and the middle superior temporal gyrus (m-STG). 
Subsequently, in a second stage (light-grey circles in Figure 2), both models propose 
that more complex acoustic processing takes place to integrate the auditory information 
from stage one into more abstract units of representation, but the models disagree 
regarding the location of this processing stage. While the Wildgruber model places 
stage-two prosody perception in the posterior STG (p-STG), the Kotz model positions 
it further down the auditory object recognition pathway (the ‘what’ stream) in the 
anterior STG (a-STG). Finally, both models propose that in a third stage (dark-grey 
circles in Figure 2), abstract evaluation of prosody takes place in the inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG).  
In Chapter 2.3, a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies 
was performed to test with high statistical power which of these two models can best 
account for the neuroimaging literature to date. Two functional contrasts were meta-
analyzed, (i) a low-level contrast capturing all hypothesized phases of the emotional 
perception process, and (ii) a high-level contrast that captures more abstract (stage two 
and three) emotional prosody perception. The low-level contrast revealed above-chance 
convergence of activation likelihood in the bilateral m-STG continuing medially into 
HG, p-STG and the IFG. However, no significant convergence of activation likelihood 
was found in the a-STG. In the high-level contrast, significant convergence of 
activation likelihood was found in the right p-STG and IFG. Importantly, no significant 
convergence was found in either contrast for the amygdala, a structure hypothesized to 
be important for emotional perception (Schirmer & Kotz, 2006) and to be the evolved 
neural structure supporting automatic processing (Öhman & Mineka, 2001), an issue we 
will return to in the next paragraph. On the one hand, the amygdala might just not be 
crucial for emotional prosody perception, as suggested by lesion studies (Adolphs & 
Tranel, 1999; Bach, Hurlemann, & Dolan, 2013). However, as has been pointed out 
before, it is possible that the amygdala quickly habituates to emotional prosody, 
preventing its detection with fMRI paradigms that typically use sustained stimulation 
(Wiethoff, Wildgruber, Grodd, & Ethofer, 2009; but see Scheuerecker et al., 2007). 
Thus, the quantitative meta-analyses reported in Chapter 2.3 confirmed that HG and 
m-STG are likely to be involved in stage one and the IFG in stage three prosody 
perception, respectively, as proposed by both intrahemispheric models of prosody 
perception. Concerning stage-two prosody perception, however, our meta-analyses 
suggest that this more abstract acoustic processing stage is more likely to be supported 
by the p-STG as predicted by the Wildgruber model than the a-STG as predicted by the 
Kotz model. In Figure 3, a final modified schematic illustration of the prosody 




perception pathway is provided based on our meta-analyses of the neuroimaging 
literature on emotional prosody perception.  
Next, we asked whether automaticity of emotional prosody perception can be 
demonstrated in the emotional prosody perception network illustrated in Figure 3. As I 
have explained in Chapter 1, automaticity of prosody perception can be demonstrated 
at the neural level, by diverting attention away from the emotional prosody dimension 
of an utterance and observing whether there is continuation of above-threshold neural 
processing of emotional prosody (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 
2003). If we find such sustained neural processing of emotional prosody when 
participants do not intend to analyze the emotional prosody, this is evidence for the 
‘unintentionality feature’ of automaticity of processing, as proposed by Moors and De 
Houwer (2001). Note that, based on Darwin’s theory of evolution, it has been 
proposed that a hard-wired system dedicated to the perception of emotional prosody 
could explain automaticity for prosody perception, and that such a dedicated system 
would be particularly plausible for emotional information that signals potential harm to 
the organism (Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & 
Gabrieli, 2003; Schupp et al., 2004). If this hypothesis were true, we would particularly 
expect automatic perception of emotional prosody that signals threat, i.e., anger prosody. 
Thus in Chapter 2.4, using fMRI, we investigated whether continued supra-threshold 
activation could be found for anger prosody and, as a control, a non-threatening 
emotional category (surprise) when participants do not intend to analyze emotional 
prosody. It was found that for surprise no significant supra-threshold activation could 
be demonstrated when attention was diverted from the emotional prosody. For anger 
processing, however, continued supra-threshold activation was found in the right STG 
when subjects did not attend to the emotional prosody. Thus, in Chapter 2.4, we 
provide evidence for automatic processing of emotional prosody, but only when 
emotional prosody signals potential harm (i.e. anger), as predicted by models that 
assume an evolved dedicated system for the detection of social information that signals 
potential harm to the organism (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). However, our results suggest 
that the neural substrate does not reside in the amygdala but in the right superior 
temporal gyrus. Thus, also based on our meta-analyses of the lesion and neuroimaging 
literature above, it might be the specialized acoustic processing centers in the right 
hemisphere instead of the amygdala that have evolved to detect danger in the auditory 
modality. Alternatively, as has been pointed out above, it might be the case that these 
auditory processing centers are engaged by the amygdala first, but that activation of the 
amygdala itself is missed by fMRI because the amygdala quickly habituates to emotional 
prosody stimulation.  
As I have elucidated in Chapter 1, if automaticity of emotional prosody 
perception can be explained by an evolved hard-wired system dedicated to the 
detection of emotional states of conspecifics, we would not expect automatic 
processing of a probably more recently invented artificial signal that can powerfully 
convey emotion – music. Alternatively, cross-cultural recognition of music by culturally 
disparate groups suggests that there might be a dedicated biological system for the 
recognition of emotion in music, too (Fritz et al., 2009) pointing to a potential fitness 
value of emotional music perception. Further, the ‘super-expressive voices’ hypothesis 
(Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008) proposes that emotional music obtains its powerful emotional 
expression capability by imitating and subsequently exaggerating the acoustic properties 
of emotional prosody. Thus, by imitating emotional prosody, music could engage a 
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system dedicated to the processing of emotional prosody and as such be processed 
automatically, too. If any of these two alternative hypotheses were true, we would 
expect automaticity of emotional music perception as well. 
Recall that, in addition to the unitentionality feature of automaticity discussed 
above, rapid processing has been proposed to be a feature of automaticity (Moors & 
De Houwer, 2001). As was explained in Chapter 1, the affective priming paradigm 
(Fazio, 2001) takes advantage of the hypothesized fast processing of emotional 
information by first presenting an emotional stimulus (the affective prime) that is either 
positive or negative and almost immediately (typically 200 ms) thereafter presenting a 
second emotional stimulus (the target). Participants are required to categorize targets as 
positive or negative. The affective prime hence can be either congruent or incongruent 
with the valence of the affective target. If the affective prime is indeed processed very 
rapidly (i.e. in less than 200 ms), it should be able to facilitate responses to congruent 
targets but inhibit responses to incongruent targets. In Chapter 2.5 we presented 
participants with very short (800 ms) segments of emotional prosody and emotional 
music that were either happy or sad. Shortly (200 ms) after the onset of these affective 
primes, positive and negative affective target words were presented, which participants 
were required to categorize with respect to valence. While participants were engaged in 
the affective priming task, ERPs were recorded. We found a significant affective 
priming effect (APE) for prosody but not for music. Further, the so-called N400 effect 
was observed for incongruent vs. congruent trials for prosody and music, which had 
previously been proposed to be associated with automatic spreading of activation. 
However, in a second study, participants performed exactly the same tasks but with 
attention diverted from the affective dimension of the emotional targets. This time no 
APEs or N400's were found for prosody (nor for music). Thus, although mainly 
emotional prosody (but not emotional music) seems to fulfill the rapid processing 
feature of automaticity as evidenced by a significant APE in the first experiment, it did 
not fulfill the unintentionality criterion as measured in the second experiment. 
Moreover, the presence of the N400 in the first study combined with its absence in the 
second, suggested that such rapid APE effects are caused by response level interference.  
Thus, to summarize the results regarding automaticity of processing, the 
present thesis does find evidence for the unintentionality criterion of automaticity for 
emotional prosody perception, but only when prosody signals threat, as predicted by 
phylogenetically inspired models that propose a hard-wired neural system dedicated to 
the detection of social information that signals potential harm to the organism. Further, 
we find evidence for the rapid processing criterion of automaticity for happy and sad 
emotional prosody but not for affective music. Further, happy and sad prosody do not 
fulfill the unintentionality criterion of automaticity as measured with the affective 
priming paradigm. Thus, we do not find strong evidence for a dedicated system for the 
perception of emotional music. This (though somewhat tenuously) could be 
understood within the theory of evolution, if we assume that emotional music 
perception either had no fitness value or emerged too late in evolutionary history to 
prompt the evolution of a dedicated system. Also, we do not find evidence in favor of 
the ‘super-expressive voices’ hypothesis, as on the basis of this hypothesis we would 
have expected stronger affective priming effects for music than prosody. Further, the 
result that APEs for prosody do not persist when attention is diverted away from the 
affective dimension of the stimuli, suggests that automaticity for emotional prosody 
perception is relative (i.e. processes can be more or less automatic, but even relatively 




strong automatic processes will cease to operate when attentional resources are 
sufficiently depleted), as has been suggested previously (Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & 



































Figure 3. Final adaptation of the model presented in Figure 1 based on the 
insights gained from the present thesis regarding inter- and intrahemispheric 
models of prosody perception. White circles indicate the most likely neural 
substrate for stage-one, light grey circles for stage-two, and dark-grey circles for 
stage-three emotional prosody perception. Bold circles indicate right-hemispheric 
processing centers in the emotional prosody perception pathway where initial 
evidence has been found for greater activation likelihood as compared to their left 
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4.2.3. Modulation of activity in the emotional prosody perception network by alexithymia 
In the second empirical part of the present thesis, we asked whether the personality 
trait alexithymia might modulate processing within the emotional prosody perception 
network, and if so, whether relatively early (and possibly automatic) or relatively late 
emotional perception processes are associated with (normal variation in-) alexithymia.  
 In Chapter 3.1 we investigated whether alexithymia affects automatic 
processing of emotional prosody and music, as measured with the affective priming 
paradigm and concurrently recorded ERPs. Alexithymia did not significantly affect the 
behavioral APEs found during affective categorization. However, at the 
electrophysiological level alexithymia was associated with a reduced N400 component 
for affectively incongruent primes and targets. These results point to modulation by 
alexithymia of relatively automatic (and hence ‘early’) affective processing, without 
effects being evident at the behavioral level, possibly due to a higher level 
compensation mechanism. 
In Chapter 3.2, we examined using fMRI whether alexithymia modulated the 
neural response to emotional prosody when attention was directed at emotional 
prosody and when attention was not directed at emotional prosody. Alexithymia did 
again not affect behavioral performance. However, on the neural level alexithymia was 
associated with a reduced response of the amygdala and the STG to emotional prosody, 
both when attention was directed to emotional prosody and when attention was 
diverted from the emotional prosody. Activation of the IFG, however, was not affected 
by alexithymia. Thus, alexithymia seemed to be associated with a relatively early stage of 
emotional prosody perception (stage-one and two processing in the STG) but not with 
a relatively late stage (stage-three processing in the IFG). Further, in keeping with the 
ERP results presented in Chapter 3.1, while modulation of automatic affective 
processing by alexithymia is evident at the neural level, it does not translate into effects 
at the behavioral level.  
 Together, then, these two studies suggest that (non-clinical) alexithymia 
primarily modulates relatively early emotional prosody perception stages. In the only 
other study on modulation of neural processing of emotional prosody by alexithymia, 
however, both modulation of relatively early and late ERP components was found 
during attended and unattended emotional prosody perception (Goerlich, Aleman, & 
Martens, 2012), without translating into effects at the behavioral level. In a recent meta-
analysis of the neuroimaging literature on modulation of visual emotional processing by 
alexithymia (Van der Velde et al., 2013), it was found that alexithymia is associated with 
a decreased response of subcortical structures (such as the amygdala and the insula) but 
with an increased response of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The authors 
suggested that the decreased subcortical response might reflect disturbance of early 
emotional processing in individuals scoring high on alexithymia, while the increase in 
ACC activation may reflect a compensatory effort to allocate more attention to the 
emotional stimuli. Although admittedly speculative, this hypothesized primary early 
emotional deficit in combination with a higher order compensation mechanism may 
indeed explain the early emotional processing effects observed in this thesis, and why 
these effects do not translate into behavioral effects (due to higher level compensation). 
However, it should be noted that a limitation of the present research is that only 
modulation by normal (non-clinical) variation in alexithymia was studied and hence the 
conclusions may not generalize to clinical levels of alexithymia.  
 




4.3. Summary of conclusions 
We have started this concluding chapter by asking what network in the brain supports 
perception of prosody, how it does so, whether this network indeed sometimes processes 
prosody automatically, and if so, why this might be the case. Further, we asked whether 
alexithymia modulates processing in the emotional prosody network, and if so, whether 
early or late emotional processing is affected (or both). 
The series of studies reported in the first empirical section of this thesis 
suggest that a bilateral temporo-frontal network comprising the HG, m-STG, p-STG 
and IFG analyzes prosody in at least three processing steps. Within this network, there 
is relative acoustic specialization of the right HG and p-STG for emotional prosody 
perception but no hemispheric specialization for linguistic prosody perception. Further, 
automatic processing of emotional prosody can indeed be demonstrated (but not for 
emotional music) and is particularly evident for anger prosody, suggesting that such 
automatic processing may be supported by a hard-wired neural substrate that has 
evolved to detect (social) threat in order to avoid harm to the organism.  
Last, the studies reported in the second empirical section of this thesis 
confirmed that non-clinical variation in alexithymia modulates activity within the 
emotional prosody perception network. More specifically, alexithymia seems to 
primarily modulate early emotional prosody perception stages without translating into 
behavioral effects, pointing to a potential higher-level neural compensation mechanism.  
 
4.4. Future directions 
There are ample new avenues towards advancing our understanding of the cognitive 
neuroscience of prosody perception and its modulation by alexithymia. For instance, 
most of the neuroimaging literature to date has focused on emotional prosody 
perception. Future neuroimaging work could investigate to what extent the network 
identified in Figure 3 is also involved in various linguistic prosody functions. Regarding 
emotional prosody perception, it has hardly been directly tested yet whether there are 
indeed substantial structural and functional connections between the areas in Figure 3, 
and whether the information flow is indeed in the hypothesized directions. However, 
initial steps in this direction have been taken (Ethofer et al., 2013). Further, by 
combining the temporal resolution of ERPs and the spatial resolution of fMRI, it could 
be investigated whether the areas identified in Figure 3 are indeed active in early versus 
late stages of the prosody perception process as hypothesized. To gain knowledge 
regarding the necessity of the areas identified in Figure 3 for emotional and linguistic 
prosody perception, Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) could be employed to 
investigate whether inhibition of activity in these areas does indeed degrade 
performance as hypothesized. Indeed, initial steps in this direction have been taken as 
well (Hoekert, Vingerhoets, & Aleman, 2010). Regarding automaticity of emotional 
prosody perception, future studies could investigate, with more emotional categories in 
addition to anger and with further reduced levels of attention to emotional prosody, 
how robust automaticity of emotional perception is and whether it is indeed specific for 
anger. 
Last, concerning modulation within the prosody network by alexithymia, 
functional and structural connectivity studies may investigate whether alexithymia might 
be associated with altered structural connections between the ACC and early emotional 
prosody processing centers, and, using functional connectivity analyses, whether there 
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is altered control from the ACC over early emotional prosody processing centers along 
these pathways in alexithymia.  
Such new directions will undoubtedly further advance our understanding of 
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Hoe we iets zeggen – met welke toon, luidheid en spreeksnelheid – kan net zo belangrijk 
zijn als wat we zeggen (de verbale inhoud). Dit proefschrift richt zich op de vraag welk 
netwerk in de menselijke hersenen dergelijke ‘prosodische’ aspecten van spraak 
waarneemt en of de persoonlijkheidstrek alexithymie de waarneming van prosodie door 
dit neurale netwerk beïnvloedt. 
 Aan de hand van prosodie kunnen twee fundamenteel verschillende soorten 
informatie gecommuniceerd worden. Aan de ene kant kan prosodie gebruikt worden 
om emotionele informatie over te brengen – door de manier waarop we iets zeggen 
kunnen we bijvoorbeeld aangeven of we vrolijk zijn of boos. Aan de andere kant kan 
prosodie gebruikt worden om de taalkundige structuur van een spraakuiting over te 
brengen, door bijvoorbeeld aan te geven of een uiting een mededeling of juist een vraag 
is. Zowel emotionele als linguïstische prosodie maken gebruik van akoestische 
dimensies als fundamentele frequentie (toonhoogte), intensiteit (luidheid), duur en 
spectrale samenstelling om betekenis over te brengen. Dit proefschrift richt zich op de 
vraag welk netwerk in de menselijke hersenen deze twee communicatieve functies van 
prosodie analyseert en hoe (gebruik makend van welke opeenvolging van 
neurocognitieve bewerkingen).  
 Bijna iedereen zal beamen dat het moeilijk is om bijvoorbeeld een ruziënd stel 
in een restaurant te negeren – zelfs als we deze personen niet kunnen zien en niet 
kunnen verstaan. Deze observatie duidt erop dat het netwerk in onze hersenen dat 
emotionele prosodie analyseert, dit blijkbaar ook blijft doen als we niet de intentie 
hebben de emotionele prosodie te analyseren. In de experimentele psychologie worden 
dergelijke mentale processen die blijven optreden zelfs als men niet de intentie heeft het 
proces in te zetten, wel ‘automatisch’ genoemd. Een andere eigenschap van 
automatische processen is dat ze snel (efficiënt) zijn. Waarom zou waarneming van 
emotionele prosodie dan automatisch zijn? Darwin’s evolutietheorie biedt een 
mogelijke verklaring. Het nauwkeurig waar kunnen nemen van de emotionele prosodie 
(en daarmee de emotionele toestand) van soortgenoten zou in onze evolutionaire 
geschiedenis voordelig geweest kunnen zijn – het nauwkeurig vaststellen van boosheid 
van een dominant groepslid zou het verschil betekend kunnen hebben tussen leven en 
dood (en daarmee het verschil tussen het wel of niet doorgeven van de genen naar de 
volgende generatie). Omdat waarneming van emotionele prosodie hiermee 
waarschijnlijk ‘fitness value’ heeft gehad, zou er in de hersenen door selectieve 
evolutionaire druk een aangeboren systeem geëvolueerd kunnen zijn dat emotionele 
prosodie automatisch analyseert. Er is wel voorgesteld dat een dergelijk gespecialiseerd 
neuraal netwerk met name aannemelijk is voor dreigende prosodie (met andere 
woorden ‘boosheid’) omdat het mogelijk schade aan het organisme aangeeft (zodat de 
vermijding ervan ‘fitness value’ zou kunnen hebben). In dit proefschrift werd daarom 
onderzocht of automatische waarneming van emotionele prosodie kan worden 
aangetoond en of dergelijke automatische waarneming een algemene eigenschap is van 
emotionele prosodische perceptie of specifiek is voor boosheid.  
 Als automaticiteit van de waarneming van emotionele prosodie inderdaad 
verklaard kan worden door het bestaan van een geëvolueerd neuraal systeem dat 
gespecialiseerd is in de waarneming van emoties van soortgenoten, dan zouden we geen 




automatische waarneming verwachten van een veel recenter uitgevonden akoestisch 
signaal waarmee ook emotie kan worden gecommuniceerd – muziek. Aan de andere 
kant is er gesuggereerd dat ook muziek ‘fitness value’ heeft gehad zodat er mogelijk ook 
een gespecialiseerd neuraal systeem bestaat voor de waarneming van emotionele muziek. 
Een alternatieve hypothese die is voorgesteld is dat muziek haar krachtige emotionele 
vervoeringsvermogen ontleent aan het imiteren en vervolgens overdrijven van 
emotionele prosodie zodat het mogelijk door het voor emotionele prosodie 
gespecialiseerde neurale netwerk automatisch waargenomen kan worden. In dit 
proefschrift werd daarom waarneming van emotionele prosodie en muziek direct 
vergeleken en onderzocht of automaticiteit van waarneming voor beide akoestische 
media kan worden aangetoond. 
 Hoewel het netwerk dat in onze hersenen emotionele prosodie waarneemt in 
grote lijnen hetzelfde is voor verschillende personen, zijn er ook subtiele individuele 
verschillen in de waarneming van emotionele informatie. Een persoonlijkheidstrek die 
geassocieerd is met emotionele waarnemingsstijl is alexithymie. Mensen die hoog scoren 
op deze persoonlijkheidsdimensie hebben moeite met het herkennen, identificeren en 
het onder woorden brengen van emoties en worden daarom door de omgeving wel als 
‘koud’ of ‘afstandelijk’ gezien. Er is niet veel bekend over of alexithymie de waarneming 
van emotionele informatie in de hersenen beïnvloedt (en zo ja, hoe). Het lijkt echter 
waarschijnlijk dat alexithymie invloed heeft op de verwerking van emotionele prosodie 
in de hersenen. In dit proefschrift werd daarom tenslotte onderzocht of, en zo ja, in 
welke fase van het waarnemingsproces alexithymie de waarneming van prosodie in de 
hersenen beïnvloedt.  
 In Hoofdstuk 2.1 van dit proefschrift werd onderzocht of er verschillen zijn 
tussen de twee hersenhelften in het vermogen om emotionele en linguïstische prosodie 
waar te nemen, ofwel of er ‘hemisferische specialisatie’ is voor de waarneming van 
prosodie. Dit kan onderzocht worden door te onderzoeken of schade door een 
hersenbloeding in de ene hersenhelft de prestatie op prosodische waarnemingstaken 
meer verstoort dan vergelijkbare schade aan de andere hersenhelft vergeleken met 
gezonde controlepersonen. Uit een meta-analyse van dergelijke studies bleek dat schade 
aan beide hersenhelften zowel de waarneming van emotionele- als linguïstische 
prosodie verstoort. In het geval van emotionele prosodie leidt schade aan de rechter 
hemisfeer echter tot grotere achteruitgang in taakprestatie dan vergelijkbare schade aan 
de linker hemisfeer. Uit Hoofdstuk 2.1 bleek dus dat er relatieve rechtshemisferische 
specialisatie is voor de waarneming van emotionele prosodie, terwijl er voor 
linguïstische prosodie geen hemisferische specialisatie kan worden aangetoond.  
 In Hoofdstuk 2.2 werd onderzocht hoe hemisferische specialisatie voor de 
waarneming van prosodie zou kunnen ontstaan. Eén mogelijkheid is dat de rechter 
hersenhelft beter is in het analyseren van de akoestische eigenschappen van emotionele 
prosodie dan de linker hersenhelft. Een andere mogelijkheid is dat de rechter 
hersenhelft beter is in het op meer abstracte wijze analyseren van emotionele informatie. 
In Hoofdstuk 2.2 werden daarom identieke onzinwoorden aangeboden aan twee 
groepen proefpersonen. De onzinwoorden hadden klemtoon op de eerste- of de 
tweede lettergreep en tegelijkertijd treurige of boze prosodie. De ene groep 
proefpersonen moest de linguïstische prosodie categoriseren, en de andere groep juist 
de emotionele prosodie. Tijdens het categoriseren van de onzinwoorden werd 
elektrische activiteit van de hersenen gemeten met elektro-encefalografie. Als alleen de 




hemisferische specialisatie bepaalt, dan zouden we voor de groep proefpersonen die de 
onzinwoorden naar emotie categoriseert grotere activiteit over de rechter dan linker 
hersenhelft moeten zien, maar voor de groep proefpersonen die dezelfde woorden talig 
(naar klemtoon) analyseert niet. Er werd echter geen verschil in activiteit tussen de 
hersenhelften gevonden voor beide groepen. Uit Hoofdstuk 2.2 bleek dus dat rechts 
hemisferische specialisatie niet goed verklaard kan worden door superioriteit van de 
rechter hersenhelft in het op abstractere wijze analyseren van emotionele informatie 
maar waarschijnlijk eerder door specialisatie in de waarneming van de akoestische 
kenmerken van emotionele prosodie. 
 In Hoofdstuk 2.3 werd onderzocht welk netwerk in de menselijke hersenen 
betrokken is bij de waarneming van emotionele prosodie. Eerder onderzoek had 
gesuggereerd dat de waarneming van emotionele prosodie in drie fases verloopt. In een 
eerste fase zouden elementaire akoestische eigenschappen van emotionele prosodie 
verwerkt worden in Heschl’s gyrus (HG) en het middelste deel van de superieure 
temporale gyrus (m-STG). In een tweede fase zouden vervolgens deze akoestische 
eigenschappen geïntegreerd worden tot meer abstracte representaties. Het was echter 
niet duidelijk of deze fase plaatsvindt in de anterieure superieure temporale gyrus (a-
STG) of de posterieure superieure temporale gyrus (p-STG). In een laatste fase zou 
emotionele prosodie abstract geëvalueerd worden en geïntegreerd met andere aspecten 
van de uiting (zoals de semantische betekenis) in de inferieure frontale gyrus (IFG). In 
Hoofdstuk 2.3 werd een meta-analyse van de functionele MRI (fMRI-) literatuur 
uitgevoerd om te onderzoeken welk netwerk daadwerkelijk bij de waarneming van 
emotionele prosodie is betrokken. Het bleek dat HG en m-STG enerzijds en IFG 
anderzijds inderdaad betrokken waren bij respectievelijk de eerste en laatste fase van het 
waarnemingsproces. Voorts bleek dat de p-STG en niet de a-STG waarschijnlijk het 
neurale substraat is van de tweede fase van emotionele prosodiewaarneming. 
Overeenkomstig de bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 2.1 werd gevonden dat beide 
hersenhelften betrokken zijn bij de waarneming van emotionele prosodie, maar dat er 
grotere betrokkenheid is van de rechter hersenhelft, wederom duidend op een relatieve 
rechtshemisferische specialisatie voor emotionele prosodie. Deze grotere 
rechtshemisferische betrokkenheid werd echter alleen gevonden voor HG en p-STG, 
wat suggereert dat hemisferische specialisatie voor emotionele prosodie verklaard kan 
worden door specialisatie van de rechter hemisfeer voor de waarneming van akoestische 
eigenschappen van emotionele prosodie, overeenkomstig de conclusie uit Hoofdstuk 
2.2.   
In Hoofdstuk 2.4 werd onderzocht of automaticiteit van waarneming kan 
worden aangetoond voor emotionele prosodie, en of dergelijke automaticiteit specifiek 
is voor dreigende prosodie (boosheid) of een algemene eigenschap is van emotionele 
prosodiewaarneming. Hiertoe werden proefpersonen twee taken aangeboden met 
identiek materiaal terwijl de hersenactiviteit werd gemeten met fMRI. Tijdens de eerste 
taak moesten proefpersonen categoriseren of de emotionele prosodie van 
onzinwoorden neutraal, verrast of boos klonk. Voor de tweede taak moesten 
proefpersonen een andere dimensie van dezelfde onzinwoorden beoordelen. Als we nu 
in gebieden zowel tijdens de eerste- als de tweede taak activiteit zien, is dit een 
aanwijzing dat in deze gebieden er automatische verwerking van emotionele prosodie 
plaatsvindt (want blijkbaar blijven deze gebieden ook emotionele prosodie analyseren 
als men niet de intentie heeft de emotionele prosodie te analyseren, aangezien men de 
instructie heeft gekregen om een andere dimensie van dezelfde stimulus te 




categoriseren). Het bleek dat er inderdaad automatische verwerking van emotionele 
prosodie aangetoond kon worden in de superieure temporale gyrus (STG), maar alleen 
voor boosheid. Hiermee zijn de resultaten uit Hoofdstuk 2.4 in overeenstemming met 
het idee van een geëvolueerd neuraal substraat voor de automatische waarneming van 
dreigend gevaar uit menselijk stemgeluid (d.w.z. boosheid).  
In Hoofdstuk 2.5 werd onderzocht of er ook automatische waarneming van 
emotionele muziek kan worden aangetoond. Een ander kenmerk van automatische 
waarneming (dan het optreden van het waarnemingsproces zelfs als men niet de 
intentie heeft emotionele prosodie te analyseren) is dat automatische waarneming zeer 
snel plaatsvindt. Het zogenaamde ‘affective priming paradigma’ kan gebruikt worden 
om te testen of er inderdaad snelle waarneming plaatsvindt van emotionele prosodie of 
muziek. Binnen dit paradigma wordt eerst treurige of vrolijke emotionele prosodie of 
muziek gepresenteerd (de ‘affectieve prime’). Vlak (200 milliseconden) daarna wordt 
een emotioneel woord gepresenteerd dat positief of negatief is. De woorden kunnen 
dus emotioneel congruent zijn met de affectieve prime (bv. vrolijke muziek en het 
woord ‘GELUK’) of emotioneel incongruent (bv. vrolijke muziek en het woord ‘PIJN’). 
Proefpersonen moeten zo snel mogelijk beoordelen of een woord positief of negatief is. 
Als emotionele prosodie en muziek nu inderdaad snel (in minder dan 200 milliseconden) 
verwerkt worden, dan zouden deze affectieve primes de snelheid van het 
categorisatieproces moeten kunnen beïnvloeden, met een langzamere responsie voor 
incongruente dan congruente paren. Dit wordt het ‘affectieve priming effect (APE)’ 
genoemd. In Hoofdstuk 2.5 werd dit paradigma daarom toegepast terwijl de elektrische 
activiteit van de hersenen werd gemeten. Uit zowel de reactietijden als de metingen van 
elektrische hersenactiviteit bleek dat er wel automaticiteit van waarneming van 
emotionele prosodie kon worden aangetoond maar niet voor de waarneming van 
emotionele muziek. Als proefpersonen echter werden gevraagd een andere (niet 
affectieve-) dimensie van de woorden te beoordelen, verdwenen ook voor emotionele 
prosodie de aanwijzingen voor automaticiteit van waarneming. De resultaten van 
Hoofdstuk 2.5 bevestigen dus de conclusie uit Hoofdstuk 2.4 dat er automatische 
waarneming is van emotionele prosodie, maar ondersteunen niet de hypothese dat er 
vergelijkbare automatische waarneming is voor muziek. Hoewel strikt genomen 
speculatief, komt deze afwezigheid van automatische verwerking van emotionele 
muziek overeen met het idee dat waarneming van emotionele muziek (in tegenstelling 
tot emotionele prosodie) mogelijk geen ‘fitness value’ heeft gehad in de evolutionaire 
geschiedenis van de mens zodat er geen gespecialiseerd neuraal substraat voor is 
geëvolueerd. Voorts suggereren de resultaten dat automaticiteit voor de waarneming 
van emotionele prosodie relatief is – als de aandacht van de emotionele dimensie wordt 
afgeleid, zien we geen snelle (automatische-) waarneming meer van vrolijke en treurige 
prosodie.  
 In het tweede empirische deel van dit proefschrift werd onderzocht of de 
persoonlijkheidstrek alexithymie de waarneming van emotionele prosodie in de 
hersenen beïnvloedt, en zo ja hoe, d.w.z. in welke fase van het verwerkingsproces.  
In Hoofdstuk 3.1 werd onderzocht of alexithymie de automatische 
waarneming van emotionele prosodie beïnvloedt zoals gemeten met het affectieve 
priming paradigma in Hoofdstuk 2.5. Alexithymie bleek niet de gedragsresultaten te 
beïnvloeden. Op neuraal niveau was er echter een reductie te zien van de 
elektrofysiologische index van automaticiteit van emotionele prosodiewaarneming door 




waarneming van emotionele prosodie beïnvloedt zonder dat dit ook is terug te zien op 
gedragsniveau, mogelijk door strategische compensatie.  
In Hoofdstuk 3.2 werd onderzocht of alexithymie de verwerking van 
emotionele prosodie beïnvloedt zoals onderzocht in Hoofdstuk 2.4. Het bleek dat 
alexithymie op gedragsniveau opnieuw geen invloed had. Op neuraal niveau bleek 
alexithymie echter gepaard te gaan met een verminderde responsie van de amygdala en 
de STG op emotionele prosodie, terwijl activiteit van de IFG niet werd beïnvloed. Deze 
resultaten duiden er weer op dat alexithymie met name vroege fases van het 
waarnemingsproces beïnvloedt. Het feit dat alexithymie de gedragsresultaten niet 
beïnvloedde suggereert dat er vervolgens mogelijk een strategisch compensatie-
mechanisme wordt ingezet om voor dit tekort te compenseren.  
 Concluderend wijzen de resultaten uit dit proefschrift erop dat een bilateraal 
netwerk, bestaande uit HG, m-STG, p-STG en IFG, (emotionele) prosodie in drie 
verwerkingsstappen waarneemt. Hierbij is er geen hemisferische specialisatie voor 
linguïstische prosodie maar wel relatieve rechtshemisferische specialisatie voor de 
waarneming van emotionele prosodie. Het is aannemelijk dat deze relatieve rechts-
hemisferische specialisatie voor de waarneming van emotionele prosodie verklaard 
wordt door specialisatie voor de waarneming van de akoestische eigenschappen van 
emotionele prosodie in de HG en p-STG. Voorts kan inderdaad automatische 
waarneming van emotionele prosodie worden aangetoond, met name voor dreigende 
prosodie (overeenkomstig met fylogenetisch geïnspireerde modellen van automaticiteit 
van emotionele prosodiewaarneming) maar niet voor emotionele muziek. 
Automaticiteit van de waarneming van emotionele prosodie voor vrolijke en treurige 
prosodie blijkt echter relatief te zijn – er zijn geen aanwijzingen voor snelle verwerking 
van deze categorieën van emotionele prosodie als de aandacht van de emotionele 
prosodie wordt afgeleid. Tenslotte blijkt alexithymie inderdaad de waarneming van 
emotionele prosodie in het hierboven beschreven netwerk te beïnvloeden. Hierbij lijken 
met name vroege (en mogelijk automatische-) fases van het waarnemingsproces 
beïnvloed te worden zonder dat er ook op gedragsniveau effecten te zien zijn. Dit 
patroon van resultaten wijst op mogelijke secundaire strategische compensatie voor een 
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